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.. /I found an
announcement/not the woman's
bloated body in the river/floating
not the child bleeding in the
59th street corridor/not the baby
broken on the floor/
"there is some concern
that alleged battered women
might start to murder their
husbands and lovers with no
immediate cause"1
INTRODUCTION
I am writing about women's lives. Our lives, like everyone's, are
lived within particular cultures that both reflect legal structures and
affect legal interpretation. Focusing on domestic violence, this article
describes an interrelationship between women's lives, culture, and law.
This relationship is not linear (moving from women's lives to law, or
from law to life) but interactive: cultural assumptions about domestic
violence affect substantive law and methods of litigation in ways that
in turn affect society's perceptions of women; both law and societal
perceptions affect women's understanding of our own lives, relation-
ships, and options; our lives are part of the culture that affects legal
interpretation and within which further legal moves are made. Serious
harm to women results from the ways in which law and culture distort
our experience.
The courtroom is the theater in which the dramas of battered wo-
men have been brought to public attention. Trials like that of
Francine Hughes, whose story became the book and movie The Burn-
ing Bed,2 create a cultural and legal spotlight that has in some ways
benefited women by increasing public knowledge of the existence of
domestic violence. However, the press has emphasized sensational
cases that have a high level of terrorism against women and a gro-
1. Ntozake Shange, With No Immediate Cause, in FAMILY VIOLENCE: POEMS ON THE PA-
THOLOGY 66, 67 (Mary McAnally ed., 1982).
2. FAITH MCNULTY, THE BURNING BED (1980).
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tesque quality of abuse.3 These cases come to define a cultural image
of domestic violence, and the women in these cases define an image of
battered women.
These images disguise the commonality of violence against women.
Up to one half of all American women - and approximately two
thirds of women who are separated or divorced - report having ex-
perienced physical assault in their relationships. 4 However, litigation
and judicial decisionmaking in cases of severe violence reflect implicit
or explicit assumptions that domestic violence is rare or exceptional.5
For actors in the courtroom drama, the fiction that such violence is
exceptional allows denial of the ways in which domestic violence has
touched their own lives.6 Perhaps most damagingly, the fiction of ex-
ceptionality also increases the capacity of women to deny that the sto-
ries told in the publicized courtroom dramas have anything to do with
our own lives. Therefore, it limits the help we may seek when we
encounter trouble, the charges we are willing to file, our votes as jurors
when charges have been filed by or against others, and our conscious-
ness of the meaning of the struggles and dangers of our own
experience.
Although domestic violence is important in many areas of legal
doctrine, including family law and torts, the criminal justice system
places the greatest pressures on cultural images of battered women.
The self-defense cases in which women kill their batterers are small in
number compared to the overall universe of domestic violence,7 yet
they are highly emotionally charged as well as highly publicized. In
many states, the right to expert testimony on behalf of these defen-
dants has been won through much dedicated feminist litigation.8 The
justification for admitting expert testimony is determined in large part
by cultural perceptions of women and of battering; therefore, many
points made by experts respond to just these cultural perceptions.9
3. See Julie Blackman, Emerging Images of Severely Battered Women and the Criminal Jus-
tice System, 8 BEHAVIORAL Sc. & L. 121 (1990). Women who kill their batterers are likely to
have experienced extremely severe violence during the course of their marriages. See ANGELA
BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WoMEN KILL (1987).
4. For discussion of the estimates of the incidence of domestic violence in the United States,
see infra text accompanying notes 36-44.
5. See, e.g., quotations given in text and cases cited at notes 153-69 infra.
6. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing influence on courtroom partici-
pants of their own experiences of violence).
7. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
8. See eg., State v. Kelly: Amicus Briefis 9 WOMEN'S R s. L. REP. 245 (1986).
9. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984) ("[Expert testimony] is aimed at an
area where the purported common knowledge of the jury may be very much mistaken ... an area
where expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard their prior conclusions as being
common myths rather than common knowledge."); see infra text accompanying notes 153-69
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Yet the expert testimony on battered woman syndrome and learned
helplessness can interact with and perpetuate existing oppressive ste-
reotypes of battered women.10
Academic expertise on women has thus become crucial to the legal
explanation of women's actions and the legal construction of women's
experience. Psychological analysis, in particular, has responded to the
sharp demand for explanation of women's actions in the self-defense
cases. Yet the sociological and psychological literature still reflect
some of the oppressive cultural heritage that has shaped legal doc-
trines.12 Even when expertise is developed by feminists who explain
that women act rationally under circumstances of oppression, courts
and the press often interpret feminist expert testimony through the
lens of cultural stereotypes, retelling a simpler vision of women as vic-
tims too helpless or dysfunctional to pursue a reasonable course of
action.1 3 These retold stories affect other areas of law, such as custody
cases, which share the problems of professional evaluation of women
and the incorporation of cultural stereotypes.14 The portrait of bat-
tered women as pathologically weak - the court's version of what
feminists have told them - therefore holds particular dangers for bat-
tered women with children.
Legal pressures thus distort perceptions of violence in ways that
(expert testimony based on issue being beyond jury's ken). A telling example of the relationship
between the need for expert testimony and the points made by experts is the issue of women's
"failure" to leave violent relationships. Many cases review the jury's common-sense belief that
women can and will leave violent relationships freely. The experts explain the women's incapac-
ity and failure as a function of many factors, especially the psychology of abused women and
traditionalism about the family. Se4 eg., People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361-62 (Sup. Ct.
1985); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 370-73.
10. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and
the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering 9 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 195 (1986); Lenore
Walker, A Response to Elizabeth M. Schneiders Describing and Changing, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 223-25 (1986).
11. For example, see three recent books on this subject: JULIE BLACKMAN, INTIMATE VIo-
LENCE (1989); CYNTHIA GILLESPIE, JUsIFIABLE HOMICIDE (1989); LENORE WALKER, TERRI-
FYING LOva (1989).
12. Compare R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIvEs 193-
99 (1979) (describing traditional psychological approaches) and EDWARD GONDOLF & ELLEN
FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURViVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS 13-15 (1988) (describing psychological views of women as masochistic) with
DOBASH & DOBASH, supra, at 211-26 (criticizing the legal system).
13. Schneider, supra note 10, at 198.
14. In contested custody decisions, for example, women are also at risk that either too little
strength or too much strength may be held against them. See generally PHYLLIS CHESLER,
MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN AND CUSTODY (1986). Therefore, the por-
trait of battered women as pathologically weak - the courts' version of what feminists have told
them - may disserve battered mothers seeking custody. Myra Sun & Elizabeth Thomas, Cus-
tody Litigation on Behalfof Battered Women, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 563, 570 (1987); Laura
Crites & Donna Coker, What Therapists See That Judges May Miss, JUDGES J., Spring 1988, at 8,
13 (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 223-25.
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create real problems for women. Many of us cannot recognize our
experience in the cultural picture that develops under the influence of
legal processes. The consequence is that we understand ourselves less,
our society less, and our oppression less, as our capacity to identify
with battered women diminishes ("I'm not like that"). Before the
feminist activism of the early 1970s brought battering to public atten-
tion, society generally denied that domestic violence existed.' 5 Now,
culturally, we know what it is, and we are sure it is not us.
Recent feminist work on battering points to the struggle for power
and control - the batterer's quest for control of the woman - as the
heart of the battering process. 16 Case law and the popular conscious-
ness that grows from it have submerged the question of control by
psychologizing the recipient of the violence 17 or by equating women's
experience of violence with men's experience.18 We urgently need to
develop legal and social explanations of women's experience that illu-
minate the issue of violence as part of the issue of power, rather than
perpetuating or exacerbating the images that now conceal questions of
domination and control.
As one example of a strategic effort to change both law and cul-
ture, this article proposes that we seek to redefine in both law and
popular culture the issue of women's separation from violent relation-
ships. 19 The question "why didn't she leave?" shapes both social and
legal inquiry on battering; much of the legal reliance on academic ex-
pertise on battered women has developed in order to address this ques-
tion. At the moment of separation or attempted separation - for
many women, the first encounter with the authority of law20 - the
batterer's quest for control often becomes most acutely violent and
15. See infra text accompanying note 94 (discussing the role of feminist activists in bringing
national attention to domestic violence).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 131-35.
17. See GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 12, at 1-3 (describing "psychologizing" of domestic
violence).
18. See Phyllis Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill in Self-
Defense 8 HARV. WOM 's LJ. 121 (1985); see also GILLESPIE, supra note 11, at 115-17 (dis-
cussing women's and men's differing experiences of violence in layperson's terms).
19. Redefining separation must include rethinking many assumptions - that it is the wo-
man's job to separate from a battering relationship, that separation is the appropriate choice for
all women when violence first occurs within a relationship, that appropriate separation is an
immediate and final break rather than the process of repeated temporary separations made by
many women - as well as identifying the violent assault on women's attempts to separate.
20. These encounters may take many forms, including the attempt to have a violent partner
arrested, the filing of a temporary restraining order or legal separation, or the rush to find legal
counsel because the partner has threatened to take custody of the children. See. ag., infra text
accompanying notes 200-01 (discussing custody litigation).
October 1991]
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potentially lethal.21 Ironically, although the proliferation of shelters22
and the elaboration of statutory structures facilitating the grant of pro-
tective orders23 vividly demonstrate both socially and legally the dan-
gers attendant on separation, a woman's "failure" to permanently
separate from a violent relationship is still widely held to be mysteri-
ous and in need of explanation, an indicator of her pathology rather
than her batterer's. We have had neither cultural names nor legal doc-
trines specifically tailored to the particular assault on a woman's body
and volition that seeks to block her from leaving, retaliate for her de-
parture, or forcibly end the separation. I propose that we name this
attack "separation assault."
Separation assault is the common though invisible thread that
unites the equal protection suits on enforcement of temporary re-
straining orders, the cases with dead women that appear in many doc-
trinal categories,24 and the cases with dead men - the self-defense
cases. As with other assaults on women that were not cognizable until
the feminist movement named and explained them,25 separation as-
sault must be identified before women can recognize our own experi-
ence and before we can develop legal rules to deal with this particular
sort of violence. Naming one particular aspect of the violence then
illuminates the rest: for example, the very concept of "acquaintance
rape" moves consciousness away from the stereotype of rape (assault
by a stranger)26 and toward a focus on the woman's volition (violation
of her will, "consent"). Similarly, by emphasizing the urgent control
moves that seek to prevent the woman from ending the relationship,
21. See Desmond Ellis, Post-Separation Woman Abuse: The Contribution of Lawyers as
"Barracudas," "Advocates," and "Counsellor" 10 INTL. J.L. & PSYCHiATRY 403, 408 (1987),
Many authors note the dangers of this period. See, eg., GiLLESPIE, supra note 11, at 150-52;
ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 298-99 (1980).
22. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 12, at 1.
23. Id.
24. These cases are often concerned with the mental state or sentences of the murderer. See,
e-g., infra text accompanying notes 325-26, 351-57 (discussing provocation and manslaughter).
Another example appears in several Ninth Circuit cases on competency to plead guilty, including
Darrow v. Gunn, 594 F.2d 767, 771 n.6 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 444 U.S. 849 (1979) (wife mur-
der); Sailer v. Gunn, 548 F.2d 271, 273 (9th Cir. 1977) (attempted murder of estranged wife); de
Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977) (wife
murder).
25. The example I discuss below is "date rape." See infra text accompanying notes 304-05.
Sexual harassment is another such example. In her book Sexual Harassment of Working Wo-
men, Catharine MacKinnon defined sexual harassment in terms of power and inequality ("sexual
harassment... refers to the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power") and argued that sexual harassment was sex discrimination.
CATHARINE MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1, 4 (1979). Within a
decade, this argument had transformed both sex discrimination law and cultural understanding
of sexual harassment.
26. SuSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 3-4 (1987).
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the concept of separation assault raises questions that inevitably focus
additional attention on the ongoing struggle for power and control in
the relationship.
Because of the interactive relationships between law and culture in
this area, law reform requires such an approach to simultaneously
reshape cultural understanding. Separation assault is particularly easy
to grasp because it responds to prevailing cultural and legal inquiry
("why didn't she leave") with a twist emphasizing the batterer's vio-
lent quest for control. However, meaningful change requires rethink-
ing the entire relationship of law and culture in the field of domestic
violence and developing many approaches to revealing power and con-
trol. Otherwise, since separation assault is so resonant with existing
cultural stereotypes, it may be understood as justifying or excusing the
voman's failure to leave rather than challenging and reshaping legal
and social attitudes that now place this burden on the woman.
To illustrate the contrast between women's lives and legal and cul-
tural stereotypes, and to accomplish a translation between women's
lives and law, this article offers narratives and poems from the lives of
survivors of domestic violence, and a few from the stories of non-
survivors, as part of its analysis and argument. 27 Seven women's sto-
ries have come to me through their own accounts.2 Five of these have
27. Conversations with women are cited several times in the footnotes of this article. Partic-
ularly thoughtful input has come from Kim Hanson and Donna Coker. This citation form is
deliberately chosen and consistent with the method of the article. Each citation credits the wo-
man with an original thought or contribution that has not appeared in a form suitable for con-
ventional citation as this article goes to press.
There are three reasons for my choice of citation form. The first is honesty: when other
women who have not yet published scholarly work have offered me so much of their best thought
- and it has become so deeply part of my own best thought - I must either falsely claim their
ideas as my own or credit them as they spoke. The second reason is methodological: much of
feminist theory, and much of the strength women draw upon for survival, grows out of conversa-
tions with each other. This is, for example, the fundamental method of consciousness-raising.
See ag., Ronnie Lichtman, Consciousness Raising - 1970, in THE FEMALE EXPERIENcE 456
(Gerda Lerner ed., 1977). For a discussion of consciousness-raising and its role in feminist
method, see, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes,
41 STAN. L. REv. 751 (1989) (reviewing CATHAPINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED
(1987)).
Finally, the third reason for citing women's conversations is political: women may not have
published their thoughts because of constraints on their time and effort imposed by uniquely
womanly responsibilities. This article had its roots in conversations between Kim Hanson and
myself, neighbors in family student housing, when I was a first-year and she a third-year law
student at Stanford. Our children played together, and we talked around them over the back
fence, encountering each other while hanging laundry, while carrying groceries in from the car.
This work is in part the product of that shared work and thought. Since then, Kim has litigated
for a major law firm, started her own firm, become known as a battered women's advocate, and
remarried. She has had two more babies since we first met. I hope some day she writes her own
articles. Until then, I acknowledge her thought in my work as a way of acknowledging her work
as part of my own.
28. These are women who talked with me or sought me out for help over the past several
years. One was my next-door neighbor at Stanford; another sought me out during my second
October 1991]
Michigan Law Review
at some time identified themselves as battered women.29 Three of
these women were Stanford Law School students or graduates; an-
other was an undergraduate student at Stanford. One was an acquain-
tance in a support group. One is black, the rest are white. All but two
were mothers when the violence occurred. Though our class back-
grounds vary, only one was a highly educated professional before the
battering incidents described, but several have acquired academic de-
grees since the marriages ended. The other women's voices in this
paper are drawn from identified published sources.
One of these stories is my own. I do not feel like a "battered wo-
man."'30 Really, I want to say that I am not, since the phrase conjures
up an image that fails to describe either my marriage or my sense of
myself. It is a difficult claim to make for several reasons: the gap
between my self-perceived competence and strength and my own im-
age of battered women, the inevitable attendant loss of my own denial
of painful experience, and the certainty that the listener cannot hear
such a claim without filtering it through a variety of derogatory stereo-
types. 31 However, the definitions of battered women have broad con-
tours,32 at least some of which encompass my experience and the
experiences of the other strong, capable women whose stories are in-
cluded here.
In fact, women often emphasize that they do not fit their own ste-
reotypes of the battered woman:
The first thing I would tell you is that very little happened. I am not
one of those women who stayed and stayed to be beaten. It is very im-
portant to me not to be mistaken for one of them, I wouldn't take it.
Besides, I never wanted to be the one who tells you what it was really
like.
The rejection of stereotypes, the fear of being identified with these ste-
year of law school, six months after I gave a talk for incoming women students about emotional
reactions to the materials in casebooks. When I relate these women's stories, I do not include
specific citations.
29. Most did not generally use the term when describing themselves.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 86-92 (this term labels the woman instead of the pro-
cess or the man), and infra note 93. I would prefer some term that lets us discuss stereotyping
without hopelessly dooming the discourse from the start. However, I think it is important to
overcome our fear of the stigma and stereotype that come with the term "battered woman," so I
accept it for this paper.
31. I fear derogatory stereotypes of myself and of my ex-husband and of that marriage. See
generally infra text accompanying notes 86-93; see also Liz Kelly, How Women Define Their
Experiences of Violence in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WiFE ABUSE 114, 116 (Kersti Yllo &
Michele Bograd eds., 1988) (meaning of terms like "rape" and "battering" often taken for
granted).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 110-36 (critique of definitions of battering and bat-
tered women).
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reotypes, is expressed by lesbian women as well as heterosexual
women:
First I want you to know that I am an assertive and powerful wo-
man. I do not fit my stereotype of a battered woman. I am telling you
this because I never thought it could happen to me. Most lesbians I
know who have been battered impress me with their presence and
strength. None of them fit my stereotype. Do not think that what hap-
pened to me could not happen to you. 33
Although there is relatively little published material on lesbian bat-
tering, this literature can shed light on the ways in which we concep-
tualize the battering process. Although lesbian battering is similar to
heterosexual battering, the analysis of lesbian battering is unique in
two ways that are significant for this paper: it has been generated en-
tirely by feminist activists, and it has developed in isolation from the
legal system. Therefore, it provides one clue to the question, "[W]hat
would this... landscape look like if women had constructed it for
ourselves?" 34
Part I of this article discusses violence in the ordinary lives of wo-
men, describing individual and societal denial that pretends domestic
violence is rare when statistics show it is common,35 and describing
the ways in which motherhood shapes women's experience of violence
and choices in response to violence. Part II examines definitions of
battering and evaluates their effectiveness at disguising or revealing the
struggle for control at the heart of the battering process. I then de-
scribe in Part III the pressures that self-defense and custody cases
place on legal and cultural images of battered women and contrast the
development of an analysis of lesbian battering, an analysis generated
outside the legal system. In Part IV, I discuss battering as a struggle
for power and control and show how legal analysis can help reveal the
control issue by naming separation assault and building litigation
33. Arlene Istar, The Healing Comes Slowly, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT
ABOUT LESBIAN BATMRING 163, 164 (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986) [hereinafter NAMING THE
VIOLENCE].
34. Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives
on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CI. LEGAL F. 23, 30 (1989) (paraphrasing Heather R.
Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, I BERKELEY WO-
MEN'S L.. 64, 75 (1985) ("In an ideal world, what would this woman's life situation look like,
and what relationship, if any, would the law have to this future life situation?")).
35. Denial is a potent force that operates on at least four levels: at a broad societal level that
shields the institution of marriage (we do not recognize the pervasiveness of violence and its
normal occurrence within marriage), among men who wish to protect their privilege or deny
their own battering, among individual women who are not currently battered or who believe they
are not ("I wouldn't be like that"), and in women who admit experiencing domestic violence but
minimize their estimates of its harm to themselves as part of survival and coping mechanisms.
See generally infra text accompanying notes 47-73.
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strategies to redefine the issue separation. Finally, in Part V, I identify
separation assault in the cases where women have been killed or
harmed, as well as cases in which women killed in self-defense, and
explain how the concept of separation assault is consistent with the
particular needs of expert testimony in the self-defense cases. I
demonstrate how naming separation assault can intervene in the inter-
relationship between law and culture in the field of domestic violence
to change both the questions asked and the answers found by courts in
several areas of law.
I. VIOLENCE AND THE ORDINARY LIvEs OF WOMEN
A. The Prevalence of Violence and the Phenomenon of Denial
Most people I have known who have been abused in marriage have come
out - once burned, twice shy. But that doesn't mean fire's not hot. But
people treat marriage and relationships and love, in our society, as if
fire's not hot.
Statistics show that domestic violence is extremely widespread in
American society. Exact figures on its incidence are difficult to come
by. Some studies have counted incidents of violence by or against
either spouse regardless of context and found a nearly equal incidence
of violence by men and women.36 Other studies show that women are
far more frequently victimized than men,37 and that women's violence
is almost always in self-defense and generally less severe than their
partner's.38 The most conservative figures estimate that women are
physically abused in twelve percent of all marriages, 39 and some schol-
ars estimate that as many as fifty percent4° or more41 of all women will
36. MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN
FAMILY (1980).
37. In New Jersey, wives or girlfriends were victims in 85% of all reported domestic violent
offenses. Gail A. Goolkasian, Confronting Domestic Violenca" A Guide for Criminal Justice
Agencies in U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE REP. (1986).
38. Daniel G. Saunders, Wife Abuse Husband Abuse, or Mutual Combat? A Feminist Per-
spective on the Empirical FindingS in FEMINIST PERSPECTrIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 31,
at 90, 103-08.
39. STRAUS ET AL., supra note 36, at 36.
40. LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 19 (1979) [hereinafter LENORE WALKER].
The 50% estimate is weighed and accepted by Christine A. Littleton. Littleton, supra note 34, at
28 n.19. For the reasons articulated by Littleton, and from the stories told to me by women, the
50% figure seems reasonable to me as well.
41. JENNIFER B. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE 155 (1979), quoted in Achieving Equal
Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, in ADVISORY COMM. ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS, CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND
MEN IN THE COURTS pt. 6, at 3 (draft Mar. 23, 1990) [hereinafter Achieving Equal Justice]
(estimating 60% of married women experience domestic violence at some time during their mar-
riages); SImERHOOD Is GLOBAL, 703 (Robin Morgan ed., 1984) (50%-70% of women experi-
ence battering during marriage).
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be battering victims at some point in their lives. Accurate estimates
are difficult,42 in part because of the likelihood of underreporting. 43
However, using any of these estimates, marriages that include violence
against the woman represent a relatively widespread phenomenon in
our society.44
Although these statistics are widely reproduced, there is little so-
cial or legal recognition that domestic violence has touched the lives of
many people in this society and must be known to many people. Judi-
cial opinions, for example, treat domestic violence as aberrant and un-
usual: "a unique and almost mysterious area of human response and
behavior, 45 "beyond the ken of the average lay [person]." 46 This rad-
ical discrepancy between the "mysterious" character of domestic vio-
lence and repeatedly gathered statistics reflects massive denial
throughout society and the legal system.
Denial is a defense mechanism well recognized in psychology that
protects people from consciously knowing things they cannot bear to
reckon with at the time.47 A powerful if undiscussed force affecting
42. The incidence of domestic violence is hard to determine, in part because it takes place
within the home, and in part because the many studies in the field present statistical information
that is not directly comparable with that in other studies. Some focus on the number of women
who are victims of spouse abuse: estimates of women physically abused by husbands or boy-
friends in the United States range from 1.5 million, BROWNE, supra note 3, at 5, to 3-4 million,
Mary Pat Bryger, Domestic Violence: The Dark Side of Divorce, FAM. ADVOCATE, Summer
1990, at 48. Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz studied violence against spouses of either gender and
found that more than 1.7 million Americans at some time faced a spouse wielding a knife or gun.
STRAus ET AL., supra note 36, at 34.
43. BROWNE, supra note 3, at 4-5 (citing studies by Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz and the
Louis Harris organization). Self-reports may undercount significantly. See generally DIANA E.
RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 96-101 (1982) (reviewing statistical techniques and results of
several surveys on domestic violence).
44. Stating violence is normal does not mean it is normative or culturally accepted, as it once
was. See DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 12, at 48-74, for a discussion of violence that was
historically part of control of women within marriage. Violence against women was an early
focus of feminist protest and efforts at reform. By the mid-nineteenth century, contrary to some
popular stereotypes, wifebeating was already considered "a disreputable, seamy practice'; it was
illegal in most states by the 1870s. LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE
POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 255 (1988). Although today domestic violence is
indeed "disreputable," that does not mean that it has disappeared in fact - only that the com-
monality of its occurrence in normal marriage is widely denied.
45. See, e-g., Sinns v. State, 283 S.E.2d 479, 481 (Ga. 1981) (explaining Smith v. State, 277
S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1980)).
46. See, eg., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1983).
47. The American Psychiatric Association defines denial as "[a] defense mechanism operat-
ing unconsciously used to resolve emotional conflict and allay anxiety by disavowing thoughts,
feelings, wishes, needs, or external reality factors that are consciously intolerable." AMERICAN
PsYcHIATRIc ASSN., A PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 28 (5th ed. 1980). The emphasis here is on
what is consciously tolerable for an individual. This is the sense in which I use the term "individ-
ual denial." I use the term "societal denial" to mean an ideology that protects us from knowing
that which our culture finds intolerable. Cf David M. Trubek, Where the Action Iv Critical
Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. 575, 607 (1984) ("Legal thought is a form of
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the evolution of the law and litigation on battered women, denial exists
at both the societal and individual levels. Societal denial amounts to
an ideology48 that protects the institution of marriage by perpetuating
the focus on individual violent actors, concealing both the commonal-
ity of violence in marriage and the ways in which state and society
participate in the subordination of women.
"Societal" denial - albeit within a smaller, more consciously self-
defined society - also slowed recognition of lesbian battering.
Although many lesbian activists helped start the battered women's
movement, battering did not emerge as an internal problem in the con-
sciousness of the lesbian community until years after the movement
had begun. 49 This collective denial of internal violence was based, in
part, on the reluctance to let go of an ideal of lesbian relationships and
community, a "lesbian utopia - a nonviolent, fairly androgynous,
often separatist community struggling for social justice and freedom
for ourselves and other oppressed people." 50
However, there are important differences between the ideological
defense of marriage and the defense of lesbian utopia. The differences
lie in the way power is vested in one partner of a marriage at the time
of marriage by society, law, and tradition, fitting heterosexual bat-
tering into a historic framework of oppression and domination of wo-
men by men. Marriage is an institution which underlies many -
perhaps most - other social, political, and economic relations, and to
that end many elements of society have a stake in defending it. Be-
cause of oppression of lesbians and exclusion from many social struc-
tures - for example, lesbians cannot marry in the United States - the
dream at stake was less central to the surrounding society but, poign-
antly, at least equally central to lesbian self-definition and community.
The ideology that protects the institution of marriage and the
state's participation in subordinating women is consistent with the
findings of James Ptacek's study of batterers.5 1 Ptacek found that
denial, a way to deal with perceived contradictions that are too painful for us to hold in
consciousness.").
48. JURGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 311 (Jeremy J. Shapiro
trans., 1971), quoted in James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FEMINIST PERSPEC-
TIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 31, at 155 ("From everyday experiences we know that ideas
serve often enough to furnish our actions with justifying motives in place of the real ones. What
is called rationalization at this level is called ideology at the level of collective action.").
49. See, eg., Lydia Walker, Battered Women's Shelters and Work with Battered Lesbians, in
NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra note 33, at 73 (describing her work in a battered women's pro-
ject, her work with battered lesbians, and her difficulty in facing the violence she had experienced
in her own relationships with women).
50. Barbara Hart, Preface to NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra note 33, at 9, 13.
51. See generally Ptacek, supra note 48. A New York judge told the state's Task Force on
Women in the Courts that, when a woman gives up an attempt to separate, judges either smile
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both batterers and the criminal justice system tended to blame women
for their abuse and deny or trivialize the violence involved. 52 These
excuses and justifications are ideological in nature: "At the individual
level, they obscure the batterer's self-interest in acting violently; at the
societal level, they mask the male domination underlying violence
against women. Clinical and criminal justice responses to battering are
revealed as ideological in the light of their collusion with batterers'
rationalizations. '53
This ideology pervades the courtroom as well as other areas of the
criminal justice system. It shapes legal events in several ways: it af-
fects the individual consciousness of the actors in the courtroom, 54 the
doctrinal questions that are the legal framework of each action,55 and
the options to avoid legal confrontation and the resources individuals
bring into the courtroom. 56 Especially troublesome, this ideology
which denies oppression has had a profound impact on the develop-
ment of explanations of women's experience and behavior that can fit
within the conceptual structure of the law.57
It is likely that a number of people present in any court will have
some personal experience of domestic violence.58 Using the conserva-
tive estimate that domestic violence occurs in one quarter of house-
(thinking they have brought the couple back together), or snicker. The snickering response is
based on their perception "that the woman who accepts this violent behavior and reconciles with
the mant,] even if she reconciles in a split but doesn't pursue the case, isn't worthy of our respect
because she does not respect herself .. " New York Task Force on Women in the Courts,
Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 11, 36-37
(1986-1987) [hereinafter New York Task Force Report].
52. Ptacek, supra note 48, at 141-49 (batterers), 154-55 (criminal justice system).
53. Id at 155 (emphasis added).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 58-61 (discussing experience of battering among court-
room participants).
55. Sea eg., infra text accompanying notes 371-78, 410-24 (discussing the question of the
imminent danger of death or grave bodily harm in cases in which women assert they have killed
their batterers in self-defense).
56. See, eg., infra text accompanying notes 195-210 (discussing the relative power of men
and women in custody actions).
57. For example, if the batterers' position is essentially identical with the perspective of the
criminal justice system, and both fit with an ideology that protects marriage, then the "common-
sense" position in any courtroom will tend to favor men. Therefore, women will need experts to
explain their lives; men will not. See eg., Littleton, supra note 34, at 35 (all women, not only
battered women, may appear alien from a male perspective).
58. Violence in our personal lives has existed for everyone in varying degrees. The magni-
tude of the damage and turmoil is the real crux of the problem. If individuals on the panel
are afraid of their own feelings about having been battered, then perhaps they will not be
open to the battered woman's feelings. Some will have battered someone themselves and
will struggle to justify their own actions.
Roberta K. Thyfault et al., Battered Women in Court: Jury and Trial Consultants and Expert
Witnesses, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF




holds,59 at least four of the fifteen or more actors in an average
criminal action - jurors, judge, and attorneys - probably will have
experienced or committed at least one domestic assaultA0 Similarly, in
custody suits, the judge and the attorneys - and the social workers
and psychologists who are performing evaluations of the parents -
have this statistical likelihood of having experienced or committed vio-
lence. Therefore, the atmosphere in the courtroom will not reflect
mere ignorance, nor merely the broad social stereotypes which courts
generally recognize can be a problem.61 Rather, the response to and
evaluation of the case before them will also include the unseen and
unspoken ties that bind these participants to the fabric of their own
lives, their parents' lives, and their children's.
Social workers and psychologists play an important role in this
process. Our legal system - like the rest of society - has to a large
extent entrusted these professionals with the definition of what is nor-
mal and functional. 62 Despite the statistics on the epidemic incidence
of domestic violence, there is almost no legal or social science scholar-
ship that describes an author's experience of violence63 or even indi-
cates that the author has had any such experience. 4 It is unlikely that
a disinterested body of social scientists is doing all this research. How-
ever, scholars may be reluctant to indicate their own experience be-
cause they fear intellectual marginalization65 or familial repercussions.
Scholarly fears of marginalization probably reflect some acceptance of
stereotypes of battered women; certainly, they reflect caution about
the power and danger of stereotyping by others.
This silence among professionals and scholars is one intersection
between individual denial and an ideology of societal denial. This is
where one of the lenses through which we see the world is constructed:
59. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
60. Overrepresentation of the middle class in the courtroom would not change this estimate.
Domestic violence occurs across class lines. LENORE WALKER, supra note 40, at 19.
61. See; eg., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984) (jurors may hold "common
myths").
62. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 213-22 (discussing the role of social workers in
custody disputes).
63. The exceptions here are Robin West, who discusses her own experience of battering,
Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Femi-
nist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 98-99 (1987); and Terry Davidson, who discusses
being the child of a wife beater, TERRY DAVIDSON, CONJUGAL CRIME: UNDERSTANDING AND
CHANGING THE WIFEBEATING PATTERN 14-15, 131-54 (1978).
64. But see Jan E. Stets' preface to her excellent study, JAN E. STETS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND CONTROL v (1988) (research on domestic violence brought understanding of violence she
witnessed and experienced while growing up).
65. See, eg., West, supra note 63, at 99 (describes grappling with this anxiety but goes on to
discuss her own experience).
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if scholars are silent for "personal" reasons, their "professional" si-
lence then perpetuates the social stereotypes that construct battered
women as different, exceptional, "other." Ultimately, the denial of
personal experience of domestic violence in social science literature
and forensic testimony permits continued societal blindness to the im-
plications of the statistics these same experts gather and employ.66
Individual denial protects the images of self and marriage held by
individual women and men, as well as being the mechanism through
which much societal denial operates. This is true elsewhere as it is in
the courtroom: people need to know that their own marriages are
sound, therefore it is important to know that they (or their wives) do
not "stay" in the relationship; they "are" in the relationship. Their
own relationships define what is normal and appropriate; it is appro-
priate for their own relationships to continue. The battered woman
must be different. Therefore, the question "why did she stay?" com-
monly finds answers that attempt to explain difference: "because she
had children" or "because she was frightened" or "because she be-
came pathologically helpless" - not, significantly, because I/you/we
"stayed" too.
Do we "stay," or are we simply married? Writing this article
forced me to grapple with my own image of battered women, my "cre-
dentials" in claiming this identity, and my experience of marriage. As
I worked, I found similar conceptions of self and marriage in several of
the women who spoke with me. These women described their mar-
riages as "bad" or "unhappy" and then went on to recount attacks
that were almost murderous - threats with guns and knives, partial
strangling, deliberately running into a woman with a car:
I tried to nurse John [her colicky baby], but Ed screamed that I was
trying to poison him. I said, "OK, I'll get you a bottle." I had to kneel
down by the microwave, and Ed pushed me over, so that I fell over. So I
put the bottle in the micro and stood up, and finished microwaving the
bottle, put the nipple on, and gave it to Ed .... Ed began screaming
almost incoherently, and grabbed John, and started to storm back out to
the car with him.
At this point I got worried. The first time [earlier that night, when
her husband first stormed out and drove around with the baby] I thought
he was angry because I had yelled, and I felt guilty ... it didn't seem that
aberrant. But screaming about poison when I tried to nurse him, knock-
ing me over ... it just seemed like there was something wrong. I said,
"You're welcome to leave, but you can't take John. I don't think you're
all there."
66. Conversation with Kim Hanson, 1989 ("As long as you don't speak out, you're part of
the conspiracy of silence.").
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He pushed past. I stood in front of the car. He drove into me. I
tried to go over the hood of the car, hit the pavement quite hard, and
blacked out for a minute. When I came to, he had turned the car
around, he was like a foot from me, and he was saying "get up, or I'll
drive over you."
[Her husband had "scared himself... realized he had gone too far"
and gave her the baby to nurse. They finally fell asleep.] Next morning,
Ed had gone to work. I couldn't move, I couldn't move my legs. I re-
member thinking, I'm going to die. [The baby] is going to wake up next
to a corpse .... When I look back, there was so much rage in that
thought [at the colicky baby as well as the husband] .... I had a very
hard time functioning. I was able to make it to the bathroom, but the
tunnel vision seemed worse.
Women often discussed the relationship at length before they men-
tioned any violence. Finally, I began to understand that the violence
against these women seemed shocking to me - and the violence
against me seemed shocking to them - precisely because we heard
each others' reports of violence isolated from the context of the mar-
riages. For ourselves, on the other hand, the daily reality of the mar-
riages - none of which included daily or even weekly violent episodes
- defined most of our memories and retrospective sense of the rela-
tionship: these were "bad" marriages, not ordeals of physical torture.
We resisted defining the entire experience of marriage by the episodes
of violence that had marked the relationship's lowest points. Our un-
derstanding of marriage, love, and commitment in our own lives - as
well as our stereotypes of battered women - shaped our discussion.
This question of the line between "normal" marriage and violent
marriage is a common one. One activist social worker recounts that
when she speaks on domestic violence in any forum, someone always
asks why women "stay." She says, "When should she have left? At
what point? Maybe the time she watched while he smashed up the
furniture?" A silence, a shock of recognition, falls over the audience.
It is, relatively speaking, normal for a woman to watch a man smash
up the furniture. Many of the women in the room have seen some-
thing like it - and called it "marriage," and not "staying."67
Denial conditions women's perceptions of our own relationships
and need for assistance. An extreme example is a woman who
founded a shelter for battered women; although her husband was beat-
ing her during this period, she never identified with the women she
sought to help:
I just thought that the incidents of violence that I - in order to be a
67. Conversation with Donna Coker, 1989 (discussing four years of activist feminist social
work with battered women in Honolulu).
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battered woman you had to be really battered. I mean OK, I had a
couple of bad incidents, but mostly it was pretty minor, in inverted com-
mas, "violence." I didn't see myself in that category, as a battered wo-
man at al1.68
Similarly, women may fail to perceive armed attacks that do not
result in injury as physical abuse - or indeed fail to so perceive any-
thing other than an archetypal brutal beating:
I don't know what I'd have done if I had to live with what [I assume]
you did. My marriage wasn't physically abusive, but there was emo-
tional abuse. My husband had a pistol... he did pull his gun on me ....
This may happen even when the woman calls for help:
When I finally called the Battered Women's Center for help, I was just
looking for advice - my husband had threatened to move back in with-
out my consent while I was recovering from a Cesarian section .... He
said "you can't stop me".... I told the counselor that I was just look-
ing for a referral, as I didn't qualify for their help because my marriage
had not been violent, although I had left after he attacked me with a
loaded shotgun. There was a tiny pause, and then she said gently: "We
classify that as extreme violence."
Other aspects of women's denial of oppression within ordinary
marriage also affect our perception of battered women. Battered wo-
men interviewed by social workers often say they felt a responsibility
to support their children's relationship with their father because "he's
really good with the children."'69 This is not dissimilar to statements
by women in nonviolent relationships - or relationships they do not
perceive as violent. Women often admit when pressed that they are
actually describing a father who is loving with a child when he chooses
to interact with it, even if that interaction happens seldom, yet insist
on the value of his presence in the children's lives. However, this is a
parallel that makes many women uncomfortable: how could a bat-
terer be like their husband? Similarly, although sexual abuse is often a
part of domestic violence, many battered women who did not experi-
ence sexual abuse describe sex as having been "the only good thing
about the marriage."' 70 Women who are in relationships of unequal
power that are not violent must also find sexual pleasure under condi-
tions of inequality, yet they may not wish to recognize the similarity in
experience.
68. Kelly, supra note 31, at 114, 123-24.
69. Conversation with Donna Coker, supra note 67.
70. Id ; see also Lenore Walker's discussion of her difficulty understanding the reports of




The literature on battering notes, clinically and sometimes with
condescending undertones, that women tend to "perceive" the onset of
violence as atypical.71 Of course, the onset of violence is atypical, and
therefore our perceptions are in many ways appropriate.72 Yet we
may ignore danger signals and early attacks because we believe that
the "battered-ness" is a characteristic of the woman - a characteristic
we do not have - rather than a characteristic of her partner or a
symptom of a dynamic in the relationship. Denial creates and rein-
forces the perceptions (1) that battered women are weak, (2) that we
are not weak, and (3) that therefore we are safe.
Finally, individual denial leads women to minimize the pain and
oppressiveness of our experiences while we continue to live with them.
This is also a familiar dynamic in women's relationships; yet if vio-
lence is what we are minimizing, we face great costs and dangers.
That session in the hospital when I had been married one month, and
the nurse came and sat on the bed and said she had heard I didn't care if
I went home for Christmas .... The truth was, I couldn't face what I
was going home to. I instinctively knew it was very bad to lie about this
but I couldn't bear to tell the truth. It was too humiliating. I didn't tell
her anything. To my friends, I said I fell down. I did not intend to cover
for him but for myself ... for the confusion and humiliation ... for
finding myself in this unbelievable position.
This woman's images of battered women and herself make her posi-
tion "unbelievable." Her response, based on these images, is to dis-
guise her experience. She allows her husband to avoid the censure of
family and friends in order to protect herself from their opinions, set-
ting up the possibility of more such lies in the future because the image
itself has not been confronted, and making it likely that she will mini-
mize her own pain in order to maintain silence.7"
The cumulative effect of this denial has been very destructive for
women. We have difficulty recognizing ourselves and our experience
on the continuum of violence and power in which we actually live. To
the extent that we cannot recognize ourselves, we are hindered in for-
71. BROWNE, supra note 3, at 85.
72. The initial violent episode is not treated as though it signals the beginning of a violent
relationship. It is treated as an isolated, exceptional event, which is what one would expect
it to be treated as. Only in retrospect does the woman begin to examine the first violent act
more broadly, seeking signs that "she should have noticed .... The evidence is that there
has never been any violence before, that the husband rejects this behavior in principle....
There is no reason to expect the violence to be repeated.
DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 12, at 95-96.
73. Battered women tend to minimize the history of assault against them and the pain they
have suffered. See Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Rep-
resentation of Battered Women Who Kill 9 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 227, 228-29 (1986).
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mulating an affirmative vision in which our integrity is protected.
Although much of this article emphasizes legal aspects of the related
forces of law, society, and academia at work in the field of battered
women, I believe that the ways in which women are divided from each
other - and deprived of the capacity to understand our own experi-
ence in relation to other women - are ultimately most important.
B. Motherhood: Connectedness and Violence Against Women
Look at me, a voodoo doll,
stuffed with hair, toenails, and fear,
stuck with pins radiating like hatred
from my pincushion body.
You've held me in your hands,
a wooden fetish -
female figure carved out of heartwood
and studded with nails.
Each nail driven in is a desire, a wish,
is somebody's want driven into me.74
One of the most pervasive fictions in the case law is that women
with children are individual actors. Even much feminist legal litera-
ture has tended to pretend all women's notions of self and autonomy
will be the same.7" In fact, mothers continually make decisions on the
basis of extended, collective, multiple self-interest (their children's as
well as their own, their husbands' as well as their children's). 76 The
connectedness of mothers is not simply biological - it is existential,
social, and extremely practical. Most simply, what makes my chil-
dren's lives harder makes my life harder. If they are ill or sleepless, I
do not sleep.77 It goes both ways: what hurts me, or terrorizes me,
often hurts them as well. Also, anything that made their father's life
harder made my life harder, in both emotional and economic dimen-
sions. Finally, as the safest outlet for emotional expression and the
source of consolation for our unequal loved ones of greater or lesser
74. Harryette Mullen, Veteran of Domestic Wars, in FAMILY VIOLENCE: POEMS ON THE
PATHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 51.
75. See generally Stephanie Wildman, The Power of Women, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 435
(1990) (book review) (criticizing Catharine MacKinnon and other feminist scholars for their
inattention to the particular situations of women with children).
76. On women's intimate connection with our families, and the identity built on this connec-
tion, see generally Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. R v. 1, 18-22, 40
(1988).
77. I do not mean that these roles are purely biologically defined. To the extent that some
men fill this role with children, they can be seen as also engaged in mothering. Christine Lit-
tleton has pointed out that gender is in many ways socially constituted. Christine A. Littleton,
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987). Men who interact at this primal




power,78 women are uniquely bound to weighing the needs of others as
our own. These needs have, in fact, become our own in many signifi-
cant ways - our "selves" simply are not single.
The ordinary lives of women leave us vulnerable to violence and
oppression both because of our commitments and because of the lack
of understanding and protection within the law. Despite the many
responsibilities and connections of women's lives, courts and legal
scholars widely assume that it is a woman's responsibility to leave the
relationship. 79 When women tell the stories of their commitment to
relationships, stories which may include love and hope, the legal sys-
tem often has no way to hear them.80 In order to recognize women's
attempts to forge families and the complex attendant pressures on de-
cisions about domestic violence, we need to increase social under-
standing of women's commitments as well as of women's fear. In fact,
the onset of violence often occurs after commitment deepens. This
may occur soon after the couple is married:
He beat me up on our wedding night. I wound up with a black eye, a
very bad black eye, and split lip. He was almost arrested that night ....
I ran out of the house in my nightgown and flagged down a passing car
and got them to take me to my father-in-law's house. When my father-
in-law came back, the neighbors had called the police and the police
were there. My father-in-law talked them out of taking him in.
Pregnancy, which also increases commitment, is also often an on-
set point for violence.' Women who experience this violence have
had their emotional and economic needs transformed by the preg-
nancy itself; it is a very poor time for them to respond. Since mothers
bear much of the responsibility for the emotional ties between the fa-
thers and children in our society, the new family structure changes her
responsibilities to all parties: if the children are not physically
78. See West, supra note 76, at 26 (women exist in a web of natural inequality that involves
continual care for dependent children).
79. This assumption is questioned by Littleton, supra note 34, at 29, 53-54 ("Why should the
woman leave? It's her home, too - in fact, often it's her home, period.").
80. Id. at 43-44, 46-47 (discussing Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, (Ga. 1981)).
81. The accounts of pregnancy triggering men's violence against women are virtually univer-
sal. See, eg., LENORE WALKER, supra note 40, at 105-06. This is generally interpreted as the
man's competition with the fetus for his wife's attention and affection. Id. It is true that our
emotional lives and daily practical lives are transformed by children; men often want this atten-
tion, have received it, fear its loss, show resentment and anger. People who have problems with
control may react badly to change and stress. See RICHARD A. SToRDEUR & RICHARD STILLE,
ENDING MEN'S VIOLENCE AGAINST THEIR PARTNERS: ONE ROAD TO PEACE 101-03 (1989).
Interestingly, pregnancy is not on the list of stressors listed by Stordeur and Stille that therapists
see most in treating batterers. This may be a function of the point in the relationship at which
men enter treatment: the top stressors (divorce, marital separation, jail term, marital reconcilia-
tion) all refer to later points in the relationship than marriage or pregnancy. Id
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harmed, the woman may hesitate to deprive the children of his com-
panionship, even at substantial danger to herself.8 2 However, our so-
cial and legal doctrines increase the cost of her loyalty by viewing her
attempt to fulfill this responsibility as problematic "staying" in the
relationship.
From the viewpoint of the woman in a violent marriage, "staying"
may look very different. One of the women in my support group was
strikingly strong and serene. She worked as a legal secretary, earning
a good salary for a working woman. She was attractive, intelligent,
thoughtful. I simply could not reconcile this woman's presence, com-
posure, and depth with my image of a battered woman. Finally, after
a meeting, I took her aside and said, "I know this question must sound
just awful, but what on earth are you doing here? You're so strong.
.. " She said:
Well, my husband is an alcoholic. Things have been really bad these
past few years. But we've been married thirteen years. And I have three
children. For nine of those years, he was the best husband and father
anyone could have asked for. The way I look at it, he has a disease. I
know that when he's not drinking, he's not like this. I may have to leave.
But if I do, I'm giving up on a father for the children, and I'm giving up
on him. And I can't just throw away those nine years. So I go to Al-
Anon, and I come here. I get the support I need. And I may have to
decide to go. But I'm not going to do it lightly.
The wearing, repetitious labor of motherhood becomes part of the
cycle of survival in ways we have had trouble recognizing. The con-
stant work and need create a wearing down of the self, an erosion of
borders that represents not confusion but exhaustion - a thirst for
solace and protection as well as individuation. The constant demands
of children, especially in an unstable situation, may prove exhausting.
Women experience this blurring of borders, this need to subject their
own needs to others, even when violence is not present. Question:
Was it a battered or nonbattered wife who wrote this poem?
82. Even after divorce, most women place high value on their children's relationship with the
father. LENORE WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 230 (1985). In fact, the woman is
essentially required to be responsible to these broad familial emotional and developmental needs
when she goes into court to pursue her claim to custody. Martha Fineman notes that social
workers are suspicious of individuals who seek sole custody and seem to want to break ties with
the other parent; social workers tend to want to punish these individuals by awarding custody to
the other parent. Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARv. L. REv. 727, 766 (1988).
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A Woman's Work is Done (on the Run)
Mama, I'm hungry
So get up and feed me
my diapers are dirty
it's your job to clean me.
Mama, I'm happy
and I want to play
Do you really have
something
else to do anyway?
Mama, I'm angry
and I want to fight
Sometimes it seems like
you can't do nothing right.
Mama, I'm hurting
you gotta make me better.
Cure my cold, wipe my
nose
and make me wear a
sweater.
Mama, I'm tired
so rock me off to sleep.
Just give me the best
of your life and don't
weep.
Baby, I'm hungry
you know I got to eat
You've got a way w/cookin
that just can't be beat.
Baby, I'm happy
and I want to play
A little of your love
goes a long way.
Baby, I'm angry
coz you want your "rights"
You know you're just(l) a
woman
so go fly a kite.
Baby, I'm hurting
and need your gentle touch
Just hold me close and rock
me
it doesn't take that much
Baby, I'm tired
so let me go to sleep
Don't bother me with your
needs
just make my life complete.
Answer: It was a nineteen-year-old woman in the midst of a bat-
tering relationship,83 but like the furniture smashing example above,
there seems little to distinguish this woman's daily concerns from a
nonviolent marriage. The skills common to women in dealing with
these demands easily convert to battlefield skills of compartmentaliza-
tion and an emergency mode of coping with only immediate present
demands; while extremely functional in times of crisis, these skills are
wearing over time and may later cause her to be defined - or to define
herself - as dysfunctional.
Two days after he broke the glass in the door, it was the middle of a
hot summer afternoon. My son was asleep in his crib in my room, my
daughter was taking a nap in hers. I was lying in bed reading. Suddenly,
I heard a popping noise, and glass started crashing to the floor. Someone
was shooting through my windows. There were no bullets flying around
- I remember wondering if it was an air rifle. The windows kept shat-
tering, and I didn't know what would happen if anything hit the baby.
83. I thank Kim Hanson for sending the poems by J.C. Clark, as well as portions of her own
journals I drew on extensively for this article.
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I grabbed him out of the crib, got down toward the floor, and half-
crawled out of the room. I took him downstairs. Of course, he was only
three-months-old, when he woke up he had to nurse. Then I had to
change his diaper. Then my daughter started crying - she had waked
up from her nap. Then I had to change her diaper. Then she was hun-
gry. Then I had to change his diaper again. By then he had to nurse
again ....
At 5:30 when I took them upstairs for their baths, I noticed the glass
all over the floor. That was when I remembered what had happened. It
was the worst moment of all of it... because I couldn't even rely on
myself any more. I started crying and I called my mother long-distance.
I said, "Mama, it finally got to me, I've finally lost my mind. If your
window is shot out and you crawl out of the room with your baby in
your arms, you're not supposed to forget about it. It should at least be
the main event of the day!"
Ironically, this particular attack ultimately proved to be teenage van-
dalism, coincidentally following by two days a violent episode in
which the woman's ex-husband broke a pane of glass in her door and
lay bleeding on her floor until the police arrived. She described an
initial unwillingness to call the police again so soon after the previous
events, and her conviction at the time that the attacks must be related.
The blurring of borders, so frightening at the time, is in fact part of
women's experience of motherhood and daily life - of her daily duty
to lay aside her own needs for her children's. In many cases, the emo-
tional changes of motherhood may combine with the pressures of vio-
lence to push women toward at least temporary compliance with a
batterer's demands - while in the long run impelling her toward
whatever choice (leaving, staying, seeking family or professional inter-
vention) seems to best protect both herself and her children.
Finally, the sense of physical responsibility to the children - inev-
itably, economic responsibility - is a major constraint. Women and
children suffer severe economic losses upon divorce.8 4 Mothers must
be very desperate to walk out without knowing how they will all sur-
vive. A large number of homeless women and children today have fled
violent situations, and women often balance the possible harm to the
children through inadequate housing with the harm from maintaining
the relationship. Unless the children are threatened directly or indi-
rectly, the woman may well choose for them rather than herself. In a
very real way, she is choosing between known and unknown dangers,
blurred borders under familiar conditions and those under unfamiliar
conditions.
Our building was very roach-infested. In winter, the children needed
84. WErrzMAN, supra note 82, at x.
October 1991]
Michigan Law Review
real shoes instead of sneakers, and I put together the money to get them
good high-tops. My son's shoes had an unusually strong smell of
leather. One morning I picked up his shoe and it erupted... a volcano
of baby roaches, with a few big roaches as well. They loved that shoe.
Every night they tried to move in. Powder didn't help. I couldn't afford
more shoes.
To me, this is what all of it was like, the marriage and what followed.
I just remembered to pick up and hide the baby's shoe every night or...
remembered to get there first every morning, when he couldn't see me,
and shake out the hundreds of nesting roaches. Or, because eventually it
happened, I forgot, and heard him scream in terror. And felt terrible
because I had failed to protect him from knowing that shoes can explode
into insects, that everything can change to nightmare in a second.
Whether the woman is trying to maintain a relationship or trying
to leave it, her particular life circumstances will affect the dangers she
faces and the choices she makes. Women are entitled, as Christine
Littleton says, to "safe connection" - to the measures that protect us
in this effort as well as to social recognition of our values and needs.8 5
We are also entitled to legal doctrines that respect our circumstances
and responsibilities by recognizing that every aspect of our experience
of assault and response to it may be shaped by the experience of moth-
erhood, including the times at which we are attacked, the nature of the
attacks, the methods by which we cope, and our judgment of whether
the pain of relationship outweighs its value.
II. DEFINITIONS OF BAT=ERING AND BAT=ERED WOMEN
A. Identification as a "'Battered Woman"
"Battered woman" is not a simple term. 6 It focuses on the wo-
man and defines her through the battering experience. While the term
has some value for understanding women and our experience, both of
these qualities might also reinforce stereotypical notions of women's
experience. This section describes problems women encounter in iden-
tifying ourselves as "battered," the ways in which definitions of bat-
tered women reflect changing social consciousness, and the way
descriptions of battering have moved from a focus on control toward a
focus on incidents of violence.
85. See Littleton, supra note 34, at 49-53. "If battered women seek to maintain connection in
the face of enormous danger, perhaps the key to accessing the legal system on their behalf lies in
taking seriously both the connection they seek and the danger they face in that quest." Id. at 52.
Littleton suggests four basic approaches: changing the batterer, decreasing the costs of rupture
to women, increasing the perceived costs of battering, and expanding the options for community.
Id at 53-56.
86. See STORDEUR & STILLE, supra note 81, at 18-20 (providing brief recent review of many
positions on the terminology of "wife assault, battering, abuse, violence, family violence, and do-
mestic violence" (emphasis in original)).
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Women resist applying the term "battered woman" to ourselves.
This is often true even when we approach hotlines and shelters, 87 even
when we seek temporary restraining orders against our abusers, even
when we talk to each other. I believe that we do this not only because
of the denial discussed above, but because the stereotypical implica-
tions of the term fail to correlate with our self-images in ways that
reflect correct self-assessment on our parts.
It is a deadly combination, this mixture of (negative) denial and
(positive) self-respect that makes women reject an image of degrada-
tion and incapacitation. As a woman interviewed at a shelter in Eng-
land said, "It's difficult to accept yourself as a 'battered wife' as the
term isn't right. I have had a lot of marital troubles, which have in-
cluded violence. Despite all my attempts to make the marriage work,
I had no choice but to get away." 8 She defines herself as active, work-
ing to solve her problems, reaching out for solutions.89 These actions
conflict with her sense of what a "battered wife" is. Yet her story told
of frequent beatings and otherwise fit the stereotypical picture of a
battering relationship reasonably well. 90 Her self-esteem and insis-
tence on her own competency may have been double-edged: a wo-
man's rejection of the stereotype may slow her perception of her
problems or available resources, or postpone her decision to seek help,
since she may not turn immediately to agencies targeting "battered
women."
Because the term "battered woman" focuses on the woman in a
violent relationship rather than the man or the battering process, it
creates a tendency to see the woman as the problem. There are other
options: at one conference, several women described themselves with
the phrase "a woman who used to be married to a battering man." 91
However, many feminists insist on using "battered woman" in prefer-
ence to terms such as "spouse abuse" which are not gender specific in
order to emphasize that women, not men, are almost always the target
of intraspousal abuse. 92 The very substantial psychic damage done
87. Conversation with Donna Coker, supra note 67 (recounting stories of several clients at a
battered woman's program who doubted whether they were "really" battered women).
88. Joy Melville, Some Violent Families, in VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 10 (J.P. Martin ed.,
1978).
89. Id at 10-11.
90. This woman had been hit frequently. Her husband did not permit her to leave the house,
even to go to social security or the doctor. Id at 11.
91. Conversation with Donna Coker, supra note 67.
92. Studies that equated all forms of violence by all actors, whether or not provoked, have
generated concern for "battered husbands." This methodology has been extensively criticized.
See RUSSELL, supra note 43, at 102-09. Debate on this point continues. See generally 11 RE-
SPONSE TO THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN No. 3 (1988); Susan Schechter,
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through the experience of violence may be minimized or denied
through less woman-focused terminology. Although the term "bat-
tered woman" is unfortunate in its potential for stigma, no less specific
term can capture this damage; the search for different language may
lose a sense of the harm.93
B. Evolution of The Definition of the Problem
The current debate over terminology reflects differences in the
backgrounds and approaches of feminist activists, scholars in sociol-
ogy and psychology (some feminist, some not), and professionals such
as social workers active in the field of domestic violence. Social aware-
ness of violence against women grew out of the activism of the feminist
movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In Women and Male
Violence, Susan Schechter traces the evolution of the "women's
rights" and "women's liberation" wings of the feminist movement and
places the roots of public consciousness of domestic violence in the
early women's liberation literature.94 Other groups were also active in
the field. Women from Al-Anon, the organization for families of al-
coholics, founded the first shelters for battered women in the 1960s.95
The first Boston shelter was also a self-help project: two battered wo-
men opened their home as a haven and rapidly found support from
radical feminists. 96
Social workers had dealt extensively with battered women since
the early days of social service agencies. Over time, historian Linda
Gordon has shown, women clients began to create out of their own
complaints a right not to be beaten. 97 Until the 1930s, the women
were more likely to receive social work assistance for their charges of
nonsupport by husbands than for charges of brutality; however, from
Building Bridges Between Activists, Professionals and Researchers in FEMINIST PERSPECIVE.S
ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 31, at 299.
93. Conversation with Kim Hanson, supra note 66. We need definitions that do not inher-
ently blame women. For the past decade, I have often reluctantly applied the term to myself in
order to help break down stereotypes and overcome the strong pressures toward silence. To the
extent that I do not "really" feel like a battered woman but like a bit of an imposter, I know this
puts me in line with battered women everywhere. For the similar perspective of a woman who
chose to use the terms "batterer" and "battered" when she had been violently struck once by her
partner, see BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK 88 (1989).
94. SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 32-33 (1982) (citing the anthology
STEmalOOD IS POWERFUL (Robin Morgan ed., 1970) and the discussion in consciousness-rais-
ing groups). Scheehter reviews the different ideologies within the women's movement that con-
tributed to the battered women's movement.
95. The Al-Anon women were concerned that women who fled abusive alcoholic husbands
were sleeping in cars. Id at 5, 55-57.
96. Schechter, supra note 92, at 302.
97. GORDON, supra note 44, at 257-61.
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the 1930s on, women increasingly insisted on their right to physical
integrity.98 Heavily influenced by Freudian thought, social workers in
the 1940s and 1950s were likely to interpret women's complaints as
indicating frigidity or a need to undermine their husbands' author-
ity.99 This victim-blaming mentality contributed to family violence
becoming less visible until the new emphasis and political mobilization
grew out of the feminist movement of the 1970s.10
Recently, several feminists have written about the split between
social scientists and feminist activists on domestic violence issues. 101
Some psychological and sociological studies of domestic violence are
deeply antiwoman. Most of the early studies focused on the psychopa-
thology of the female victims, not the aggressors; 0 2 such approaches
tended to reinforce batterers' defenses and denial, since the psychiatric
problems under consideration appeared outside their control. 10 3
Although some studies of domestic violence focus on the oppressive
societal structures that vest power in men,1° 4 those written from the
family systems perspective most widespread in social work today10 5
tend to portray the partners as equally responsible for violence 0 6 and
ask the woman who describes experiencing violent attacks to consider
how she provoked them.10 7 The gender-neutral approach adopted by
many sociologists minimizes the importance of male domination and
power. Division between activists and professionals, social scientists
and funding sources has also affected how issues were explored and
what research was conducted in the field of domestic violence, 10 8 since
98. Id. at 258-59.
99. Id. at 282.
100. Id. at 22-25.
101. Michele Bograd, Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse An Introduction, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON Wn ABUSE, supra note 31, at 11, 19; Schechter, supra note 92, at 299; Kersti
Yllo, Political and Methodological Debates in Wife Abuse Research, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 31; see also DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 12, at 193-99;
GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 12, at 1-2; Edward W. Gondolf, The State of the Debate: A
Review Esay on Woman Battering, 11 RESPONSE TO THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN AND
CHILDREN No. 3, supra note 92, at 3-8; cf Lee Ann Hoff, Collaborative Feminist Research and
the Myth of Objectivity, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 31, at 269.
102. MILDRED D. PAGELOW, WOMAN-BATTERING: VICTIMS AND THEIR EXPERIENCE 20
(1981) (citing several studies).
103. STORDEUR & STiLLE, supra note 81, at 24-25.
104. See generally DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 12 (discussing wife beating that is consist-
ently placed in the context of a critique of both patriarchy and capitalism).
105. Fineman, supra note 82, at 744 & n.77.
106. See generally Michele Bograd, Family Systems Approaches to Wife Battering: A Femi-
nist Critique 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 558-68 (1984) (family systems theories can perpetu-
ate gender bias by blaming the victims of wife abuse).
107. STORDEUR & STILLE, supra note 81, at 26; see also LEwis OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE:
FACTS REPLACING MyrIS 96-97 (1986) (dicussing Straus' application of systems theory).
108. Feminist activists first raised the issues of wife beating as part of their struggle against
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conscious use of feminist methodology in research is rare. 109 Our con-
ceptions of battering reflect this mixed intellectual and political
background.
C. The Attempt To Define the Battered Woman
The most widely known definitions of battering tend to be inci-
dent-focused, looking to the types of assaultive or coercive incidents
and the number of times these occurred. This makes it possible to
bring a woman and her history into court with objective indicia of her
status as a battered woman. However, this type of definition tends to
direct attention away from the source of the violence - the struggle
for power and control - and has the additional problem of emphasiz-
ing the very incidents women tend to minimize and fortifying an im-
age women seek to deny.
Lenore Walker, author of three books and many articles on bat-
tered women, is also one of the leading forensic psychologists in the
field. 110 By 1986, she had introduced expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome in sixty-five cases in which battered women had
killed or hurt their abusers. 11 In Walker's first book, her definition of
"battered woman" emphasized the batterer's control of the woman:
"A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to co-
erce her to do something he wants her to do without any concern for
her rights."'112 However, the very next sentence moves from a focus
on control to the issue of repetition of violence and whether the wo-
man has remained in the relationship:
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
the oppression of women; professionals, researchers, and funding sources then recast and trans-
formed the way these issues were seen and developed, casting shelter residents and program
participants as "clients" rather than inclusively defining them as experiencing an extreme form of
oppression faced by all women. Schechter, supra note 92, at 302. Schechter believes the differ-
ences between activists and professionals are growing more complicated as "more professionally
trained women join the movement at the same time that more battered women try to assume
power within it." Id at 309.
109. For a general discussion, see descriptions of applied feminist methodology in Hoff, supra
note 101, at 270-77 (describing process of developing questions and focus for research through
helping and working with the women she would study until they trusted and spoke with her,
before developing her questions, thus overcoming severe mistrust of academics and professionals
among shelter staff and residents).
110. See, eg., LENORE WALKER, supra note 40; LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WO-
MAN SYNDROME (1984) [hereinafter WALKER, SYNDROME]; WALKER, supra note 11. Walker's
description of a three-stage cycle of battering and application of the psychosocial theory of
learned helplessness to battered women had great influence on the field of domestic violence and
proved especially significant in law.
111. Walker, supra note 10, at 224.
112. LENORE WALKER, supra note 40, at xv.
[Vol. 90:1
Legal Images of Battered Women
relationships with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a bat-
tered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least
twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a
man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she
is defined as a battered woman. 113
By 1984, in her second book, Walker had elaborated her descrip-
tion of battered women and developed another definition, now also
cited by courts. This definition was not related to control but defined
by incidents of violence: "A battered woman is a woman.., who is or
has been in an intimate relationship with a man who repeatedly sub-
jects or subjected her to forceful physical and/or psychological
abuse... . 'Repeatedly' means more than one assault [at least two
'acute battering incidents']."' 1 4 Physical abuse is "any form of a coer-
cive physical act, with or without resultant injury.'" 115
Walker articulated her first, more control-focused definition of bat-
tered women based on an interest in women's lives growing out of her
feminist consciousness." 6 However, the elaboration of "battered wo-
man's syndrome" led away from an emphasis on power and toward a
focus on incidents and behavior. Even Walker's first study showed
some ambivalence about the implications of recognizing the issue of
control. Walker found that as her women clients in psychotherapy
became more assertive, they encountered more physical and psycho-
logical abuse." 7
My first fear was that critics of the women's movement might be right.
Perhaps violence erupted because women began to make their own deci-
sions to control their lives. Feminism was indeed having a profound
impact on the family by changing power relationships. Would strong,
assertive women be able to live in harmony and equality with those men
whom they loved? Fortunately, a further investigation proved these
fears to be groundless; in those relationships where battering was occur-
ring, coercion between the partners had existed from the beginning of the
relationship." 8
Walker flinched from the prospect that changes in power in relation-
ships may generate violence or that men would resist changes in wo-
men's empowerment. This distinction between existent "coercion"
113. Id
114. WALKER, SYNDROfAE, supra note 110, at 203.
115. Id at 202. Psychological abuse consists of eight elements, including periods of contrite,
loving behavior that keep alive hope that the abuse will stop. IAL
116. See her account of the commencement of her work in LENORE WALKER, supra note 40,
at xi-xiii. Walker has also done extensive work to further feminist goals in psychotherapy
through the Feminist Therapy Institute, of which she was a co-founder and the first chairperson.
Conversation with Jeanne Adleman, Chair, Feminist Therapy Institute, 1988-1990 (1988).
117. Lai oPE WALKER, supra note 40, at xi.
118. Id: at xi-xii.
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and "strong, assertive women" is somewhat stereotyping and fails to
account for the existence of battered feminists. 119 I believe that this
psychological approach - not unique to Walker - also reflects white
middle-class norms about the family: women are either strong and
assertive or coerced. Some of us may be both - a lot may depend on
the level and type of coercion involved. Especially, women who are
not white or middle class may not fit these generalizations; 120 they
may have less difficulty reconciling the simultaneous experience of
strength and oppression. 121
However, Walker's definition is useful when women's experience
must be described to a court. First, the definition is incident-focused:
incidents can be asserted and often proven as objective support for the
woman's perceptions and feelings. Second, the "repeatedly" require-
ment is a sorting mechanism that allows the judge or jury to consider
the woman before them without accepting that any woman who has
been struck even one time - a figure that may be familiar from their
own relationships in ways they still deny - is susceptible to the devel-
opment of battered woman syndrome.1 22
The various attempts by feminist scholars to define battering show
some tension between breadth - reaching to include the many ways
women are harmed - and precision in describing particular experi-
ence, which generally leads toward focus on incidents. Mary Ann
Douglas gives a broad definition:
A battered woman is any woman who has been the victim of physical,
sexual, and/or psychological abuse by her partner.... Physical abuse is
assault that ranges from hitting or slapping at one end of the continuum
to homicide at the other [citing Pagelow]. Physical abuse may or may
not be accompanied by physical injury and/or by the victims' attempts
119. Feminists and nontraditional women are also battered, and one author states it is ques-
tionable whether feminists have even a diminished tendency to be battered. OKUN, supra note
107, at 86.
120. See Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. Rv.
581, 612-13 (1990) ("Feminist theory at present, especially feminist legal theory, tends to focus
on women as passive victims .... At the individual level, black women have had to learn to
construct themselves in a society that denied them full selves.").
121. See Schneider, supra note 10, at 216 n.146 (discussing the possibility that white women
and their perspective have formed the basis for much of the literature on battering). I believe
these descriptions poorly capture the discrepancy between how women appear to others and how
they appear to themselves. In Walker's later study, The Battered Woman Syndrome, she found
higher levels of self-esteem than she had in her previous study. WALKER, SYNDROME, supra note
110, at 80-82, 114.
122. For further discussion of battered woman syndrome, see infra text accompanying notes
148-89. The "repeatedly" requirement also raises the issue of inquiry into the woman's "failure"
to leave that expert testimony is designed to address; there may be less expectation that a woman
would leave a marriage over only one incident of violence, which then in hindsight becomes the
first such incident.
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to defend themselves.123
Douglas' definition has the advantage of being broad and inclusive,
and explicitly rejecting any requirement that the woman have suffered
physical injury. However, people may see one incident of violence as
insufficient to distinguish "battering" from any ordinary relation-
ship.124 Also, women do not always recognize being physically re-
strained from moving as a form of physical abuse when it is not
mentioned specifically, and therefore this definition lacks some of the
inclusiveness of Walker's "any physically coercive act."
Angela Browne's definition of battered women is more specific in
its attention to incidents of assault:
"[B]attered women" are those who have been struck repeatedly, often
experiencing several different kinds of physically violent actions in one
incident, and usually, by the time they are identified, having experienced
a series of such incidents, each consisting of a cluster of violent acts. 125
If closely examined, Browne's definition reveals some of the other
problems. It plays into women's denial by its specificity and its focus
on "striking." Women who have been threatened with deadly weap-
ons may fail to recognize their experience in this definition if they were
not physically injured, as may women who have experienced other
types of assault such as sexual abuse.
Mildred Pagelow defines battered women without requiring strik-
ing in a way that allows her to reconsider the question of repetition of
violence:
[Blattered women refers to adult women who were intentionally physi-
cally abused in ways that caused pain or injury, or who were forced into
involuntary action or restrained by force from voluntary action by adult
men with whom they have or had established relationships, usually in-
volving sexual intimacy, whether or not within a legally married state.126
Pagelow separates battering into "primary battering" (the first attack)
123. Mary Ann Douglas, The Battered Woman Syndrome in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON
TRIAL, supra note 58, at 39.
124. See supra text accompanying note 113 (Lenore Walker stating: "Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once.").
125. BROWNE, supra note 3, at 13. Since Browne's material was gathered in the Walker
study, td at ix, 196 nn.l-2, the works had identical underlying criteria despite the difference in
language of their definitions. The emphasis on physical striking and patterns of repetition in
Browne's definition is similar to that offered by Deschner: "a series of physically injurious at-
tacks on an intimate or family member that form part of a repeated, habitual pattern." JEANNE
P. DESCHNER, THE HITrING HABIT: ANGER CONTROL FOR BATrERING COUPLES 2 (1984),
quoted in STORDEUR & STILLE, supra note 81, at 19. Obviously Deschner goes further than
Browne in requiring physical injury.
126. PAGELOW, supra note 102, at 33. This definition may screen out women who have
experienced such attacks as the pointing of a loaded gun or a knife held against the skin; some
women who spoke with me identified such experiences as "emotional" rather than physical
abuse. Diana Russell mentions a similar phenomenon in which many women fail to recognize
marital rape as rape. RUSSELL, supra note 43, at 63.
October 1991]
Michigan Law Review
and "secondary battering" (everything that follows). 12 7 She views the
woman's "acceptance" of the primary battering incident as the key to
whether secondary battering will develop, because the woman's reac-
tion to the first episode may in some way provide incentives for the
man to continue, and thus move the relationship toward secondary
battering. 128 In this view, women reinforce battering through compli-
ance with batterers' demands, giving them "feelings of increased con-
trol and power."' 129 While this description identifies power and
control as issues, it obscures them again by indirectly holding the wo-
man responsible for the batterer's continued control efforts;130 it re-
mains incident-focused with the second incident decisive for
categorization.
Most of these definitions are essentially incident-focused, not con-
trol-focused. Falling into this conceptualization in describing their ex-
periences, some women describe clear cut control struggles as separate
from "battering":
The way it came out for me was not a battered woman's thing. I wanted
to go out with my girlfriends, and that triggered possessive jealousy ....
He wouldn't let me go do the things I wanted to do, therefore the mar-
riage wouldn't work. The problem didn't start with his beating me up.
After I made my stand on that ground, then the violence started. That
led to a lot of self-blame - if only I had been a better wife, this wouldn't
have happened.
This woman has completed therapy, participated in a battered wo-
man's group, obtained a bachelor's degree in sociology and a law de-
gree. She is doing pro bono work with battered women. I would
argue that the information she has been given, and her interpretation
of it above, show a functional definition of battering as based on male
violence that is not about control, and a "battered woman's thing"
that is about the woman's "thing," rather than the batterer's pursuit of
power.
Lesbian battering, in contrast, considers the victim of domestic vi-
127. PAGELOW, supra note 102, at 42-51.
128. The responsibility for taking decisive action at the first occurrence of battering appears
to fall almost entirely on the woman. If... this behavior appears to be accepted by his spouse
because of lack of negative feedback, he is most likely to continue it." Id. at 44.
129. Id at 45. Pagelow does not explain what actions by women other than leaving at the
first incident would be sufficient to avoid secondary battering, although she recognizes that in
some relationships violence occurs only once.
130. Similarly, Pagelow says she rejects a focus on what "types" of women are battered as
opposed to another type who are not. Id at 223. Yet she formulates the "most important ques-
tion" as "what are the characteristics (social and personal) that distinguish among women who
are never battered, never battered a second time, or battered repeatedly?" Id at 42. This is
merely another formulation of essentially the same focus.
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olence within the framework of continued attempts by the batterer to
achieve and maintain dominance and control in the relationship:
Lesbian battering is that pattern of violent and coercive behaviors
whereby a lesbian seeks to control the thoughts, beliefs or conduct of her
intimate partner or to punish the intimate for resisting the perpetrator's
control over her.
Individual acts of violence, by this definition, do not constitute les-
bian battering. Physical violence is not battering unless it results in the
enhanced control of the batterer over the recipient. If the assaulted part-
ner becomes fearful of the violator, if she modifies her behavior in re-
sponse to the assault or to avoid future abuse, or if the victim
intentionally maintains a particular consciousness or behavioral reper-
toire to avoid violence, despite her preference not to do so, she is
battered. 131
Several elements of this definition merit discussion. Battering is a
"pattern of violent and coercive behaviors" defined by the batterer's
purpose. The state of being battered is defined by the woman's re-
sponse. This would seem to exclude situations in which someone
struck out in anger but did not hit hard, or in which they hit again but
there was no effective intimidation; it would seem to include the times
the furniture was smashed up and threats uttered, and the nonviolent
partner was afraid to move or respond.
At first, the emphasis on the battered woman's response seems su-
perficially similar to Pagelow's definitions of primary and secondary
battering. However, the difference is crucial: the lesbian battering
definition emphasizes a woman's experience of the violence, which
may include either her feelings or her behavior; Pagelow targets her
responsive behavior to emphasize her success or failure at nonreward-
ing the batterer. 132 In essence, this defines the woman by her success
at controlling the partner who is attempting to control her. This focus
on the woman's experience does not automatically resolve problems of
denial: women may not recognize how much our thoughts, feelings or
actions are determined by the violence until a period of time has
passed, or until the relationship is over. However, this approach does
help the battered woman overcome denial: she need only recognize
that she has modified her behavior or "intentionally maintain[ed] a
particular consciousness or behavioral repertoire to avoid violence."
These elements imply little stigma and help reveal the context of
power and control within which the violence took place.
131. Barbara Hart, Lesbian Battering: An Examination, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra
note 33, at 173.
132. I believe that this definition is useful and possible in part because lesbian battering is so
seldom litigated. As a result, few if any of the power and control moves between lesbians wind
up in the courtroom.
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Feminist activists writing about heterosexual battering have also
defined power and control, rather than incidents of violence, as the
heart of the question. Ellen Pence and Michael Paymar's training
manual, which grew out of a treatment program for batterers in Min-
nesota developed by activists, is entitled Power and Control: Tactics of
Men Who Batter. 133 Pence and Paymar treat violence as a form of
control 134 and explicitly reject theories that focus on "some flaw in the
abuser, the victim, the relationship, or all three of these." 135
Incident-focused definitions have advantages in court which they
lack if we look to them as a way to explain women's experience to
ourselves and each other, support women, and fight oppression. For
example, Pagelow's emphasis on traditional ideology in women may
be very appealing to traditionalism in some jurors or in judges, who
are mostly male: this woman was hurt and became so desperate be-
cause she was so determined to be a good wife and mother. Control-
based definitions may be more comprehensible to many women in re-
gard to our own lives. However, women who resist types of control
that have general societal acceptance (for example, women who resist
traditional roles in their lives) may evoke less sympathy in judges or
jurors who hold traditional values. If women are hurt for resisting
domination, it may also be more difficult to explain the nature of the
struggle in court simply because so many aspects of domination may
appear normal and are subsumed under the label "traditionalism.1 136
In order to resolve the tensions inherent in the effort to define bat-
tering and battered women, we need to understand the pressures of the
legal system and create solutions that change cultural consciousness as
well as law.
III. PRESSURES OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM





pan across the walls.
Listening to the familiar
engine's drone.
133. ELLEN PENCE & MICHAEL PAYMAR, POWER AND CONTROL: TAcTICS OF MEN WHO
BATTER (1986).
134. See, eg., id at 64-83.
135. Id at 64.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 250-57.
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The car door slam.
His keys.
His footfall on the stair.
I have this baby bottle.
Loaded, cocked, aimed and ready
to dash his skull to bits.137
Ironically, the most complete description of women's suffering
from domestic violence has entered our case law and legal literature at
the point where violence against women finally harms men - when
battered women kill in self-defense. 138 These are also the cases that
have had the greatest impact on public consciousness of battered wo-
men. Francine Hughes, whose story became the book and movie The
Burning Bed, killed her sleeping husband after years of extremely vio-
lent abuse. Although Hughes was acquitted on grounds of temporary
insanity rather than on grounds of self-defense, her story became the
paradigm for the image of battered women who kill their abusers. 139
Although only a fraction of battered women kill their abusers, 14
feminists and legal scholars put a great deal of energy into the self-
defense cases, which comprise a large portion of the legal literature on
battering. 141 Of course, the stakes are terribly high for the women
involved in these cases: many women who are jailed for the murders
of their abusers have been brutally and repeatedly abused. 142
137. Linda Bart, On the Defensive, in FAMILY VIOLENCE: POEMS ON THE PATHOLOGY,
supra note 1, at 15.
138. See Cynthia L. Coffee, Note, A Trend Emerges" A State Survey on the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony Concerning the Battered Woman Syndrome 25 J. FAM. L. 373 (1986-1987).
139. See, e.g., Thyfault et al., supra note 58, at 68 (suggesting that attitudes of potential
jurors toward battered woman syndrome may be elicited by asking whether they saw The Burn-
ing Bed).
140. An estimated 1.5 to 4 million women are battered in the United States each year. See
supra note 42. In 1984, approximately 477 husbands or boyfriends were killed by women. Lau-
rie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heatof-Passion Manslaughter
and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. Rnv. 1679, 1680-81 & n.10 (1986).
141. See Schneider, supra note 10, at 196 n.5 (citing 38 articles and Notes in law reviews and
legal journals). Five more articles on the subject appeared in the issue of the Women's Rights
Law Reporter. A review of the categories covering battered women and self-defense in "Info-
trae" reveals that in the ensuing three years, at least a dozen additional pieces appeared, totaling
at least 50 to 60 published pieces on the subject. In 1987, two more books on the subject were
published: BROWNE, supra note 3, and CHARLES P. EWING, BATrERED WOMEN WHO KILL
(1987). In 1989, three more new books appeared. See BLACKMAN, supra note 11; GILLESPIE,
supra note 11; WALKER, supra note 11.
142. Angela Browne's study brought together statistical findings based on a large sample of
women and explored in depth the stories of eleven couples. The women in these couples had
been severely, even grotesquely, abused over a period of years. Seven of them served sentences
from one year to life in prison. Two received suspended sentences or probation. In one case, the
district attorney's office finally agreed that the slaying was justifiable and dropped charges. One
woman was tried for first-degree murder, pled self-defense, and was acquitted. BROWNE, supra
note 3, at 187-90.
Last year, the governor of Ohio released 25 women who had been serving prison terms after
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When a woman is tried for killing her abuser, she encounters not
only the problem of the jury's ability to understand her experience, 143
but the problem of articulating her experience in court in the first
place. Lenore Walker argues that the rules of evidence prevent the
explanation of women's experience:
There is a fundamental difference between the way women tell of their
battering experiences and what is permitted under the male-identified
rules of evidence. Women tend to tell of the events in question rooted in
their context, by weaving a tale of patterns of events and feelings in the
context of how they happened. Rules of evidence call for the recitation
of discrete events separated from feelings or opinions. Facts out of con-
text may be acceptable, but they do not convey the battered woman's
experience. Expert witnesses can tie together what the current eviden-
tiary rules do not allow the defendant to say. Until feminist legal schol-
ars argue for and attain reform in the rules of evidence, a battered
woman will be constrained from putting her case in front of the trier of
fact.144
The conditions of women's lives - the children needing sweaters
or needing noses wiped, 145 or the constant demands of breastfeeding or
diapers'46 - may not be seen as relevant to the explanation of the
violent marriage or even to the question of why women "stayed."
Similarly, a statement that a husband's drinking problem developed
after many happy years is not adequate to capture the keen, passionate
consciousness of love and responsibility for both husband and children
articulated by the woman who was in my support group. 147 Finally, a
woman's perception of danger and her decisions to act are dependent
on the context of that particular relationship. Therefore, these "male-
identified" rules constrain the categories within which the legal image
of battered women has evolved.
Expert testimony on battered woman syndrome was developed by
feminist litigators and psychologists to explain the experiences of
abused women and the way women were affected by abuse. 148 Bat-
tered woman syndrome is "a collection of specific characteristics and
reviewing their records carefully. The women presented evidence of abuse. More than one hun-
dred women's records were reviewed. Isabel Wilkerson, Clemency Granted to 25 Women Con.
victedfor Assault or Murder, N.Y. TIm s, Dec. 22, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60; see also Littleton, supra note 34, at 35 ("Not
only battered women but all women" are alien from a male perspective, and therefore beyond the
ken of laymen.).
144. Walker, supra note 10, at 223-24.
145. See supra discussion of children's needs in poem in text accompanying note 83.
146. See supra narrative in text following note 83.
147. See supra narrative in text following note 82.
148. Schneider, supra note 10, at 198.
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effects of abuse on the battered woman."'149 While it does not affect all
battered women, it makes women who do suffer from the syndrome
unable to respond effectively to violence and therefore entrapped in
the violent relationship. 150 Testimony on battered woman syndrome
includes a description of Walker's three-stage battering cycle, 151 the
concept of "learned helplessness," and may also include descriptions
of the objective economic and social difficulties women face in leaving
their relationships.'5 2
In most states, 153 testimony on battered woman syndrome is ad-
mitted under the rule of evidence that allows expert testimony when
the jurors could not understand the issue without it.154 "[A] battering
relationship is a subject beyond the understanding of an average ju-
ror." 155 Jurors are particularly unable to grasp for themselves why the
woman failed to leave the relationship. 5 6 Judges may have grasped
the need for expert testimony through motives of justice, empathy,
recognition of the need to cope with prejudices and stereotypes held by
jurors, or similar reasons. Yet judges and jurors will inevitably hear
this testimony filtered through cultural stereotypes which are of neces-
sity enforced by the claim of exceptionality, of incomprehensibility, re-
quired by the requirement that the issue be "beyond the layman's
ken." The result may often tend to perpetuate stereotypes:
[Tihe expert testified that those who suffer from the battered woman
syndrome, because of certain characteristics in their personalities, do not
leave their husbands, even after numerous beatings, do not inform police
or friends of their husbands' violence, and, under certain circumstances,
believe that they are in present danger that their husbands will kill them,
although some time has elapsed since the husband's last assault against
them.' 57
149. Douglas, supra note 123, at 40.
150. Id.
151. Walker divides battery into three stages: the tension building phase, the explosion or
acute battering incident, and the calm, loving respite. LENORE WALKER, supra note 40, at 55.
The periods of loving remorse are essential in cementing bonding between the couple and re-
newing hope for change.
152. Schneider, supra note 10, at 202-03.
153. For a discussion of state and federal rules, see id
154. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (Ga. 1981) ("Expert... testimony... is
admissible where the conclusion of the expert is one which jurors would not ordinarily be able to
draw for themselves; i.e., the conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman").
155. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 567 (Kan. 1986).
156. See, eg., People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1985) ("[Ihe proffered
expert [testimony] would... serve to dispel the ordinary lay perception that [the] woman who
remains in a battering relationship is free to leave her abuser at any time .... Mhe jury's
'commonsense' conclusions [would be] that the beatings and threats ... could not have been at
all that bad or else she would have left long before.").
157. Chapman v. State, 367 S.E.2d 541, 543 (Ga. 1988) (emphasis added) (reversing for ex-
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Feminist litigators grapple with the difficulties presented by por-
traying women in a complex life situation, both acting and being acted
upon - what Elizabeth Schneider has called a contrast between
agency (the woman as actor and agent in her own life) and victimiza-
tion (the woman as acted upon by her batterer).15 8 As Schneider
points out, however, even if litigators tell a more complex story, the
legal and cultural pressures at work in this area contribute to the
judges hearing and retelling a story of dysfunctionality.15 9 Courts de-
scribe a battered woman who is "financially dependent on the bat-
terer," which may cause her to "feel partly responsible for the
batterer's violence, [also,] she may believe that her children need a
father, or fear reprisal if she leaves." 16° She is powerless, lacks self-
esteem, and has few close friends.1 61 Her "self-respect is very low and
she believes she is a worthless person."1 62 Her primary emotion is
fear.163 She undergoes a personality change and is "unable to project
her thinking into the future. She lives her life from one beating to the
next and her thoughts relate solely to her efforts to avoid the next
beating."164
Significantly, this description explains her continued presence in
the relationship, her failure to separate: her emotional paralysis and
inability to think clearly are the reasons she cannot think clearly about
escape.165 She has "traditional beliefs about the sanctity of home and
family and... false hopes that things will improve."1 66 Among the
most important aspects of her problem is the condition of "learned
helplessness," described with varying degrees of sophistication as a de-
clusion of testimony regarding victim's reputation for violence). In another Georgia case the
discussion of Smith also reinforced this perception of battered women:
We reasoned that a jury could not ordinarily draw certain conclusions for themselves, such
as; "why a person suffering from battered woman's syndrome would not leave her mate,
would not inform police or friends, and would fear increased aggression against herself ..."
[citing Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (Ga. 1981)] Testimony regarding the battered
woman syndrome assists the jury in understanding the defendant's unusual behavior and
conduct, which are vital issues in the battered woman's defense ... [which is] beyond the
ken of the jury ....
State v. Butler, 349 S.E.2d 684, 687-88 (Ga. 1986).
158. Schneider, supra note 10, at 220-22. Victimization can also include trying to describe
the woman's life in the context of a male-dominated system.
159. Id. at 198-99.
160. Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F. Supp. 451, 456 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
161. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1983).
162. Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 680 (Ga. 1981).
163. Smith, 277 S.E.2d at 680.
164. People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 654 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
165. People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (Sup. Ct. 1985) ("Numbed by a dread of immi-
nent aggression, these women are unable to think clearly about the means of escape from this
abusive family existence.").
166. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
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ficiency in perceiving escape possibilities 67 or a psychological adjust-
ment to economic dependence, love, and the failure of the legal system
to respond adequately to the problem. 16
These opinions present an image of utterly dysfunctional women.
"Such testimony generally explains the 'phenomenon' as one in which
a regular pattern of spouse abuse creates in the battered spouse low
self-esteem and a 'learned helplessness,' L e., a sense that she cannot
escape from the abusive relationship she has become a part of.'1 69
A conversation between two friends who had violent marriages:
R: They say we have this thing called "learned helplessness"....
Y: Really? I always thought it was when I was getting too much
power.
Martin Seligman developed the psychological theory of "learned
helplessness" based on laboratory experiments conducted on ani-
mals. 170 Caged dogs subjected to repeated random electrical shocks
that they could not control eventually "ceased any further voluntary
activity and became compliant, passive and submissive."' 171 Even
when it was possible for dogs to leave the cages, they "remained pas-
sive, refused to leave, and did not avoid the shock."'172 In 1979, Le-
nore Walker applied the theory of learned helplessness to the battered
women she studied:
Once the women are operating from a belief of helplessness, the percep-
tion becomes reality and they become passive, submissive, "helpless."
They allow things that appear to them to be out of their control actually
to get out of their control. When one listens to descriptions of battering
incidents from battered women, it often seems as if these women were
not actually as helpless as they perceived themselves to be. However,
their behavior was determined by their negative cognitive set, or their
perceptions of what they could or could not do, not by what actually
existed. The battered women's behavior appears similar to that of Selig-
167. "[A] feeling of surrender and a failure to realize or know options available to escape the
relationship." State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564, 567 (Wash. 1984).
168. "[A] condition in which the woman is psychologically locked into her situation due to
economic dependence on the man, an abiding attachment to him, and the failure of the legal
system to adequately respond to the problem." State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (Wash. 1984).
169. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 819 (N.D. 1983) (footnote omitted).
170. See, eg., discussion in GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 12, at 13 ("The prevailing no-
tion of learned helplessness is drawn from the extensive laboratory research of Martin Seligman
of the University of Pennsylvania .... During the late sixties, Dr. Seligman led a team of
researchers experimenting with dogs in studies that would raise the ire of today's animal rights
activists.") (citation omitted).
171. Walker describes Seligman's experiments in LENORE WALKER, supra note 40, at 45-47.
The hidden question of captivity in Seligman's experiments and Walker's interpretation is dis-
cussed further, infra notes 364-66 and accompanying text.
172. LENoRE WALKER, supra note 40, at 46.
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man's dogs, rats, and people. 173
Although Walker later cautioned against overgeneralizing about
women's responses to violence, learned helplessness and its attendant
images of submissiveness and passivity underlie much of the expertise
on battered woman syndrome and much of the legal literature. 174
Even in Walker's 1984 study, which in some ways revealed a more
complex portrait of battered women,175the discussion of battered wo-
men's "coping skills" revealed the ongoing importance of the concept
of learned helplessness:
[B]attered women develop survival or coping skills that keep them alive
with minimal injuries. There is also some evidence that such skills are
developed at the expense of escape skills. [It is] consistent with [learned
helplessness] theory to narrow one's perceptions and focus only on sur-
vival, causing misperception of other important information.... I inter-
pret their behavior as a basic coping mechanism, much like Seligman's
dogs, who used passivity as their way to stay alive. The analogy is in the
failure for both the dogs and the battered woman to develop adequate
escape skills. 176
Feminists have cautiously criticized the way learned helplessness
emerges in court both for failing to fully explain the many aspects of
battered women's behavior 177 and for creating a double bind in which
women must prove helplessness in court after they have killed an abu-
sive partner and therefore do not appear helpless as the term is ordina-
rily understood:1 78 "[A] defendant may be considered a battered
woman only if she never left her husband, never sought assistance, and
173. Id at 48.
174. For example, the following passage from the Journal of Family Law makes passivity and
submissiveness an integral part of the syndrome:
The battered woman syndrome is a term used to describe the stages of a physically and
psychologically abusive relationship with a mate and the effects of each stage of the relation-
ship on the battered woman. Three stages of a battering relationship have been identified by
Dr. Lenore E. Walker in her book entitled The Battered Woman. ... Due to the repetition
of this pattern, the woman develops certain learned responses. The batterer's false promises
of reform in the third stage result in repeated disappointments and cause the woman to
develop a learned helplessness evidenced by extreme passivity and submissivenes.
Coffee, supra note 138, at 373 n.1 (emphasis added).
175. In her later work, Walker found battered women often held liberal rather than tradi-
tional attitudes and had higher self-esteem than she expected to find. WALKER, SYNDROME,
supra note 110, at 143.
176. Id at 33.
177. See generally Littleton, supra note 34; Schneider, supra note 10.
178. For example, in Mullis v. State, 282 S.E.2d 334 (Ga. 1981), testimony on battered wo-
men was excluded. Although the court offered no specific grounds for excluding the testimony
on battered women, the evidence had clearly demonstrated the defendant's ability to fight back
and may have made her seem less "helpless." Mulli; 282 S.E.2d at 336-37. Georgia courts had
earlier accepted testimony on the battered woman's syndrome in a case where the defendant had
never resisted. See Crocker, supra note 18, at 146 (interpreting Mullis as showing an implicit
requirement that the woman never fight back).
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never fought back." 179 To the extent the theory of learned helpless-
ness is based on repeated violence, women may have trouble establish-
ing the appropriateness of expert testimony if they strike back after
experiencing one severe prior incident of abuse.' 80
It is difficult to communicate the cumulative effect of a violent
marriage. A great deal of the literature on battering develops themes
and conclusions through presentation of women's stories. While in
part this reflects a feminist methodology of working from women's
experience,' 8 ' it also may be the only way to describe a complex reality
for which we have few names.'8 2
If the woman does need expert testimony, how can her reality be
described? Elizabeth Schneider has expressed concern over the ten-
dency of testimony on learned helplessness to promote stereotypes of
women and undermine examination of the woman's particular circum-
stances,8 3 as well as the way carefully framed feminist testimony on
learned helplessness may be distorted in the courtroom.' 84 Some au-
thors find the term "learned helplessness" misleading because "help-
lessness" is only one coping tactic among many that change over
time.185 Most important, women's stories as well as much social sci-
ence literature indicate that many battered women seek energetically
to protect themselves and their families. In this vein, the most socially
situated description of learned helplessness describes it as a product of
the interaction of frustrations women meet as they energetically pur-
sue safety. 186
179. Crocker, supra note 18, at 144. Crocker points to a conflict with the "reasonable man"
standard in self-defense cases: "If the defendant has tried to resist in the past, the court accepts
this as evidence that rebuts her status as a battered woman. On the other hand, if the defendant
has never attempted to fight back, the prosecution argues that the defendant did not act as a
'reasonable man."' Id at 145; see also id at 152-53 (discussing the tensions between sex-neutral
standards, male definitions of "objectivity," and individualization theories).
180. See id at 147 (discussing State v. Griffiths, 610 P.2d 522 (Idaho 1980)). "[IThe defen-
dant shot her husband after seeing a look in his eyes which she had seen only once before when
he choked her to near insensibility." Iad
181. See generally Littleton, supra note 27 (discussing feminist methodology of working
from women's experience); see also West, supra note 63 (discussing need for phenomenological
critique based on women's stories of their own experiences, and employing this method).
182. See generally Kelly, supra note 31, at 114-17 (on importance of naming women's
experience).
183. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trialfor Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-
Defense, 15 HARV. C.1.-C.L. L. Rnv. 623, 646 (1980).
184. Schneider, supra note 10, at 198 ("Even if lawyers are not emphasizing [the woman's
learned helplessness rather than the circumstances,] judges are hearing it this way.").
185. See Kelly, supra note 31, at 114; see generally GONDOLF & FIsHER, supra note 12, at
27-39 (describing many types of helpseeking behavior by battered women).
186.The battered woman who meets with failure in [all her] tactics to create her own safety
experiences a series of lessons in the reality that neither her behavior, nor that of any other
woman[], is able to stop the violence against her ... she cannot control the actions of her
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I do not mean to criticize here the psychological theory underlying
battered woman syndrome, or even the particular theory of learned
helplessness. First, the collection of experience and perception
summed up in battered woman syndrome are descriptively true of
many women.' 8 7 Lenore Walker's defense of expert testimony is also
correct: it helps women's stories be brought into court by bringing
together fragments that women experience as part of a whole relation-
ship.188 Finally, I would not choose to discard such a major tool in
the effort to explain women's experience in court, just because it has
proved vulnerable to distortion in culture and law - we need more,
not less, explanation. However, as long as explanation emphasizes
"helplessness" in the psychology of individual women, it runs into the
danger of contributing to stereotyping.
Therefore, a profound irony marks this expert testimony: Domes-
tic violence is beyond the layman's ken (even though we know it is
fairly common) because some jurors will interpret their own experi-
ence through cultural perceptions that distort understanding and
make it difficult for all of us to talk about the subject, and because
cultural stereotypes will shape the vision of battered women held by
jurors who have no personal experience of such violence as well. Ex-
pert testimony, designed to overcome these stereotypes and help show
the context for the woman's actions, has through the pressures of the
legal system contributed to a focus on victimization that is understood
as passivity or even pathology on the part of the woman.189 This im-
age further promotes many cultural stereotypes, and may contribute
to further stigmatizing of battered women and further denial by wo-
men of the dangers they face through domestic violence. In a particu-
lar legal action, an individual battered woman's experience is at least
partly explained, but the cultural perceptions that limit broader social
understanding may remain untouched, and go on to shape legal action
again.
partner. Learned helplessness in battered women refers to the low rate of behaviors that
could potentially increase safety, based on her decreased ability or on her judgment that
these behaviors are also unsafe. [Since her judgment of the dangers of helpseeking may be
realistic,] the presence of certain behaviors associated with learned helplessness is not neces-
sarily irrational or unreasonable... They may be what kept her alive.
Douglas, supra note 123, at 42-43.
187. See also the support for battered woman syndrome theory discussed in the amicus briefs
of the American Psychological Association and American Civil Liberties Union in State v. Kelly,
reprinted in 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. RPTR. 245 (1986).
188. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
189. Schneider, supra note 10, at 207 ("[TIhe term 'battered woman syndrome' has been
heard to communicate an implicit but powerful view that battered women are all the same, that
they are suffering from a psychological disability and that this disability prevents them from
acting 'normally.' ").
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Therefore, one result of the highly publicized legal focus on bat-
tered woman syndrome and learned helplessness has been to inappro-
priately increase cultural attention to the battered woman's
psychological makeup. Evidence suggests that the batterer's behavior,
rather than the battered woman's characteristics, determines her re-
sponse and predicts whether she will kill in self-defense. 190 Yet plac-
ing courtroom emphasis on the batterer's conduct has its own pitfalls:
for example, cases in which violence took nonstandard forms may
prove confusing, and much domestic violence might not be compre-
hensible to the jury without a simultaneous exposition of the context
and history of the relationship. 91 Also, the explanation of the wo-
man's experience and interpretation of violence may again be lost by
too much focus on the batterer.
In the past, we have lacked explanatory language and litigative
strategies for exposing the batterer's quest for power and control -
the link between the conduct of the batterer and the experience of the
woman. Evidentiary rules and courtroom bias therefore continue to
skew the image of women in the self-defense cases, and these cases
continue to contribute to cultural images that in turn shape law., Be-
low, I propose a collateral attack on this problem. By identifying
those violent power and control moves that target the woman's separa-
tion, we can begin to bridge the gap between self-defense and other
battering cases. Because of the interrelatedness of the legal rules and
cultural attitudes in this area, we need law reform that illuminates the
nature of power and control in all areas of battering.
B. Custody and the Professional Evaluation of Women
A custody battle is the quintessential power struggle between men and
women. It's about who controls a woman's mind and body. It's also
about who gets to control the future. Children are the future. Men
think of children as the necessary chains to keep wives from flying away.
If we fly away anyway, they transfer their needs to their children.192
Women fear losing our children upon divorce.'9 3 During mar-
190. BROWNE, supra note 3, at 127. Browne found seven predictors of homicide in a bat-
tering relationship. Only one of these (the woman's threats of suicide) is based on the woman's
behavior, all the other predictors (frequency of abusive incidents, extent of woman's injuries,
frequency of forced sexual acts by man, man's drug use, and frequency of his intoxication) are
based on actions by the man. Id
191. This problem is symmetrical to the dangers that helplessness theories pose for women
who fight back against violence.
192. Anonymous quotations from mothers on custody battles, from the chapter, Mothers'
Voices, Written on the Wind, in CHESLER, supra note 14, at 449.
193. WErrzMAN, supra note 82, at 311 (stating that men see custody as part of a total pack-
age of divorce issues; women "are more likely to consider custody on an altogether different level
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riage, women are usually primary caregivers for children, even when
both father and mother work full time.194 In Lenore Weitzman's
study of divorce, one third of the women interviewed reported their
husbands threatened to seek custody as a ploy in postseparation nego-
tiations, usually because they sought financial gains. 195 Women rou-
tinely sacrificed support to which they would otherwise be entitled in
order to avoid even the risk of losing their children. 196 Other studies
have observed a dynamic with regard to domestic violence that paral-
lels the financial bargaining Weitzman recounted: rather than face
custody suits, women accept mutual orders of protection, which are
inappropriate if the woman has not been violent and can hinder the
effectiveness of the protective order. 197 In both instances, women lose
protection they need and to which they are legally entitled, because
they fear the treatment they are likely to receive in court.198
These fears are realistic.199 First, since so many divorcing women
report they have experienced violence, the problem is common. Sec-
ond, violent men will likely seek new means of control when old ones
fail. Batterers use the legal system as a new arena of combat when
they seek to keep their wives from leaving.2°° Of the women whose
stories are in this paper, all but one who had children at the time of
divorce have either fought a custody action or were threatened with
one.
201
Men who pursue custody have a better than even chance of gaining
- it is something they simply cannot negotiate about because it is too important - it is worth
any price").
194. Fineman, supra note 82, at 769 & n.166; see also WErrMAN, supra note 82, at 240
(noting that husbands spend even less time with their children when their wives are employed).
195. WErrZMAN, supra note 82, at 310.
196. Id. at 311-12.
197. New York Task Force Report, supra note 51, at 40 n.84.
198. One woman obtained a temporary restraining order when her husband threatened to
move back in without her consent or to take away the children if she refused to reconcile. See
narrative regarding fear of opinion of therapist, text following infra note 217. After being served
with the order, her husband offered to drop the threat of a custody suit if she would agree not to
obtain a permanent protective order. She agreed and allowed the temporary order to expire
without seeking a permanent order. She was pleased, in part because she believed that perma-
nent orders would be difficult to enforce. In actuality, however, she had agreed to less legal
protection solely in order to protect her relationship with her infant children.
199. For a discussion of the problem of domestic violence in custody decisions, including
cases in which courts awarded custody to violent or even murderous fathers, see Naomi Cohen,
Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Determina-
tions, VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming).
200. Lenore E.A. Walker & Glenace E. Edwall, Domestic Violence and Determination of
Visitation and Custody in Divorce in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL, supra note 58, at 130.
201. The one woman who reported no such threat had a husband disabled by mental illness
who was not working steadily at the time of divorce.
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custody.20 2 Even violent men are frequently successful in custody
suits. In one study, fifty-nine percent of the judicially successful fa-
thers had physically abused their wives; thirty-six percent had kid-
napped their children.203 A recent article estimated that at least one
half of all contested custody cases involved families with a history of
some form of domestic violence; in approximately forty percent of
those cases, fathers were awarded the children irrespective of their his-
tory of violence.2°4 Another study reported many awards of custody
to battering fathers, including one case in which the judge made his
decision after walking past the shelter to which the mother and chil-
dren had fled. The judge found the shelter to be an inappropriate liv-
ing arrangement and concluded the father provided the better
home. 20 5
The past two decades have seen major changes in child custody
litigation.206 Martha Fineman has explained how the advent of gen-
der-neutral rules in custody decisionmaking created a situation that
actually disfavors women, since factors that would favor women, such
as nurturing, are defined as gender-biased.20 7 In devaluing past
caregiving and seeking decisionmaking factors that would not inher-
ently prefer women, courts have wound up relying on factors such as
financial resources that usually favor men.20 8
With the advent of no-fault divorce, fault became relevant only in
custody proceedings.2° 9 This contributes to a critical evaluation of
mothering and holds particular problems for women leaving violent
marriages. Violence against women is less likely to be raised at all in a
no-fault action. It may be dangerous for women to raise the issue of
domestic violence, since it invokes stereotypes that judges or social
202. Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymak-
ing: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 107, 120 & n.37. In one study, 70%
of 37 judges ordered children into paternal custody. CHESLER, supra note 14, at 80-81. in
Weitzman's study, men who requested custody received it 63% of the time in negotiated cases.
Weitzman found that in many cases where fathers received custody there was some explicit or
implicit agreement by the mother. However, the "agreement" sometimes appeared to have been
coerced by threats against the woman's safety, reputation, or financial security. WErrZMAN,
supra note 82, at 233-34. Men won 33% to 38% of the cases that were fully contested in court.
Id. at 234.
203. CHESLER, supra note 14, at 81.
204. Walker & Edwall, supra note 200, at 127, 130.
205. New York Task Force Report supra note 51, at 42.
206. Se eg., Fineman, supra note 82, at 738-39; Fineman & Opie, supra note 202, at 113-21.
Beginning in the 1970s, feminists sought to construct a notion of woman not tied to the idea of
mothering. Simultaneously, in a reaction to women's liberation, father's rights groups chal-
lenged the assumption of maternal custody that had characterized the preceding period. See id.
207. Fineman & Opie, supra note 202, at 121.
208. Id
209. WErrzMAN, supra note 82, at 223.
October 1991]
Michigan Law Review
workers may hold. It may not even be helpful: in the absence of phys-
ical harm to a child, violence against the mother might not be seen as
relevant to the welfare of the children.210 Women therefore must de-
cide whether to describe the violence against them - and risk judicial
stereotyping - or keep silent, and allow the violence of their spouse to
be judicially invisible.
The difficulties here have been exacerbated by the simultaneous de-
velopment of several liberal legal reforms. Feminist litigation on bat-
tered women's syndrome occurred contemporaneously both with the
attempt - as part of some feminist visions of equality - to make
motherhood less central to women's identity, and with the advent of
no-fault divorce. The evolution of a dysfunctional portrait of battered
women therefore occurred simultaneously with the changes wrought
by no-fault and joint custody. Indeed, by making violence against wo-
men less visible at divorce, no-fault divorce laws may have indirectly
contributed to cultural stereotypes of battered women by removing
public blame of the perpetrator of the violence. Once the man as bad
actor disappears, it is easy to shift the focus to the woman. Rather
than asserting his harm to her from the beginning, the woman must
raise battering as an issue defensively, while she is being clinically eval-
uated, with greater attendant risk of stereotyping.
The resulting legal dangers appear in many women's stories. An-
gela Browne tells of a woman who left her husband after the third
"physically assaultive incident" had endangered their infant son. She
went into hiding with relatives and consulted an attorney to file pro-
tective orders and obtain a divorce. The husband sought custody and
claimed that his wife's disappearance from the family home proved
her instability. Because the woman had left before the violence be-
came grotesque, she was not treated as having been seriously endan-
gered. The state placed the child with the abuser's family because they
were considered stable; his family then fought to restrict the mother's
visitation. The welfare department finally recommended the baby re-
main with its grandparents since they had been taking care of it, not-
ing "the fact that their stories [were] so contradictory makes both
parents seem unreliable. 211 Christine Littleton tells a similar story: a
210. Walker & Edwall, supra note 200, at 140.
211. BROWNE, supra note 3, at 112-13.
This woman's story provides one answer to the question: "Why don't battered women
leave?" The woman acted independently and rationally: She left the situation when she
began to realize that it would not improve; she refused to tolerate victimization; she sought
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woman who had obtained a restraining order against her husband
awoke one night to find him wielding a knife in her bedroom; after she
fled into the night, he claimed she had abandoned the children, and
she was unable to regain custody.212
No-fault divorce and the widespread adoption of the "best interest
of the child" standard for resolving custody disputes also put more
power in the hands of professionals such as social workers.2 13 Judges
follow the recommendations in evaluations ninety percent of the
time.214  The increased reliance on these professionals created
problems for battered women with children. Even before separation,
it may be dangerous to place much trust in a counselor who may later
be called on to testify regarding the qualities of the parents:
The problem is, I feel as if the therapist likes him better. She took it
seriously the day he had attacked me. But then I decided I wanted a
separation, and I asked him to leave. She told me that "the person who
wants the separation should be the one who leaves." It's student housing
- it's my apartment. But I'm afraid to argue with her. I don't know
what she'll do if he tries to take the children.
This woman was right to perceive the marriage counselor as a haz-
ard.215 Therapists can prove susceptible to the charm of batterers.216
The battered woman often believes she is a less attractive figure than
her spouse. "Who would like me? Can't think straight, crying, de-
pressed.., ugly... tired, twenty years old, with two kids to support.
... " Therapists may justify the batterer during the counseling pro-
cess, or break the wife's confidence to inform the batterer of the wife's
complaints of violence, as well as posing a danger in the event of later
custody disputes. 217
The woman's unwillingness to compromise may be penalized as
well. A woman may manage to drag the man into marriage counsel-
ing, yet despair after continued problems and seek a separation. Both
212. Littleton, supra note 34, at 54.
213. Fineman, supra note 82, at 740-44.
214. Sun & Thomas, supra note 14, at 573.
215. Family systems theory has great influence in the field of social work today. Fineman,
supra note 82, at 744-45 & nn.77-81. The family systems approach strongly protects the status
quo. When a woman describes her husband's violence, social workers following family systems
theory often ask the woman to focus on what she did to provoke the man. STORDEUR & STILLE,
supra note 81, at 26.
216. Walker & Edwall, supra note 200, at 141; see also LOUISE ARMSTRONG, THE HOME
FRONT: NOTES FROM THE FAMILY WAR ZONE 37-62 (1983) (describing how psychiatrists mis-
construe or even ignore the realities of abuse); LENORE WALKER, supra note 40, at 248-50 (dis-
cussing sexist attitudes among psychotherapists).
217. See, ag., Anonymous, Letter to the Editor, Why Battered Wives Don't Leave Home
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1983, at A18 (describing the counselor's violation of confidences in order
to establish "trust and communication").
October 1991]
Michigan Law Review
the charm of the batterer and the therapist's desire for an evenhanded,
unifying solution may lead to problems.
My husband threatened to try to take the children from me, to tell
the court I was unfit, that my friends were a bad influence. The therapist
had always liked him better, and for several months I had been afraid
she would be biased against me if she testified. But by the time he made
the threat I wasn't as scared as I had been, because I knew I had won.
He had finally lost the therapist as an ally - not by pulling a gun on me,
not by being proud of it later and scaring her so badly that day - but by
failing appointments when I continued to make them.
The battered woman fearing a custody action therefore faces pow-
erful forces that may be hostile or difficult to control. Mothers gener-
ally fare poorly in the professional literature used by social workers. 218
Battered women face additional difficulties from court reliance on so-
cial workers and other professionals in evaluating contested custody
issues, since few evaluators have much training at understanding the
impact of battering on the child as well as the woman.219 Also, the
background of Freudian psychology, with its emphasis on women's
masochism, still affects some of the psychological and sociological ex-
pertise in the field of domestic violence.220 Feminist scholars have par-
ticularly criticized family systems theory, widespread in the field of
social work today, for its tendency to equalize responsibility for the
violence:221 the family systems view of battering as an interaction be-
tween family members tends to blame the victim for failing to stop the
violence, and to define success as reconciling the partners in the rela-
tionship rather than as stopping the abuse.222
Finally, battered women with children face an image problem. We
need to be strong, resourceful, effective as a parent, meeting the needs
of the children when we appear in court. On the other hand, if we do
that too well, the court may disbelieve our stories because of stereo-
types held by judges or psychologists. 223 If the court will consider
218. Fineman, supra note 82, at 767 n.161 (noting that in 125 articles studied, mothers were
blamed for 72 psychological disorders in children; no mother-child relationships were described
as healthy, though some father-child relationships were described as healthy).
219. Walker & Edwall, supra note 200, at 140, Sun & Thomas, supra note 14, at 573.
220. See ARmSTRONG, supra note 216, at 16-36.
221. Family systems theory tends to view the divorcing family as a whole rather than looking
at individuals and to seek to accommodate the entire family's transition to a new set of relation-
ships. Fineman, supra note 82, at 744-45 & nn.77-81.
222. STORDEUR & STILLE, supra note 81, at 25-26.
223. Crites & Coker, supra note 14, at 13. One such story was recounted by a social worker,
whose client had been evaluated by a therapist as too strong to have been a battered woman and
too upset about her ex-husband, considering that two years had passed, to be a stable parent.
The ex-husband had continued his attacks for two years, including such calculated violence as
cutting the brake lines on her car. Conversation with Donna Coker, supra note 67.
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violence as a factor at all in custody decisions, we may be seen as - or
in effect be required to appear as - having been weak, helpless, and
economically dependent to have "stayed" with the man all these years.
The hazards are obvious. In self-defense claims, we have pressed
upon judges and juries a portrait of induced dysfumctionality. In cus-
tody cases, we must prove functionality - or at least recovery.224 The
concept of "learned helplessness" is a factor that may influence nega-
tive custody decisions.225 The needs of battered women in custody
cases seem almost directly inverse to self-defense cases: women must
prove our subjective reasonableness for self-defense claims, our objec-
tive rationality and competence as parents; learned helplessness may
"explain" why a woman "stayed" in the self-defense context, but may
be interpreted as making her a poor model in childrearing and possibly
a poor caregiver as well when custody is in question. The cases may
not always be tried before the same judges, but they work within the
same legal system and popular culture. To the extent that our psycho-
logical literature has been focused on "battered women" rather than
the violent power and control moves against these women, it perpetu-
ates stereotypes that damage us in our other encounters with the legal
system.
Therefore, fear of the law controls some of the behavior of battered
women with children. A woman who leaves her husband may wind
up on the defensive regarding custody, subject to rules that disfavor
her which are then interpreted through negative cultural images.
Through this interaction of the power of the legal system and the
man's violent moves for control, women are hindered in simultane-
ously protecting ourselves and our relationships with our children. In
this impossible bind, we may end temporary separations under pres-
sure from social workers226 or from fear of custody actions,227 or make
concessions over needed financial support or the level of protection we
demand or receive from the state. We may also reluctantly accept
dangers we can observe and respond to personally - the threat of
violent men we know - to avoid the uncertainties of custody suits.
C. Lesbian Battering: Defining a Problem Outside the Legal
System
Lesbians are excluded from most constraints of the courtroom.
224. Battered women's adjustments to the separation may bring stress and emotions that can
harm her on evaluation. Walker & Edwall, supra note 200, at 140-41.
225. Sun & Thomas, supra note 14, at 569.
226. See STORDEUR & STILLE, supra note 81, at 26.
227. Sun & Thomas, supra note 14, at 574.
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This is not a fact that should be idealized; it grows out of oppression.
They cannot marry. While they do confront custody litigation by for-
mer male partners, lesbians have not historically been able to sue each
other for custody of children they coparented. 22 Lesbians may also
find it difficult to assert legal rights in shared property on separa-
tion.229 Homophobia in society deters many battered lesbians from
invoking the legal system by calling the police for help or attempting
to arrest the batterer.230 Even when lesbians seek protection through
law, restraining orders may be unavailable against same-sex partners
in some states.231 Because of this exclusion, the analysis of battered
lesbians has developed in less direct relation to legal pressures than has
analysis of heterosexual battering.
There are a few reported differences between lesbian and hetero-
sexual battering.232 Lesbians report physically fighting back more
often than women who are battered by men. 233 Since heterosexual wo-
men also report fighting back against physical assaults,234 this differ-
ence in reporting may show a difference in what it is acceptable for
women to discuss, or it may reflect an actual difference in women's
responses to battering.235 The virtual absence of self-defense killings
in lesbian relationships236 has also helped keep battered lesbians
outside the legal system: battered woman syndrome is less empha-
sized in materials on lesbian battering in part because lesbians have
not been raising claims of self-defense in court.
Lesbians have not only been excluded from the courtroom. Their
stories as stories of women's lives have also often been excluded from
228. In three very recent cases, lesbians sought custody or visitation rights in court; in each
case, however, no parental rights were recognized in the partner who was not the biological
mother. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1991); Curiale v.
Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990); In the Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia
M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
229. Nancy Hammond, Lesbian Victims and the Reluctance to Identify Abuse, in NAMING
Ti VIOLENCE, supra note 33, at 190, 196.
230. Hammond, supra note 229, at 190, 196.
231. Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruise" Intra-Lesbian riolence Law and Lesbian Legal
Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 567, 576-81 (1990).
232. Walker, supra note 49, at 75-76.
233. Id
234. See generally Saunders, supra note 38, at 90, 103-08 (self-defense is most common rea-
son women exhibit violence).
235. Lydia Walker notes that possible explanations include "less size differential, less accept-
ance from the community to not fight back, [and] more permission from the community to talk
about fighting back .... ." Walker, supra note 49, at 76 (emphasis added).
236. Recently, a Florida court allowed the first use of expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome in the defense of a lesbian who killed her batterer. See Robson, supra note 231, at 574-
75. The jury convicted Annette Green of first degree murder despite the prosecution's acknowl-
edgement that she had been battered and shot at in the past. Id. at 575.
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the legal,237 psychological, and sociological literature.238 Despite the
hard work of some lesbians in the battered women's movement, in-
cluding staffing agencies and shelters, lesbians have often been ex-
cluded from shelters and from the support of the battered women's
movement.2 39 Although this lack of recognition and scarcity of re-
sources has caused harm to many lesbians, it left lesbian battering to
be defined within an activist tradition close to the grassroots shelter
movement and dedicated to supporting women.
Naming The Violence, the first book on lesbian battering, includes
the stories of many battered lesbians. Compared with published narra-
tives of heterosexual women's battering relationships, the lesbian nar-
ratives place more emphasis on the positive aspects of the relationship;
the battered women seem more willing to explain, or possibly more in
touch with, the positive feelings that drew them in and kept them
involved:
I look back and can see that there was something good. It didn't
start with violence and ugliness. It started with summer nights, two wo-
men in their early twenties trying to find a way to see each other. Both
lived in households where it wasn't possible to be open about the rela-
tionship. Meeting at movies and bars until early in the morning - until
finally one left her home. Nights of lovemaking, not enough sleep and
feeling fine at work the next day - being relaxed and happy. I had
found something that I never even knew existed. I never thought that
there would be some one person for me, and I had now found her. I
think neither of us doubted that we had found a lifetime relationship.
The feeling of rightness was there....
And who is the monster in the next room who did this? She's just a
woman like you who is feeling as upset as you are and is temporarily full
of remorse. She is the only friend you have, the only one who seems to
237. See generally Leigh M. Leonard, The Missing Voice in Feminist Legal Theory: The
Heterosexual Presumption, 12 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 39 (1990).
238. The stories of lesbians have been excluded from most fictional treatment of women's
lives as well. In "Listening," the final story in Grace Paley's most recent book, the narrator,
Faith, is in a car, stopped at a light, watching a man crossing the street and thinking warmly
about his body. She speaks to Cassie, a friend sitting next to her who has not previously ap-
peared in the book of stories, and asks, "He's nice, isn't he?" Cassie refuses to accept Faith's
statement that the man is returning to "everyday life":
To whose everyday life, she said, goddamnit, whose?
She turned to me.... Listen, Faith, why don't you tell my story? You've told every-
body's story but mine. I don't even mean my whole story, that's my job. You probably.
can't. But I mean you've just omitted me from the other stories and I was there. In the
restaurant and the train, right there. Where is Cassie? Where is my life? It's been women
and men, women and men ..... Goddamnit, where the hell is my woman and woman,
woman-loving life in all this?... You let [our other friends] in [to your stories] all the time;
it's really strange, why have you left me out of everybody's life?
GRACE PALEY, LATER THE SAME DAY 209-10 (1985).




care. The idea of leaving seems worse than if you try to stay and make it
work and make sure it doesn't happen again. Bruises heal and resent-
ment fades back into the routines of work, shopping, watching reruns of
All Creatures Great and Small, and driving her to church on Sunday
morning.240
In these stories, lesbians seem more willing to face the current du-
ality of their memories and feelings. This does not necessarily repre-
sent a difference between lesbian and heterosexual battering. These
stories are more like those I heard from heterosexuals whose stories
are included in this article, which emphasized the complexity of the
marriage relationship while trying to analyze the violence, than they
are like most of the stories in the published material on heterosexual
battering.241 Lesbians do not seem less hurt by battering relationships
than heterosexual women. Rather, it seems likely that the editors sim-
ply excised less of this quality than do the editors of most social sci-
ence research:
I fell in love with her because she was warm and loving and open.
Her brilliance and clear political thinking dazzled me, as did her creativ-
ity - her artwork, her cooking, her carpentry, her ideas about raising
children. Like me, she was Jewish and radical and understood the im-
portance of making one's home in the country. She was responsive to
our class differences in ways that surprised and delighted me. We had
similar dreams of family and commitment, and fantasies of how we
wanted to live. We often had hot, passionate sex. She bought me flow-
ers, and chocolate, and crystals, and wool socks. She played a mean
game of Pac-Man. She sang me love songs, and slow-danced with me in
the living room. She did not do these things only at the beginning but
throughout our relationship. Even when the violence was most frequent,
she also expressed caring tenderness toward me.
I want you to understand that I stayed with her for the same reasons
any woman stays with her lover - because I honestly and deeply loved
her, and was honestly and deeply loved by her.
I also stayed because I had nowhere else to go .... 242
The second major difference in this lesbian battering literature is
the absence of blaming the victim. Historically, lesbians have at least
at times shared the cultural stereotype of battered women as weak.
Therefore, Naming the Violence and articles on lesbian battering re-
count an initial resistance to recognizing the problem and show early
240. Lisa, Once Hitting Starts in NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra note 33, at 37-39.
241. Donna Coker suggests that battered heterosexual women also tell complex stories that
mix love, happiness, pain, and unhappiness, but that professionals working with battered women
are often uneasy with the complexity of these stories. Conversation with Donna Coker, 1990.
242. Istar, supra note 33, at 164-65.
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acceptance of myths about lesbian abuse.243 Some women initially be-
lieved that only "bar dykes" engaged in violence, that feminist lesbians
were not involved in battering relationships, and that only couples
"strictly locked into butch/femme roles ha[d] a problem with
violence." 24
So stereotypes have indeed existed among lesbians. Yet when
these attitudes emerged within activist, feminist communities they
were promptly confronted. They do not define the literature, and
therefore do not create more ongoing stereotyping of battered lesbians.
Traditional stereotypes are largely absent: the voice of the conserva-
tive social scientist, the Freudian analyst, and the professional who
blames the battered woman for failing to control her batterer, have
been left behind. The analysis generated by a grassroots, feminist, ac-
tivist community presents a more nuanced, less stereotyping, and less
victim-blaming view than any other literature in the field.
IV. POWER, CONTROL, AUTONOMY, AND SEPARATION
A. Identifying Domination in Violence Against Women
Battering is about domination: "Violence is a way of 'doing power'
in a relationship," 245 an effort by the batterer to control the woman
who is the recipient of the violence.246 This is not news. A review of
the literature shows that the conception of battering as about power -
rather than about incidents of violence or about the psychology of wo-
men who experience violence - has been present in some of the psy-
chological and sociological literature for some time.247 A decade ago,
Dobash and Dobash placed battering in the context of patriarchy and
described it as domination: "The fact that violence against wives is a
form of a husband's domination is irrefutable in the light of historical
evidence." 248 However, the emphasis on power comprised only one
243. Barbara Hart reported that when lesbian battering was first brought to light, battered
lesbians were perceived as "weak sisters." Hart, supra note 50, at 14. This obviously reflects
some influence of cultural stereotypes.
244. Ann Strach et al., Lesbian Abuse: The Process of the Lesbian Abuse Issues Network
(LAIN), in NAMING THE VIoLENcE, supra note 33, at 88, 89.
245. STETs, supra note 64, at 110 ('The men want to direct and determine how their partner
behaves, and the way they do this is through violence.... Mhe men use violence to dominate,
control, and force the women to conform to what they want."). Id. at 109.
246. LEE H. BowxER, BEATING WIE-BEATING 7-9 (1983) (discussing the balance of power
in families); SCHECHTER, supra note 94, at 219-24 (describing battering as a way to maintain
control).
247. See generally DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 12 (patriarchy and domination key
framework of study); Bograd, supra note 101, at 559 ("Violence such as rape and battering is a
form of male control over women."); see also SToRDEUR & STILE, supra note 81, at 20 (noting
recent emphasis on power and control in writings of some authors).
248. DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 12, at ix.
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thread in the literature and was intermixed with much work psycholo-
gizing battered women. 249 Legal literature, in particular, has often ig-
nored the interplay of power and control, domination and
subordination in the battering relationship.
The quest for control underlying the enforcement of women's so-
cial roles is often hard to perceive. In a heterosexual marriage, if one
partner does all the dishes and the other does all the driving - that is,
if one is assigned all responsibility for household work and spends a
substantial amount of time on this work, and the other has virtually all
the mobility - this may not strike observers as the result of an exer-
cise of power but merely as a "traditional"250 attitude in the relation-
ship. A researcher describing such a relationship might perceive
"traditionalism" on the part of the woman. If the researcher is al-
ready looking for indicia of "traditionalism" in the woman's behavior
or life circumstances,251 the terms of the inquiry may construct the
findings. The woman's apparent "traditionalism" might mask a more
fundamental issue. For example, domestic work, or large numbers of
children, will represent "traditionalism" in a woman only to the extent
that they are not the man's choice. If they are his choice, both factors
might indeed represent the man's attempt to control the woman.
Dobash and Dobash treat battering as part of a context and history
of patriarchy in which violence and disapproval inflicted by society as
a whole, as well as by individual men, enforced women's roles.252 In
fact, batterers often justify their violence with complaints describing
249. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 12, at 1-2; SCHECHTER, supra note 94, at 20-24 (dis-
cussing theories of victim provocation).
250. In her 1979 study, Lenore Walker called battered women "traditionalists" who "readily
acceptD the notion that 'a woman's proper place is in the home."' LENORE WALKER, supra
note 40, at 33. Walker stated that battered women give up careers to make the batterer happy or
accede to his need to possess her. The battered woman turns her money over to her husband,
feels that income belongs to her husband, and goes out of her way to make the man feel he is
head of the home even while she holds it together. Some women secretly save money and leave
when they have enough to go. Id at 33-34. Although Walker describes this as the woman's
traditionalism, all these actions except the belief that her income belongs to the husband seem to
reflect the man's traditionalism and ability to control the woman rather than establishing her
traditionalism. In her 1984 study, Walker found battered women more liberal and batterera the
"traditionalists." WALKER, SYNDROME supra note 110, at 148.
251. For example, PAGELOW, supra note 102, at 105-44 first hypothesizes "traditionalism"
in both men and women in battering relationships. She then goes on to interpret even contradic-
tory data as "traditionalism." Variables presumed to show "traditionalism" include: "numbers
of children" and "secondary battering cohabitation" (continuing to live with the batterer after
the first incident of violence). Id. at 127. When Pagelow's data show that women with more
children, and especially more young children, stayed in relationships longer than other women,
she interprets this as evidence of a belief in the importance of two-parent homes, rather than as a
reflection of the difficulties of leaving or the low earning power relative to child care costs of
these women. Id at 141-42. The researcher's hypothesis of "traditionalism" is subtly trans-
formed to support a finding of traditionalism.
252. DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 12, at 47-96.
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the woman's insufficient fulfillment of household responsibilities and
social role.253 The energy required to maintain that division of labor
may go unnoticed when the expectations are most shared and enforced
by social norms, and even by the actions of the state.254
Then we went to get the wedding license.
We took our blood tests and identification down to the big state office
building.. . , filled in some forms, and handed them to the clerk. She
... showed us what the minister would sign and gave us a little pamphlet
on the "Louisiana Community Property Law."
Then she turned to me and said, "And these are for you." She
handed me a nylon mesh bag with a tag attached that said, "For the
Bride." It had samples of Tide, Joy, Spray'n Wash [detergent for
clothes, detergent for dishes, stain remover for clothes], Windex, PAM
... and other household products I don't remember. I said, "You've got
to be kidding." And she said, sweetly, "No, these are for the bride."
The congruence of expectation by heterosexual batterers and soci-
ety in general may be one reason lesbian battering has been understood
as concerned with power. The expenditure of energy that goes into
controlling a loved one may be more perceptible as an exercise of
power when the control that is sought is less completely in accord with
social expectation. 255
While early studies assumed - and looked for - "traditional"
attitudes in battered women, other studies found that battered women
were likely to have less traditional attitudes regarding women's roles in
the family, but that battering men had more "traditional" attitudes.256
Consistent with this, Bowker found that men's participation in male
networks increased the likelihood that the men would have rigid atti-
tudes regarding male dominance and enforce these attitudes with
253. OKUN, supra note 107, at 69-70 (batterers justify assaults with criticisms of wives'
household tasks); STETS, supra note 64, at 71, 95-98.
254. State actions enforcing women's roles include refusal to enforce TROs and returning
women to abusive situations, generations of home economics education for girls and not for boys,
and giving out cleaning supplies as in the narrative below. Additional examples are public hous-
ing policies that define women fleeing abusive relationships outside the category of those home-
less "through no fault of [their] own," see LEE ANN HOFF, BATrERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS
195-201 (1990), and public housing policies that give the battering man possession of the apart-
ment if his wife leaves. Conversation with Kim Hanson, 1990.
The following incident took place in Louisiana in 1976. I have heard of other women who
were given with their wedding licenses either actual cleaning supplies or coupons for cleaning
supplies in California during the late 1970s and in the midwest at various times. (It is not obvi-
ous which gift the women considered more offensive).
255. This would not necessarily link "role-playing" in lesbian relationships with violence; in
fact, no such correlation emerges in the reports on lesbian battering. Barbara Hart, Violence in
Lesbian Relationships 2 (unpublished manuscript in materials on lesbian battering distributed by
W.O.M.A.N., Inc.) (on file with author); id. at 3 (denial fed by idea that only violent lesbians are
those "who hang out in bars or are into playing butch").




Focusing on the struggle to control the woman that lies at the
heart of battering makes sense of many apparently discrepant research
findings. Questions of money, status, and education could trigger
acute insecurities regarding power in relationships. In many violent
relationships the woman has a higher educational level and comes
from a higher social status than the man.258 Kersti Yllo found bat-
tering highest in states where women's power and status were highest
relative to men's.259 On the other hand, Bowker's study of women in
formerly violent marriages showed that women with higher current
incomes were less likely to have been severely beaten or beaten while
pregnant, and found no correlation of violence with the woman's
higher or lower social class. 260 In lesbian relationships, some experts
have found that the battered lesbian is more likely to be the breadwin-
ner or primary supporter of the household,261 however, another com-
mentator observed higher educational and social status among
batterers.262
If the central question in battering were the woman's acceptance of
violence, it would be difficult to explain both the widespread finding of
women's higher education and status, and the inconsistency in some of
this data. However, if we emphasize the batterer's struggle for control
and look at battering as a (violent) point on a continuum of domina-
tion in relationships, then these findings make sense in two ways: first,
factors that increase the woman's independence and autonomy might
257. BowxER, supra note 246, at 54. Bowker had expected to find greater social isolation
among battered women - reflecting some assumption that society disapproves violence as well
as the assumption that battered women have been isolated from society - but instead found
increased social embeddedness among the men, with concomitant support for male dominance.
258. WALKER, SYNDROME, supra note 110, at 11, 16, 156, 158, 160, see also Molly
Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daley, Do Restraining Orders Help? Battered Women's Experience with
Male Violence and Legal Process in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REsPONsE (Eve Buzawa & Carl Buzawa eds., forthcoming 1992) (tentative title) (statiag that
violent men had fewer years of education than their wives). Walker notes that it is said most
women marry at or above their own social class, while most men marry at or below theirs. She
therefore finds this a sharp break from the usual pattern in marriage and a noteworthy character-
istic of battering relationships. LENORE WALKER, supra note 40, at 11, 17.
259. YIo, supra note 101, at 28, 31 (noting that this finding contradicted her assumptions
about traditionalism in relationships).
260. Women with higher current income also were less likely to have suffered marital rape.
BOVWKER, supra note 246 at 50-51. None of Bowker's findings permitted a comparison with
marriages in which the husbands had higher status. His findings did not support the theory that
battering was a form of compensation for other forms of maintaining power in a relationship. Id.
261. Domestic Violence By and Against Women: An Interview About Lesbian Violence, ex-
cerpts from an interview by KALX, Berkeley, California, with Susan Jan Hornstein, Exec. Dir.
of Western Center on Domestic Violence, and Naomi Porat, Administrative Coordinator at
W.O.M.A.N., Inc. and facilitator of a battered lesbian support group, in materials on lesbian
battering collected by W.O.M.A.N., Inc., supra note 255, at 2.
262. See Hart, supra note 255, at 3 (noting battering lesbians of more privileged background).
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make additional control moves, including violence, more likely; sec-
ond, power and control struggles may be triggered by many factors
within a relationship and therefore could also be consistent with domi-
nance by the partner with greater resources.
James Ptacek, who worked with batterers, and Jan Stets, who
worked with couples, found control an ongoing issue in battering rela-
tionships. Both Ptacek and Stets describe men as using violence to
control the woman.2 63 The instrumental goal of control is made ex-
cused or made invisible by the fact that the man appears to be out of
control himself: both men and women perceive violence as caused by
the man's loss of control over his actions.264 However, both Stets and
Ptacek questioned the man's apparent loss of control. Ptacek empha-
sized that batterers' actions were selective, and that their descriptions
of their own actions reflected conscious choices. 265 Stets found that
the men selectively "lost" control in order to achieve the goal of con-
trolling the women, but differed from Ptacek in emphasizing the role of
the woman's response as minimizing the negative results for the man
of his loss of control. 266 Other scholars also have emphasized that "a
major reason for the use of marital violence is to increase one's power
over a mate. '267
Recognizing the batterer's attempt at domination as the key to bat-
tering relationships allows a focus on his motivations rather than the
psychology of the victim. A study of the effectiveness of temporary
restraining orders in relation to several different goals268 found success
263. Ptacek, supra note 48, at 147-49; STETs, supra note 64, at 101-11, 121-31.
264. To both the man and the woman in the relationship, the man's loss of control over his
actions appears to cause his violence. Ptacek, supra note 48, at 153-54. See generally STTS,
supra note 64, at 54-68. Indeed, the idea that the man cannot control his anger appears through-
out sociological and psychological literature. Id at 11-12 (discussing literature); Ptacek, supra
note 48, at 152-54 (discussing literature). The man will use this apparent lack of self control to
carry out his domination of the woman, and will also use it to "excuse" his domination.
265. Ptacek sees violence as instrumental. "[This] loss of control is substantially contra-
dicted by the batterers' own testimony. While the men claim that their violence is beyond ra-
tional control, they simultaneously acknowledge that the violence is deliberate and warranted."
Ptacek, supra note 48, at 153.
266. See generally STETS, supra note 64, at 101-11. Stets criticizes Ptacek's instrumentalism
for neglecting to ask what makes batterers discontinue particular violent incidents. Id at 61. In
her discussion of battering relationships, Stets emphasizes the woman's responses as well as male
control goals. Id at 95-100 (emphasizing woman's acts as cues). This brings her somewhat
closer to family systems theorists and to Pagelow's emphasis on the woman's response to vio-
lence. Stets sees instrumental violence as emerging over time in the course of a battering rela-
tionship. Id at 103.
267. BowKER, supra note 246, at 134. Power and control were also central contested issues
in the majority of the formerly violent marriages in Bowker's study. The cessation of violence
was associated with decreased male dominance in many of the relationships. Id.




in reducing the likelihood that the man would batter again dependent
on the man's circumstances and motivation, not the woman's.269 Sim-
ilarly, a study of interspousal homicide revealed that the men could
not cope with their bondedness with women. Unable to face their de-
pendence on the women they loved, the men struck out against the
women when they felt abandoned. Spouse homicide resulted from
"individuals attempting to solve by their action the riddles of culture
that the events of life force on them. '270 As men,. they could not be
dependent on their women, yet they could not face abandonment.
This finding emphasizes the importance in battering relationships of
the man's capacity to confront his own feelings and the danger of his
need for control.
The focus on the batterer's need for control also reconciles another
discrepancy in battering studies. Bowker reports that a threat to leave
the batterer may be very effective at ending the violence.271 However,
other studies show that separation often triggers escalated violence.272
The same behavior - threatening to leave the relationship - might
prove extremely effective or tremendously dangerous for women. The
difference will depend on the men with whom they are involved. If the
key to whether the violence escalates lies in the man's capacities, then
any system examining the woman's behavior and psychology will
poorly track the danger she faces - unless we consider her the best
judge on this issue.273 Courts are ill-equipped to measure retrospec-
tively the man's capacity to "solve... the riddles of culture" without
homicide, or the persuasiveness of his threats to the woman.274
A focus on control also makes sense of the particular situations of
269. Id. Several attributes made it more likely that the man would abuse the woman again:
prior criminal history, unemployment or part-time employment, and drug or alcohol abuse.
270. George Barnard et al., Till Death Do UsPart: A Study of Spouse Murder, 10 BULL. AM.
AcAD. PsYcasATRY & L. 271, 279 (1982).
271. BOWKER, supra note 246, at 65-67, 123.
272. Ellis, supra note 21, at 408.
273. Therefore, we need to vest evaluation of the man's violent potential in the woman. Her
understanding of the process of violence and the man's motivation may not be perfect: violence
may appear out of control to the women even when men actually retain some ability to control
their actions; women also may perceive men's actions after violence as contrition or determina-
tion to reform which the men either do not experience or will not admit openly. STETs, supra
note 64, at 127. However, the instrumental nature of his violence makes her, the target, the
closest observer. She has more resources to measure his violent potential than any outside ob-
server and the woman is best placed to assess the man's potential dangerousness, because she is
most aware of the times and manner in which violence may occur. Barbara Hart, Beyond the
"Duty to Warn'" A Therapist's "Duty to Protect" Battered Women and Children, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABusE, supra note 31, at 234, 240.
274. This is true whether the legal issues relate to her injury or death, or his. Barbara Hart
has therefore drafted a lethality assessment questionnaire that aims to help professionals elicit
from the battered woman information relevant to her informed assessment of her own situation,
rather than replacing her assessment with their own. See id
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women with children. Women with children often give their children
as the reason for their action - whether they have acted to stay, leave,
or return to a relationship. 275 With the focus on control, difference
makes sense: different male tactics, different types or frequency of vio-
lent episodes, might work to keep a woman with no children in a rela-
tionship than would work with a woman with children,276 since
women often leave when they perceive either physical or emotional
danger to their children from the violence.277 Controlling a woman
with a disability - or whose child has a disability - may also have its
own particularities of action within relationships. Fear of custody ac-
tions may also facilitate the control of women who believe a court
might be unsympathetic to them.
Perhaps most important, identifying power and control as the
struggle within a relationship enables women to make sense of our
own experiences.
I don't even talk baby talk to my kid like I did to my first husband.
It reduced me - I was not supposed to think. I was not supposed to
have any ideas. I was not supposed to be a person.
One thing that made it so difficult was that before hooking up with
him, I was a leader in the community. I was doing a lot of anti-war
organizing work. I had my own apartment, my own life. I was an in-
dependent person, I'd been on my own for years. IFhad not moved from
being dependent on my family to the marriage. I was a person who
knew how to take care of myself, who had made it on my own.
To this day, I don't understand it. I'm usually not a person who's
lost for words, I'm usually not a person who falls to pieces. I get
ambushed by the Klan, and I have the clearest head of anybody around.
But that certainly wasn't the case in that marriage.
This woman recognizes her own strength and independence, and finds
it hard to reconcile these qualities with the degree of control her hus-
band succeeded in exercising through a few violent episodes followed
by explicit and implicit threats. In fact, these could have been the
qualities that made her husband feel threatened and turn to violence as
a means of control. For years, she described the unhappiness of the
marriage to friends without describing her husband's violence. She
described personal problems frankly but could not communicate the
experience of violence without diminishing her own self-esteem. She
275. DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 12, at 148.
276. Pagelow notes that the presence of young children can be a very strong factor that keeps
women in their relationships; most women waited to leave until their children were at least past
infancy. PAGELOW, supra note 102, at 142.
277. "Her decision to terminate the relationship is more often motivated by concern for her
children than by any real appreciation of the unacceptability of the abuse she has experienced."
Anne McGillivray, Battered Women. Definition, Models and Prosecutorial Policy, 6 CAN. J.
FAM. L. 15, 22 (1987); see also DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 12, at 148.
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could have described his actions as inappropriate attempts at control-
ling her without incurring the same humiliation.
Focusing on control lets women understand our lives without
stigma by describing battered women's experience as part of all wo-
men's experience. A focus on control places the sensational, severely
violent cases on a continuum of violence that makes sense whether the
woman or the batterer is the defendant, whether it is a criminal or a
civil case, whether or not the case appears likely go to court. There-
fore, a focus on control provides the link between the woman's experi-
ence in her relationship and the experience of other women she learns
of through the press or other media - an essential step toward her
informed decisionmaking and toward remaking women's cultural con-
cepts of domestic violence. Finally, by sorting and explaining wo-
men's experience in ways that apply across the varied legal postures in
which domestic violence comes to public attention, a focus on power
and control provides a coherent understanding of the experience of
women in different situations: women experiencing varying kinds of
attack by batterers in the attempt to exercise power and control; wo-
men of varying social status; women with or without children; women
perceived as "leaving" or "staying."
To bring women's experience into law and make it more compre-
hensible to women ourselves, we need litigation strategies aimed at
exposing the power and control at the heart of battering. One example
of such litigation is the lawsuits brought since the 1970s that expose
the failure of police to enforce temporary restraining orders.278 We
need more such creative approaches that expose the complicity of the
state and society in the control of women in violent marriages. After
being physically threatened and emotionally attacked for my failures
at housework, I have often longed to sue the state actor - the clerk
processing paperwork for marriage licenses - who by handing me
cleaning supplies put the state's imprimatur on my husband's concep-
tion that this would be my job. Joyce McConnell describes battering
relationships as involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment - an analysis consistent with an emphasis on power.2 79
Below, I develop an example of such a strategy, emphasizing the at-
tacks on women's attempts to separate from violent relationships to
help expose issues of power and control in both law and culture.
278. See, e.g., Bruno v. Codd, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dept., 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988), amended on other grounds, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990);
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
279. Joyce McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women and Involuntary Servitude, 4
YALE J.L & FEMINISM (forthcoming).
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B. "Who Says She Didn't Leave?"-280 Challenging Perceptions of
Separation and Autonomy
The "shopworn question" 281 persists in the cases, legal scholar-
ship, and social science literature. It reveals several assumptions about
separation: that the right solution is separation, that it is the woman's
responsibility to achieve separation, and that she could have separated.
The question "why didn't she leave" is actually an objectifying state-
ment that asserts that the woman did not leave. Asking this question
often makes actual separations disappear.
If we ask the woman, "What did you do?" the answer very often
turns out to be, "I sought help." Edward Gondolf, who studied wo-
men's helpseeking behavior, found that women responded to abuse by
seeking help from both formal and informal sources.282 The more ap-
parent it became that the batterer would not change, or the worse the
abuse became, the greater diversity the women showed in their efforts
to find help.28 3 Gondolf concluded that it was the helping professions,
rather than battered women, that were afflicted with "helplessness."
He described battered women as "survivors" who developed self-tran-
scendence to allow them to go on.28 4
When we ask the woman, "Exactly what did you do in your search
for help?" the answer often turns out to be that she left - at least
temporarily. In Gondolf's study, more than seventy percent of the
women had left home at some time in response to violence, though
only fourteen percent had gone to shelters.285 Of the women Walker
studied, about one quarter left temporarily after each battering inci-
dent.286 Walker does not indicate whether the intention of these wo-
men as they left was temporary or permanent separation or whether
they were in fact uncertain when they left.
Some social scientists have criticized the assumption that the wo-
man has a responsibility to - on her own - successfully accomplish a
separation in her family on her first attempt to do S0.287 This assump-
280. This is my paraphrase of Lewis Okun's phrase, "Who says she does stay?" OKuN,
supra note 107, at 56.
281. Ann Jones, The Burning Bed and Man Slaughter, 9 WoMEN's Rrs. L. REP. 295, 296
(1986) (book review).
282. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 12, at 18, 27-28 (describing several studies showing
heipseeking); see also WALKER, SYNDROME supra note 110, at 26 ("As the violence escalated, so
did the probability that the battered woman would seek help.").
283. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 12, at 92-93.
284. Id at 22-23, 99.
285. Id at 77-78.
286. WALKER, SYNDROME, supra note 110, at 26.
287. OKUN, supra note 107, at 56; GONDoLF & FISHER, supra note 12, at 82-83.
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tion ignores the woman's substantial ties to her current family struc-
tures. Her initial goal in separating may have been to improve her
family structure rather than end it. Participation by the batterer in a
counseling program is a very significant factor in predicting a woman
will end a separation, since his participation tends to increase her hope
for safe return.288 Therefore, some experts recommend the credible
threat to leave or attempt to separate as a measure for women who
seek to end the violence against them but wish to preserve their rela-
tionships. 289 Finally, the assumption that the woman's first separation
should be permanent ignores the real dangers that the man will seek
actively - and sometimes violently - to end the separation. 290
When the woman is asked, "what happened to you when you left?"
we discover the lack of available resources. Shelters are unable to fill
all the women's needs; when shelters make referrals to social service
agencies, the agencies are often inadequate. Gondolf therefore identi-
fied "learned helplessness" among the helping professionals to whom
women turned for assistance.291 Neighbors, friends, and family may
be sources of help, but often they too leave the separated woman with-
out assistance:
It was a day he was supposed to visit the children, but he didn't
come. About nine o'clock at night, I heard a pounding noise downstairs.
I heard him shout that he was bleeding, "Help me, help me."
He had broken one of the glass panes in the door and wouldn't stop
hitting it. When I opened the door, he fell part way through and lay
there on the floor, moaning. He had been in a bar fight around the cor-
ner from my house, 10 miles from his own. He had broken a glass door
at the bar and come back to the house. He said the police were after
him. I thought he was crazy.
I went to the phone - I didn't want to leave the room or take my
eyes off him, and called my closest friends, a couple who lived a few
blocks away. The man answered the phone. I said urgently that my
husband was there and that I needed this friend to come over right away.
He said OK and hung up. Fifteen or twenty minutes passed, and then
his"Wife showed up. She said, "Allan wasn't going to come. He didn't
see why you were bothering us. But I figured, if you had called, someone
ought to check up and see what was going on."
The police arrived. They had traced his car to our house and fol-
lowed a trail of blood to our door. They weren't going to arrest him.
288. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 12, at 87.
289. BOWKER, supra note 246, at 65-67, 123 (husband's fear of divorce ended violence); see
also Littleton, supra note 34, at 52 (criticizing the current legal system for offering actual separa-
tion as the only remedy against violence).
290. See infra text accompanying notes 295-302.
291. GoNDoLF & FISHER, supra note 12, at 22-23.
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When I asked, they waited for his brother-in-law to come pick him up.
... Finally everyone went home.
It was so frightening that a man I had known for five years, who
knew how my ex-husband had been, had actually lied to me and said he
was coming, then been willing not to show up. They lived four blocks
away! My mother told me I should talk to the neighbors, try to line up
more help for next time. So I went to my next door neighbor the next
day and began, "About the noise last night. . . ." He looked at me very
fiercely. "What noise? We didn't hear anything!" For a minute, I
thought he had been running his air conditioner and really couldn't hear.
It was a small quiet street in a family neighborhood. I said, "When the
police came... ." He glared at me again and interrupted. "We didn't
hear a thing!"
Finally, we ask the woman herself about the key behavior of the
violent partner whose behavior actually defines her state as a "battered
woman." We say, "What did he do when you left?" At that moment,
we will hear the story of the attacks on her autonomy; all we need to
do is listen. Often, a woman has left several times before she finally
ends a marriage. 292 Or, she may have been restrained from leaving by
violent or coercive means: by being held prisoner in her home, by
being threatened with custody suits, by having her savings taken away
before she could depart.2 93 One feminist writer in the field recently
wrote without apparent irony,
[He] always found ways to get her to come back. He would come and
tell her how sorry he was and how much he loved her; he would promise
never to do it again. And she wanted to believe him .... When she
wavered and it appeared his pleas and promises might not work, he
would threaten to kill her if she refused to come home, threats which his
past behavior gave her every reason to take seriously.294
There are many aspects to redefining separation: we need to compre-
hend the related power and control issues common to continuing rela-
tionships and to separation, rethink the implicit burden on the woman
to leave her home and risk losing her family, and change our percep-
tions of what it means for her to separate. Finally, we need to reckon
with the dangers she faces. The rest of this article discusses the assault
on women's attempts to separate. The story of the violent pursuit of
the separating woman must become part of the way we understand
domestic violence to help eliminate the question "Why didn't she
leave?" from our common vocabulary.
292. See, e.g., DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 12, at 144-47 (discussing the woman's leav-
ing, returning, and leaving again as a process of pulling away from the commitment of marriage
and establishing an autonomous life despite insufficient resources to support a family).
293. See, eg., OKuN, supra note 107, at 69 (citing several studies describing women's secret
savings to allow them to leave abusive relationships).
294. GILLEsPIE, supra note 11, at 2.
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C. Strategies for Change and the Redefinition of Separation
How can we bring the issues of power and control into the court-
room? Can we explain how differently men and women may perceive
control?
I once told a man in a bar that if I was attacked by a man and could
somehow fight him off enough to run away, I would consider that I had
won the encounter - that I had beaten him. The man said, "No, no,
you had to run away, therefore you lost." I said, "No, I was safe, I was
unviolated, and therefore I won, I preserved myself." That's what we
have to deal with: the way we cope may be very successful, useful, and
good - as women - and you can count that as a success. A man could
not count refusal to show fear as success. Because he was able to control
you as he saw it, show rage, he may think he was successful in that
situation as well.
This reflection on the ways men and women perceive control has
important implications for the concept of separation assault. The wo-
man defines successful flight from attack as a victory. The man insists
that this is not victory but defeat. The persistent accounts of the diffi-
culty women encounter on separation, especially condemnation from
their families and employers, suggest society's perceptions track men's
interpretations: leaving a violent relationship is widely perceived as an
admission of defeat rather than victory. The ways in which separation
is similar to the escape from impliedly sexual assault discussed in the
quotation above are generally not cognizable at all in law or social
discourse. The dangers women face in the effort to separate make sep-
aration a victory. These dangers need a name.
Law assumes - pretends - the autonomy of women. Every legal
case that discusses the question "why didn't she leave?" implies that
the woman could have left. We need to challenge the coercion of wo-
men's choices, reveal the complexity of women's experience and strug-
gle, and recast the entire discussion of separation in terms of the
batterer's violent attempts at control.
Although it is still focused on successful and final separation as the
key event, the recently developed term "postseparation woman abuse"
begins to grapple with the problem of revealing the issue of power and
control in women's experience of violence.295 At least half of women
who leave their abusers are followed and harassed or further attacked
by them.296 In one study of interspousal homicide,297 more than half
295. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 21, at 410.
296. BROWNE, supra note 3, at 110.
297. Until we begin gathering on a broad scale statistics that speak to separation, we are
more likely to know if women kill spouses than if men do, since the status of a woman victim as a
former partner of the man may or may not appear in police reports and statistics. Since women
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of the men who killed their spouses did so when the partners were
separated; in contrast, less than ten percent of women who killed were
separated at the time.298 Power and control are crucial here in several
ways. Men who kill their wives describe their feeling of loss of control
over the woman as a primary factor; most frequently, the man ex-
presses the fear that the woman was about to abandon him, though in
fact this fear may have been unfounded. 299 The fact that marital sepa-
ration increases the instigation to violence3°° shows that these attacks
are aimed at preventing or punishing the woman's autonomy. They
are major - often deadly - power moves.
However, the term "postseparation woman abuse" fails to capture
the many cases where violence occurs in response to the decision itself:
the essential attack is on the woman's autonomy. Barbara Hart notes
that "[tihe decision by a battered woman to leave is often met with
escalated violence by the batterer. °30 1 When the decision, rather than
actual separation, triggers the attack, the circumstances of the violence
may not reveal the assault on separation: the couple may still have
been living together, and the attack may have taken place inside their
mutual home - yet the attack may have been a direct response to her
assertion of the will to separate or her first physical moves toward
separation.
Defining Separation Assault
To expose the struggle for control, we should recognize the assault
on the woman's separation as a specific type of attack that occurs at or
after the moment she decides on a separation or begins to prepare for
one. I propose that we call it "separation assault." The varied violent
and coercive moves in the process of separation assault can be termed
"separation attacks."
Separation assault is the attack on the woman's body and volition
in which her partner seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for
the separation, or force her to return. It aims at overbearing her will
as to where and with whom she will live, and coercing her in order to
enforce connection in a relationship. It is an attempt to gain, retain,
kill partners with whom they are still living, this is more likely to be detected as interspousal
violence.
298. Barnard et al., supra note 270, at 274; see also Franklin Zimring et al., Intimate Vio-
lence: A Study of Intersexual Homicide, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 910 (1983).
299. Barnard et al., supra note 270, at 224.
300. Ellis, supra note 21, at 408.
301. Hart, supra note 273, at 240 (emphasis added).
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or regain power in a relationship, or to punish the woman for ending
the relationship. It often takes place over time.
Attacks on separation pervaded the stories of the women who
spoke with me. The announcement of intent to separate may be
fraught with grave danger:
He was on strike for the second time in a year. I was pregnant with
the second baby in a row. There was absolutely no money. Every day,
he yelled at me for a long time - an hour, two hours - about how
awful I was .... I remember how desperate I felt and how much I
needed it to stop.
[One day, when he seemed receptive, she told him it had to stop.] He
wouldn't listen. I said I couldn't live like that anymore and would leave
if he didn't stop. He kept saying I couldn't leave because we didn't have
enough money to support two households, I said that only his failure to
listen could make me leave - I couldn't live like that anymore ....
Suddenly he lost his temper .... He stormed upstairs, and I heard
him pushing around in the closet. I thought, "That's funny. It sounds
like he's getting the gun." And I didn't sit down or move - I stood in
the middle of the living room floor and waited. He came down the stairs
shouting and I saw that he really did have the shotgun. I knew it was
fully loaded. I remember making the conscious decision that this was
different than waiting through other outbursts, and that any argument
would be deadly.
I turned around and ran out the front door screaming that I was
pregnant and ran up the landlady's front steps. I was going to call the
police. But I realized that I had heard the baby crying upstairs. All the
noise had wakened her from her nap. I couldn't believe he would shoot
his child, but I didn't know why he'd gotten the gun, how well he actu-
ally knew what he was doing... how irritating her crying might be. I
turned around and went back into the house. I could hear him putting
the gun away in the closet. We got to the baby at the same moment.
I dressed her, put on my own clothes, and left. I had $1.60 and no
more money coming for several days. I took the better car. I drove
away without knowing where I was going to go. (Emphasis added.)
Although women's stories recount many attacks triggered by sepa-
ration, the nature of the attack on separation itself generally goes un-
recognized. Similarly, women describe coercive violence escalating
after separation - violence clearly aimed at denying their autonomy
- in terms that show they may internalize self-blame rather than
clearly identifying the man's attempt at control:
We had been separated nine months. I came home late one night
with a date. I was sitting in the living room playing backgammon with
this man, when I saw the car drive up. I thought of sending [my date]
home, but I didn't, maybe because I knew I needed help. Maybe I was
just defiant.
He knocked. I kept the chain lock on the door, and I told him to go
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home. He wouldn't leave. He rang the bell for fifteen minutes without
stopping. I woke up my roommate, and she disconnected the doorbell.
He started pounding on the door. He broke it in and started a fight
with this man. I'm sitting there in horror, watching it - the door bro-
ken down, them crashing around the living room .... The kids woke
up. I sat them on the couch with me.
Then - he was very drunk - the fighting stopped. It was pretty
short. But it took two hours to try to get him to leave. He ran around
with a butcher knife... he left the house with it. Finally, I could call
the police. Then I don't know if he came back in with the knife - I
think he came back after the police were called. The kids were on the
couch screaming and crying, I was trying to take care of them.
The police saw the door leaning in the middle of the room, the room
trashed and crashed. [They refused to arrest him because "his name is
still on the lease."] They told me to get a TRO the next day.
I was left to put the pieces back together. And you know what I did?
I went and made love to that guy who was there. I had to - anything to
not think. I feel kind of whorish about that - I hardly knew him. I
didn't even want to, it was 6 a.m., my whole body hurt, I was just ex-
hausted. It seems bizarre.
So I went and got the TRO. Now when I talk about it, I feel like I
should be more upset about it.
No, nobody in the building heard anything. They're afraid to. They
didn't hear him break down the door, or even ring the doorbell for fifteen
minutes in the middle of the night .... None of them heard anything!
This woman's sexual choice seems at least partly explicable as a reas-
sertion of control over her body, over her choice in men, and as a
specific denial of power to the ex-husband who had put her through so
much pain. Her husband might break down the door, but she could
affirm her separation again.
Women describe protracted and inventive attacks on their moves
to separate:
Well, leaving took months. When I first left, I really didn't even
know I was leaving the marriage. I was just going to California to get
the car that he had left there. But being on my own again, and away
from him, I began to regain some of my self-confidence, and I liked it.
And people liked me.
But then he came out to California to reclaim me. And totally hu-
miliated me in front of my friends. ["Humiliation" including forcing her
to have sex - essentially committing marital rape - in the back of a
Volkswagen van while two other men were in the vehicle.] I was scared
of him, I was still scared of his violence. As strong as I had been when
he wasn't around, as soon as he came around, I would fall back into the
baby talk, I would fall back into the patterns.
Then we got back to Michigan, and I left again and went to stay with
my friends. I was in Ann Arbor, and I had a fever. And he came to
check on me .... He got my heirloom ring off my finger that night. The
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ring that all my life I felt separated me from poor white trash. The ring
that my great-great-grandmother brought over from Germany when she
fled the failed revolution of 1848. I never saw that ring again. He
threatened to bum down the house I was staying in, but he was satisfied
when I gave him the ring because he knew I would come back for it.
I went back again [because he promised to return the ring]. I never
got it. And then when it was time for my friends to leave town, they
came to our house in Detroit, en masse, and said it was time to go. And
I picked up, and I walked out. "Well, it's time to go, we're leaving."
And I went.
Some of these attacks on separation will go unnoticed until we begin
identifying them specifically:
I felt guilty, so I went back. That lasted a month, until Valentine's
Day .... Finally, on Valentine's Day, he was throwing things. He was
throwing glass - I was barefoot - it was totally absurd. I was being
held prisoner in my bed by glass!
I picked the kids up, scrunched my feet so they were under the glass,
dragged my feet over the floor so they weren't getting cut too much, and
made it out of the house.
One of the best-known battered women in America is Francine
Hughes, whose story was told in The Burning Bed. The trial and
movie brought the atrocities against her to public attention, but there
was little cultural attention to the lessons of her search for autonomy:
Hughes' entire marriage - and her life after divorce - was a search for
the exit. [Family], in-laws, friends, social services, police, sheriff's office,
county prosecutor - she tried them all. And even when Mickey Hughes
came within moments of choking her to death or cutting her throat, no
one helped.302
We already recognize the danger of the attack on separation
pragmatically and intuitively. This is a major reason for the existence
of shelters, which protect women against attacks while giving them a
place to live. It is the main reason that shelter numbers and addresses
are not listed in telephone directories. It is the main reason women
seek protective orders. It fills the pages of our newspapers with ac-
counts of attacks on women by their separated husbands. Although
we see this attack everywhere, we cannot analyze it until it has a
name.
Naming Separation Assault and Understanding Battering
Naming women's experience is an important component of femi-
nist struggle for social and legal change.30 3 Naming separation assault
has the potential to change consciousness in a manner comparable to
302. Jones, supra note 281, at 296.
303. Kelly, supra note 31, at 114-17.
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the concept of "date rape." "Date rape" and "separation assault"
name phenomena women know from our own experience, but which
remain invisible without names.304 These terms do more, however,
than merely identify hitherto unnamed experience. Each term identi-
fies one aspect of a common attack on women in a way that illumi-
nates the whole picture. Date rape is not all rape; separation assault is
not the whole story of battering. Yet in each case, the act of identify-
ing and describing the formerly invisible part transforms our under-
standing of the formerly misunderstood whole.
"Date rape" was a term women recognized when we heard it. It
helped popularize a redefinition of the concept of rape: "Acquain-
tance rape is forced, manipulated or coerced sexual intercourse by a
friend or an acquaintance. It is an act of violence, aggression and
power. ' 30 5 Naming date rape helped move discussion of rape past its
old starting point, an image of sexual violence committed by a stran-
ger. The concept of date rape thereby allowed women to recognize
that the assault they had experienced was, in fact, rape.
Naming and recognizing separation assault will make women's ex-
perience more comprehensible to ourselves as well as to the legal sys-
tem: We know it when we hear it. Attacks on our autonomy are one
point at which women can - without stereotyping or invoking the
likelihood of denial - locate our own experiences and those of our
sisters and friends on a continuum of control attempts that includes
those extremes of violence that become known through the sensational
cases covered by the press. Women may find the current terminology
of battering stigmatizing or alienating, yet be willing to admit that
they have experienced inappropriate control attempts by their part-
ners, including assaults on their capacity to separate from "bad" mar-
riages. Exposing control attempts reveals the woman's struggle,
rather than defining her according to the behavior of her assailant.
The name "separation assault" also helps women understand our
own long-term reactions to violence or to the threats accompanying
the end of relationships. Shelters and counseling provide short-term
separation assistance, but the impact of separation assault goes on:
Fear of an ex-husband becomes part of a woman's life.
304. That which has no name, that for which we have no words or concepts, is rendered
mute and invisible; powerless to inform or transform our consciousness of our experience,
our understanding, our vision, powerless to claim its own existence.
Barbara DuBois, Passionate Scholarship: Notes on Values, Knowing and Method in Feminist So-
cial Sciences, in THEORIES OF WOMEN'S STUDIES 105, 108 (Gloria Bowles & Renate Duelli
Klein eds., 1983), quoted in Kelly, supra note 31, at 114. Another example of an assault we must
come to recognize is "sexual harassment." Id. at 115.




The first year I was at Stanford, I saw The Burning Bed. I couldn't
not watch it, and I couldn't stop watching. I was so scared when it fin-
ished. I started calling my ex-husband. It was the middle of the night
there. I kept calling him frantically for over an hour. He wasn't home.
I became convinced he was on his way there with a gun on a plane. I
was sure he would kill me.
I locked the door and got in bed with the kids and shook all night,
waiting for him. It was two and a half years later. I was two thousand
miles away.
This woman had withstood physical attacks before and after separa-
tion, as well as poverty, the indignities inflicted by welfare workers,
and the threat of a custody suit. Naming the phenomenon that re-
newed her fear will allow her to recognize her experience and weigh
the dangers of her particular situation. 306 When women blame our-
selves for the difficulties we face, this internalized fear becomes part of
the culture of women, part of advice mothers give to daughters and
friends give each other, as marriages fray and when women are
threatened. Naming the assault on separation may begin to pull loose
the threads of intimidation from the fabric of feminine wisdom, and to
legitimate women's perception of danger while directing our attention
toward the resources and support we will need, rather than to our own
deficiencies or inadequacies. 30 7
Popularizing the concept of separation assault is not without hid-
den dangers, however. Separation assault is effective in part because,
rather than directly confronting existing stereotypes of battered wo-
men, it provides a partial explanation of women's actions that redi-
rects attention toward the batterer. It works in part through its very
resonance with existing stereotypes that ask why the woman didn't
leave. Therefore, this concept alone cannot remake our understanding
of domestic violence; by itself, separation assault becomes merely an-
other explanation of the woman's apparent "failure" to separate - at
worst, subtle reinforcement of existing stereotypes. Without further
cultural redefinition of battering as a process of power and control,
naming separation assault may not deeply challenge oppressive ideol-
ogy regarding women and domestic violence. However, on a broader
scale, separation assault should help the larger goal of shifting cultural
perception because it helps change "objective" judgment - that is,
shared cultural perceptions and wisdom - about what is normal in
306. Hart, supra note 273, at 240-49.
307. Women often blame themselves and internalize responsibility for the violence. DOBASH
& DOBASH, supra note 12, at 119; OKUN, supra note 107, at 73. Gondolf and Fisher report
studies showing women most likely to blame themselves for the first incident; after that, they
increasingly blame the batterer and seek to change him. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 12, at
16.
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relationships. In the next part of this article, I explain how the redefi-
nition of separation described above can help change legal doctrine in
several areas by shifting both cultural expectation and judicial inquiry.
V. THE UsEs OF A NAME: SEPARATION ASSAULT AND LEGAL
DOcTRINE
Naming separation assault is an attempt to use a social definition, a
cultural concept, to resolve doctrinal problems in law. It should not
articulate a new test for women's behavior ("did this woman in fact
leave and how shall we judge the energy with which she attempted
separation?") but rather promote a new understanding of violence
against women. As it intervenes in cultural consciousness, separation
assault allows legal actors (including attorneys, prosecutors, judges,
jurors, social workers, and legal scholars) to reconceive many legal
questions that depend on an understanding of women's lives and ex-
periences. Our understanding of "objective" reasonableness depends
on our cultural intuitions about normal experience and normal re-
sponse. By reflecting a consciousness of power and control, and by
emphasizing the dangers attendant on separation, separation assault
helps make women's experience comprehensible in law.
In the following sections, I show how separation assault can be
identified in cases in many areas of legal doctrine, and then explain
how understanding separation assault can help resolve troubled areas
in law. My review of the cases and doctrines is necessarily partial and
suggestive, rather than comprehensive. It is a beginning. It is in-
tended both to invite more discussion of the ways in which litigation
can help expose in both law and culture the power and control at the
heart of battering, and to invite further analysis of the particular dan-
gers to women at separation.
A. Recognizing Separation Assault in the Cases: The Problem of
the Dead Woman's Voice
exit n... 1: a departure from a stage
2a: ... going away b: DEATH30 8
There is a two-layered problem in seeing through the criminal
cases involving abuse of women. First, these cases appear in various
doctrinal guises, and few explicitly acknowledge that they concern do-
mestic violence at all. Second, on closer examination, many of the
"wife-murder" cases turn out to be "ex-wife murder," the most ex-




treme violence turned against women at separation. Many of the wo-
men killed by their husbands are killed after they have separated. 309
Ironically, since those women are not alive to tell their stories, their
voices disappear into the narrative voices of the courts, where the wo-
men are not usually identified as battered:
On a day in early September in 1977, the petitioner and his wife of 28
years had a heated argument in their home. During the course of this
altercation, the petitioner, who had consumed several cans of beer,
threatened his wife with a knife and damaged some of her clothing. At
this point, the petitioner's wife declared that she was going to leave him,
and departed to stay with relatives. [This was not the first time that he
and his wife had been separated as a result of his violent behavior.] That
afternoon she went to a Justice of the Peace and secured a warrant
charging the petitioner with aggravated assault. A few days later, while
still living away from home, she filed suit for divorce. [A court hearing
date was set and several efforts to persuade the wife to return home were
rebuffed.] At some point during this period, his wife moved in with her
mother .... [Several angry phone calls were exchanged, while she re-
fused to reconcile.]
At this juncture, the petitioner got out his shotgun and walked with
it down the hill from his home to the trailer where his mother-in-law
lived. Peering through a window, he observed his wife, his mother-in-
law, and his 11-year-old daughter playing a card game. He pointed the
shotgun at his wife through the window and pulled the trigger. The
charge from the gun struck his wife in the forehead and killed her in-
stantly. He proceeded into the trailer, striking and injuring his fleeing
daughter with the barrel of the gun. He then fired the gun at his mother-
in-law, striking her in the head and killing her instantly.310
Godfrey v. Georgia presents an almost perfect picture of the dan-
gers for women at separation: Mrs. Godfrey had resolutely separated
from her husband and energetically sought the protection of the law.
However, her story does not enter the criminal law casebook 31 as a
domestic violence case. Rather, Godfrey is a death penalty case
presenting the issue of whether this murder was unambiguously "out-
rageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman," or whether the case
revealed ambiguity and vagueness in the death penalty statute. The
Supreme Court essentially found Mrs. Godfrey's death to be quite an
309. No one has counted how many women are killed at the moment they announce that
they are leaving. However, the fact that more than half of women who leave their husbands are
violently harassed was noted by BROWNE, supra note 3, at 110. The tendency for separation to
actually increase the incidence of violence has also been noted. See Ellis, supra note 21, at 408
(citing several studies).
310. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 424-25 (1980).
311. See, eg., JOHN KAPLAN & ROBERT WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1991), which
considers Godfrey in its section on capital murder. Id. at 412. In fact, most casebooks have no
category for domestic violence, though "battered woman's syndrome" may enter discussions of
the duty to retreat or of diminished capacity defenses.
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ordinary murder.312 I believe the majority was correct - this was an
ordinary murder - but the facts were even more ordinary than the
majority realized.
Mary McNeil has shown that several torts cases on duty are actu-
ally domestic violence cases in disguise.313 However, once the domes-
tic violence is perceived, separation assault appears to be a further
hidden issue in at least one of the cases.3 14 In Jablonski by Pahls v.
United States,31 5 Melinda Kimball had repeatedly approached the psy-
chologists who examined the man she lived with, telling his doctors
that she was afraid of him.316 They failed to commit him or to seek his
medical records, which would have revealed that he had ten years ear-
lier been diagnosed as schizophrenic and had then had homicidal ideas
about his wife.317 One doctor told Kimball that she should avoid
Jablonski if she feared him. Kimball left after a priest also urged her
to separate from Jablonski. She was murdered when she returned to
the apartment to pick up some baby diapers.318 Since there is no rec-
ord of any attempt to kill her before she left, separation appears to be
at least a precipitating factor in Kimball's death.
In Garcia v. Superior Court, Grace Morales was killed by Napo-
leon Johnson, Jr., the man from whom she had recently separated.319
According to the complaint, Johnson's parole officer was aware that
Johnson had killed his first wife after she left him.320 Although he was
312. "A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as 'out-
rageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman."' 446 U.S. at 428-29.
313. Mary McNeill, Domestic Violence: The Skeleton in Tarasoff's Close4 in DOMEsnc VI-
OLENCE ON TRILr, supra note 58, at 197.
314. In one of the cases McNeill describes, Hedlund v. Superior Court, 669 P.2d 41 (Cal.
1983), facts in the opinionare insufficient to reveal whether the couple was together or separated
when he shot her. Stephen Wilson and La Nita Wilson had sought counseling and psychother-
apy together, though the opinion notes that they were not married and that the identity of their
last names was in fact coincidental. 669 P.2d at 42-43 & n.4. Stephen had informed his ther-
apists that he intended to "commit serious bodily injury upon" La Nita. 669 P.2d at 43. When
Stephen shot her, La Nita saved her three-year-old son Darryl by throwing her body across the
child's. 669 P.2d at 46. The questions in the case were whether the psychologists were negligent
in failing to diagnose Stephen's dangerousness and warn La Nita, and whether Darryl should
recover because-of his close relationship with his mother. 669 P.2d at 46, 46 n.7. Some cases
McNeill discusses are ambiguous: in Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal.
1976), the dead woman had not in fact been in a relationship with her murderer, but he had
imagined that a relationship existed and that she had left him. McNeill, supra note 313, at 199.
Tarasoffis therefore a separation assault from the man's point of view - from the woman's, it is
a story of a stranger's obsession, a more general lesson in vulnerability to the male imagination.
315. 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983).
316. 712 F.2d at 393-94.
317. 712 F.2d at 393-94. Apparently, this was a first wife, given the long time period and
different city in which the first events took place. See 712 F.2d at 393.
318. 712 F.2d at 394.
319. 789 P.2d 960, 961-62 (Cal. 1990).
320. 789 P.2d at 962.
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notified that Johnson had threatened to kill Morales and that Morales
was filing a temporary restraining order, the parole officer advised
Morales that Johnson would not come looking for her.321 Johnson
kidnapped Morales and killed her; her children sued.322 The court
distinguished the parole officer's "negligent representations" from a
failure to warn for which the officer might have been liable under
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 323 and held that the
plaintiffs must allege that Morales reasonably relied on the parole of-
ficer's advice.3 24
The California case of People v. Berry, doctrinally significant for its
holding on cooling off periods when killers claim provocation by their
victims, also concerns a hidden separation assault.325 The only ac-
count of the marriage is the one Berry gave the police and at trial.
According to Berry's story, his wife, Rachel Pessah, had gone to Israel
within days of their marriage; on her return, she taunted him about
her love for another man and her plans to leave Berry.326 After re-
peated arguments and threats or attempts to separate, he tried to
strangle her.3 27 He called a cab to take her to a hospital, and she later
filed a police report that resulted in a warrant for his arrest.328 He told
her he was leaving their home and going to stay with a friend. Two
days later, he returned to the apartment and waited overnight. She
returned the next day and said she supposed he had come to kill her.
He was indecisive, but said he had. She screamed. He strangled
her.329
Even feminist literature on battering may overlook the particular-
ity of attacks on women's autonomy. For example, the feminist news-
letter Response cites the 1988 case of Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Department330 in a short article entitled "Court Rules in Favor of
Abused Wife." The one-paragraph article describes Balistreri as
an abused wife who sued police for not protecting her.... Police had
refused to arrest the batterer when summoned following a beating, failed
to offer medical assistance, and did not protect the woman over a 3-year
321. 789 P.2d at 962.
322. 789 P.2d at 961.
323. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), distinguished in Garcia, 789 P.2d at 963.
324. 789 P.2d at 963.
325. 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976).
326. 556 P.2d at 779. The expert testimony on Rachel's provocative behavior was based
entirely on Berry's account of Rachel's words.
327. 556 P.2d at 779.
328. 556 P.2d at 778-79.
329. 556 P.2d at 779. His previous marriage had also ended violently. Reporter's Transcript
at 245-53 (on file with the author).
330. 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988), amended on other grounds, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990).
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period during which she reported incidents to police and obtained a re-
straining order.3 31
Most of the facts of Balistreri concern attacks after separation.
When Balistreri's husband beat her severely in February 1982, officers
failed to help her.332 She divorced her husband - apparently
promptly, because "throughout 1982" she complained to police of
vandalism and harassing phone calls by the husband "from whom she
was now divorced. ' 333 In November that year, her "former husband"
crashed his car into her garage, and in March 1983, a firebomb was
thrown through the window of her house. 334 From 1983 to 1985, tele-
phone harassment and vandalism continued.335 Balistreri emerges as a
woman of great strength - resisting her ex-husband's repeated at-
tacks and pursuing her complaint within the legal system when her
lawyer would go no further.336 "Abused wife," the term used by Re-
sponse, captures neither her determined resistance nor her separation
as the keys to the repeated violence she suffered.
B. Recognizing the Danger to Women at Separation
Recognizing the assault on separation can help disentangle a
number of complex legal issues in cases in which women have been
killed or harmed. In some areas of substantive law, identifying separa-
tion assault will change the questions posed by the court in its deci-
sionmaking process. In other doctrinal areas, the shift in time frame
made possible by highlighting the assault on separation can change
judicial comprehension of the assault on the woman or of the
probability that more assaults may occur. Separation assault may
also, as in contested custody actions, help reveal underlying motiva-
tions in the legal action itself.
Restraining Orders
In some jurisdictions, when women seek orders of protection
331. Court Rules in Favor of Abused WIf4 11 RESPONSE TO THE VICTIMZATION OF WO-
MEN AND CHiLDREN No. 3, 19 (1988).
332. Balistrer:4 901 F.2d at 698. It seems (from dates given for violent episodes) that the first
beating mentioned in the complaint may have taken place in close connection with separation,
but the facts in the opinion do not demonstrate this clearly.
333. The second amended opinion in Balistreri uses the present tense here - "from whom
she is now divorced," 901 F.2d at 698 - but the first opinion used the past tense, 855 F.2d at
1423. The past tense is likely correct here, since both opinions refer to her "former husband"
during this period.
334. 901 F.2d at 698.
335. 901 F.2d at 698.
336. Balistreri won her appeal pro se; her lawyer had refused to continue working on the case
after the initial dismissal for failure to state a claim. 855 F.2d at 1423.
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against violent men, courts routinely grant mutual orders of protection
rather than orders specifically protecting the women.3 37 Mutual or-
ders of protection direct each party not to assault, endanger, or
threaten the other.338 If mutual orders are violated, police officers be-
lieve they must either arrest both parties or do nothing. The New
York Task Force on Women in the Courts concluded that a woman
with a mutual order of protection is in a worse position than a woman
with no order at all, since the mutual order makes her look equally
violent in the eyes of the courts, and the husband may not be held
responsible if there is another violent incident. Also, it may be harder
for her to obtain a more restrictive order if the violence recurs.339 The
Task Force concluded that this was particularly dangerous if the mu-
tual order was granted when the woman had requested protection for
herself at the same time she filed an action to end the marriage - an
especially dangerous period.340 Even in jurisdictions that do not rou-
tinely grant mutual orders, battering men may make cross-accusations
of violence against battered women. While many battered women do
fight back against their husbands, their violence is largely defensive
and less severe than the men's violence - yet since it is also described
as "violence," these allegations can prove troubling and confusing to
judges.341
If we understood better the particular attacks women face at sepa-
ration, courts could sort both cross-accusations of violence and re-
quests for mutual orders of protection by examining the nature of
current threats and the history of violence in relation to the issue of
separation. The question then becomes: "Which of these people needs
her [or his] capacity to separate protected?" Answering this question
will help sort the dangers and should result in the grant of appropriate
protective orders.
Duty to Warn
Recognizing the common occurrence of separation assault may
also clarify professionals' duty to warn potential victims. For exam-
ple, the Jablonski court upheld the district court's finding that the psy-
chiatrists committed malpractice in failing to get Jablonski's records
and failing to warn Kimball of his potential for violence.342 Applying
337. New York Task Force Report, supra note 51, at 38.
338. Id.
339. Id at 39.
340. Id. at 40.
341. Saunders, supra note 38, at 103-08.
342. Jablonski by PahIs v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 90:1
Legal Images of Battered Women
the concept of separation assault does not disturb this holding. Her
foreseeability as a victim would be even clearer. However, the clergy-
man and doctors who advised Kimball to leave Jablonski might also
have had a duty to warn her about extra care to be exercised in sepa-
rating from a homicidal man, as well as a duty to warn her of his
dangerousness.
In Garcia v. Superior Court,343 Johnson's murder of his first wife
was a separation assault of exactly the type that Johnson had
threatened against Morales. The parole officer misrepresented John-
son's danger to Morales with respect to the very issue of measures
regarding separation. Although the parole officer was legally barred
from telling anyone the exact crime for which Johnson had previously
been imprisoned, 344 the court fails to reckon with the implications of
the outright falsehood embodied in the parole officer's statement that
Johnson's prior conviction was not for anything that endangered
Morales' children. 345
A telling quote in the Garcia dissent shows that judges may inap-
propriately assume that separation assaults will inevitably culminate
in murder: the court below had concluded "it [was] highly speculative
to assume that [Morales] could have accomplished any improvement
in her security. The frightening reality is that for one in Morales's
position there is frequently nothing she can do to protect herself. '346
When courts rely on their own intuitions to state "truths" regarding
violence against women, the dangers of cultural stereotyping are se-
vere.347 A sense of the dangers of separation should have led the court
to emphasize the need not to mislead Morales as to her safety and to
recognize the implications of consciously identifying the assault on
separation.
343. 789 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1990).
344. 789 P.2d at 962 n.2.
345. The children are suing for the loss of their mother;, both the possibility of her murder
and the possibility of harm to themselves in the course of a murderous attack were "danger"
shown by Johnson's prior conviction.
346. Garcia v. Superior Court, 249 Cal. Rptr. 449, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), quoted in 789
P.2d 960 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the majority opinion for essen-
tially adopting the same view the intermediate appellate court had held. 789 P.2d at 970 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
347. See, eg., Susan Mann, The Universe and the Library: A Critique of James Boyd White as
Writer and Reader, 41 STAN. L. REv. 959, 1004 (1989) (describing oral argument during which a
judge in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted that violent couples usually reconciled, regard-
ing a case in which a man killed his separated partner). Mann argues for the attempt to reach
judges emotionally (through use of narrative). This has some conceptual similarity to my sug-
gested use of a cultural concept to convince judges of the danger to women.
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Custody Determinations: Understanding Dominance and Time-
Framing Assault
The concept of separation assault provides insight into the difficult
bargains women strike during custody determinations. Women may
accept mutual orders of protection, rather than orders that specifically
protect them against their batterers, in exchange for the husband's
agreement not to contest custody.348 Courts often award joint custody
to batterers, and some courts that do not perceive violence against the
mother as an aspect of the custody determination may even award
them sole custody. 349 The problem is exacerbated for battered women
by the professional analyses of the social workers in whom the court
vests the power to evaluate women, and by the possibility that the
judge will share a stereotypical, stigmatizing image of battered women.
Separation assault provides a link between past violence and cur-
rent legal disputes by illuminating the custody action as part of an
ongoing attempt, through physical violence and legal manipulation, 350
to force the woman to make concessions or return to the violent part-
ner. It reveals the potential for continuing danger from a batterer who
may not have struck out physically in the recent past. Threats against
the woman's separation attempts may reveal that the "domestic" vio-
lence has outlasted the marriage. Recognizing separation assault can
therefore help judges understand the relevance of past violence and
threats, and the relevance of the nature of present attacks, to custody
cases. Also, when there is evidence of violent separation assault, a
judge could give more intense scrutiny to the motives behind custody
disputes and reconsider the appropriateness of joint custody awards or
liberal visitation decrees. This would help diminish "legal separation
assault" in custody cases. Finally, by remaking the cultural concept of
separation, we may hope to affect positively the evaluation of women
by the social workers in whom the legal system places so much power.
Judging the Wfe-Killer: Time-Framing, Provocation, and the
Nature of the Assault
In Berry, the defendant's arguments for a jury instruction on prov-
ocation depended entirely upon his statements that his wife had
taunted him sexually and provoked her own murder.351 In fact, he did
348. New York Task Force Report, supra note 51, at 40 n.84.
349. Id. at 41-42; Achieving Equal Justice, supra note 41, at 37 (less than half of judges
surveyed viewed spousal abuse as a reason not to award joint custody).
350. Batterers may seek custody as part of an overall attempt to continue controlling the
woman and to punish her for separating. Walker & Edwall, supra note 200, at 140.
351. People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 778-80 (Cal. 1976).
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not kill her when she taunted him, but when she left him. 352 Recog-
nizing separation assault expands the relevant time frame to show his
behavior was consistent with numerous prior assaults that seem at
least as responsive to her departure as to sexual provocation. He had
violently assaulted his first wife as well. 353 Berry is cited for its hold-
ing that twenty hours of waiting in the apartment - some days after
his wife's last "provocative" conduct - was not as a matter of law too
long a period to permit an instruction on provocation. The court
might have viewed the case differently had the assault on separation
been as cognizable as his response to her alleged sexual taunts: it is
difficult to find "heat-of-passion" in a repeatedly attempted assault
carried out over a period of time.354
A short time frame favors men in these cases, as it does in many
types of cases, by removing violence from a context of power and
struggle.3 55 Prior-attacks on the woman's attempts to separate may
essentially be rehearsals for the final killing.356 Alternatively, the
long-term assault on her separation may be perceived as one ongoing
attack. If only the final, deadly assault is cognizable, the nature of the
assault as an attack on separation, rather than on the woman's sexual
provocation, may remain disguised.357 Separation assault can there-
fore change the time frame within which the man's mental state is to
be evaluated by changing the perception of the ways in which the wo-
man's autonomy is under attack.
C. Live Women and Dead Men: The Self-Defense Cases
The self-defense cases, which often have an extraordinarily high
level of violence against women, have exercised a powerful influence
on the literature on battering. Expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome and learned helplessness was first introduced to explain the
352. 556 P.2d at 780-81.
353. He stabbed her with a kitchen knife. Berry's account of his assault on his first wife
shows that both sexual jealousy and fear of separation were present in that relationship as well.
Reporter's Transcript, at 252-53 (on file with author).
354. In Terrifying Lov, Lenore Walker describes a case in which the judge found the wo-
man's act of separation to have been provocation for the man's murderous attack. The case was
later reversed, however. WALKER, supra note 11, at 66-69.
355. See supra text accompanying note 350 (custody cases); infra notes 371-77 and accompa-
nying text (self-defense cases).
,. 356. I am indebted to Donna Coker for suggesting this possibility. Conversation with Donna
Coker, supra note 67.
357. This is a similar process to the criticism of sociological studies that only examine an
accretion of acts of violence stripped of context and thereby distort the severity and meaning of
acts of domestic violence. See Hoff, supra note 101, at 271-72.
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woman's actions and mental state in these cases. 358 The idea that the
woman should have left the relationship, and especially the idea that
she failed to leave, shapes the courts' analyses of many aspects of self-
defense cases, including the reasonableness of the woman's perceptions
and reactions, the imminence of the threat of death or great bodily
harm, and her duty to retreat from the confrontation. In this section I
first examine the relationship between the concepts of separation as-
sault and learned helplessness. I then illustrate the relevance of the
concept of separation assault to the issues of imminent danger and the
reasonableness of the woman's perception that self-defense is
necessary.
Learned Helplessness Revisited: The Bars of the Cage
Expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome often notes the
danger of women's moves to separate from violent relationships. In a
recent case,359 a California appellate court summarized Lenore
Walker's testimony on battered woman's syndrome, describing the
syndrome as the natural result of trauma to women. The court set
forth an analysis of why women "stay in the abusive relationship,"
including some emphasis on the dangers of separation:
Terminating the relationship usually has adverse economic conse-
quences. Separating from a battering partner may be very dangerous,
and the battered woman is aware of the danger. The batterer may have
threatened to kill the battered woman or to abscond with the children if
she leaves. Many battered women have tried to leave and been unsuc-
cessful. In a battering relationship, the woman loses self-esteem, is terri-
fied, and does not have the psychological energy to leave, resulting in
"learned helplessness" and "a kind of psychological paralysis." 36°
The court described a woman's "learned helplessness" as caused by
random and unpredictable violence, which led her to believe that she
was "incapable of doing anything to prevent the abuse." This court
received a sophisticated explanation of the impact battering has on
women. Yet, as the court in turn explains the woman's situation, the
objective difficulties of leaving and subjective fear and helplessness are
both present, but seem unrelated.
358. See, eg., State v. Kelly: Amicus Briefs, supra note 8; supra notes 138-48 and accompa-
nying text.
359. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). In Aris, the defendant had shot
and killed her sleeping husband. She appealed the exclusion of portions of proffered expert testi-
mony on battered women and the refusal to offer jury instructions on perfect self-defense. 264
Cal. Rptr. at 171.
360. 264 Cal. Rptr. at 178. Other factors listed by the court included periodic positive rein-
forcement during the "loving contrition" stage of the battering cycle, and cultural training of all
women to be peacekeepers, playing optimistic and hopeful roles in relationships. 264 Cal. Rptr.
at 178.
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Despite its generally sympathetic attention to Walker's testimony
on battered woman syndrome, the court found harmless error in ex-
cluding her further testimony, which would have linked battered wo-
man syndrome with "the psychological symptoms and the
psychological impact on the person's state of mind at the time of the
homicide.1361 According to the court, no jury could have found that
the defendant was in imminent danger of harm from her sleeping hus-
band at the time she shot him.362 Although separation assaults had
occurred,363 the court did not weigh these past assaults on her capac-
ity to leave when finding no imminent danger from his threat to kill
her.
Learned helplessness is in essence a theory of deficiency at perceiv-
ing exit. Separation assault confirms the difficulties of exit. Separation
assault does not contradict the possibility of developing learned help-
lessness; the woman's subjective belief could still overestimate the diffi-
culties of leaving. Naming separation assault implies no attempt to
measure the accuracy at any particular moment of a particular wo-
man's belief in the possibility or practicality of separation. Rather, by
supporting the woman's rational perception of danger, the concept of
separation assault supports that aspect of battered woman's syndrome
which emphasizes the woman's reasonableness and the normal charac-
ter of her reaction to violence.
Separation assault is also consistent with the behavioral psychol-
ogy experiments underlying learned helplessness theory.364 Walker's
discussion of Seligman's dog experiment barely mentions the cages in
which the dogs were held.365 Yet if the dogs had not been trapped, the
shocks could not have had the same debilitating effect. Walker also
described a less famous learned helplessness experiment in which baby
rats were repeatedly held until they ceased struggling: when placed in
water, the rats drowned because they sank immediately or gave up
swimming soon. The rats were not shocked - it was essentially an
experiment in captivity. 366 Captivity is an important though under-
361. 264 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
362. 264 Cal. Rptr. at 181. The night of the killing, he said he did not think he would let her
live until morning. 264 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
363. The defendant had repeatedly left her husband, but "[b]y a mixture of threats and cajol-
ing, he invariably convinced her to take him back." 264 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
364. LENORE WALKER, supra note 40, at 45-47.
365. In derivative descriptions of learned helplessness, the cages may virtually disappear as a
factor in creating helplessness. See, ag., GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 12, at 13 ("The ani-
mals after a series of intermittent electric shocks, eventually became immobilized. They could
not escape from their cages even when an open route was provided for them.").
366. LENORE WALKER, supra note 40, at 46-47.
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emphasized component of learned helplessness - not merely the re-
sult of a psychological process that makes a woman unable to get out.
The question "why didn't she leave?" reflects a cultural failure to
recognize the bars that imprison the woman in a violent marriage.
Since separation assault appears in the cases where women are killed
or harmed as well as the self-defense cases, the concept of separation
assault helps reveal the real and deadly constraints within which
learned helplessness develops. The concept of separation assault thus
does not challenge the concepts of battered woman's syndrome and
learned helplessness. Rather, it explains the experience of many wo-
men who may not fit well with the phenomena that distinguish learned
helplessness.3 67 For example, in Fennell v. Goolsby,368 a federal dis-
trict court described Karen Anne Fennell as an atypical battered wo-
man because she had obtained a court order to have her husband
ejected from the home and had been separated for six months.369 She
had suffered incessant threats and harassment during the separa-
tion.370 The concept of separation assault would have helped refute
the court's assumption that typical battered women do not seek court
orders and emphasized the need for expert testimony to explain to the
jury the link between Karen Anne Fennell's experience and that of
other battered women.
Finally, naming separation assault cannot end the need for expert
testimony on the subject of battered woman's syndrome and learned
helplessness. Collectively, the jury can only "know" what it is possible
for them to discuss. Women will still find it impossible to incorporate
our own experience in the jury room unless the lens through which we
perceive battered women has been entirely transformed. Men will also
remain unable to discuss their experience as witnesses to violence
against women or their capacity to seek control violently. As long as
we have no way to discuss or understand the violence many of us have
experienced - or to sort out what we have heard from others - there
remains a critical need for expert testimony to explain to the jury
things beyond their capacity for collective knowledge and discussion,
even if these things are within their individual personal experience.
367. Blackman, supra note 3, at 127-28 (noting that even severely battered women may not
fit the images described by battered woman syndrome and learned helplessness descriptions).
368. 630 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
369. 630 F. Supp. at 459-60 & n.4.
370. 630 F. Supp. at 457. The court found it had been error to exclude battered woman's
syndrome testimony, but not constitutional error for purposes of habeas corpus. 630 F. Supp. at
460-61. Even if it were constitutional error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because
two psychiatrists testified to her mental state. 630 F. Supp. at 461.
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Questions of Timing, Captivity, and "Objective" Perception
The concept of "separation assault" brings the ghosts of dead wo-
men - women slain by their abusers - into court to stand beside the
woman accused of killing an abusive spouse. The facts behind many,
perhaps most,371 self-defense cases reveal that the woman's separation
has been repeatedly and successfully attacked before she finally kills
her abuser. 372 With its implicit reminder of women killed during sepa-
ration attacks, the concept of separation assault makes sense of the
woman's fear of death and her compliance in the face of the violence
that ended her previous separations. Further, by describing an assault
that by its nature takes place over time, the concept of separation as-
sault extends the time frame weighed by the court and expands the
relevance of past attacks on the woman.373 Finally, of crucial impor-
371. We will not know how many are separation attacks until we ask question designed to
elicit information about the various types of assault leveled against the woman's moves to sepa-
rate. The facts that appear in court opinions may include some - but not all - of the ways the
woman's separation was attacked.
372. Ann Jones vividly describes the assaults on the efforts to separate of many women who
ultimately killed battering men, either during or after the separation attack, often after being held
prisoner or prevented from leaving at all in a variety of ways:
Homicide is a last resort, and it most often occurs when men simply will not quit. As
one woman testified at her murder trial, "It seemed like the more I tried to get away, the
harder he beat me." Gloria Timmons left her husband, but he kept tracking her down,
raping and beating her, finally when he attacked her with a screwdriver, she shot him. Pa-
tricia Evans filed for divorce, but her husband kept coming back to beat her with a dog
chain, pistol-whip her, and shoot at her. At last, after she had been hospitalized seven times,
she shot him .... Janice Strand was forced to return to her husband when he threatened her
parents' lives. Patricia Gross' husband tracked her from Michigan to Mississippi and
threatened to kill her relatives there to force her to return to him.... Mary McGuire's
husband, teaching submission, made her watch him dig her grave, kill the family cat, and
decapitate a pet horse. When she fled he brought her back with a gun held to her child's
head.... Agnes Scott's husband found her and cut her up seven years after she left him.
There are cases on record of men still harassing and beating their wives twenty-five years
after the wives left them and tried to go into hiding. If researchers were not quite so intent
upon assigning the pathological behavior to the women, they might see that the more telling
question is not "Why do the women stay?" but 'Why don't the men let them go?"
JoNEs, supra note 21, at 298-99.
373. Shifting the time frame may also be useful in jurisdictions that impose a duty to retreat
before using deadly force in self-defense. Retreat can be reconceptualized as a question of the
scope of the attack. First, the prevalence of separation attack means that retreat may only stimu-
late the man's violence. Second, by expanding the description of the time period involved in the
assault on the woman, the concept of separation assault helps move toward dynamic portrayal of
the power and control in the relationship. Finally, recognizing separation assault would permit
us to arge that a woman need only fulfill her duty to retreat once - that she need not retreat an
unlimited number of times from dangerous assaults - and that any woman who has had her
separation violently attacked has already fulfilled her duty to retreat. For this question, at least,
the proof of past separation assault could itself be taken as the answer to a legal question.
Although only a minority of states impose a duty to retreat when an individual is attacked in
the home by another legal resident of that home, see Thomas Katheder, Case Note, Lovers and
Other Strangers: Or, When Is a House a Castle, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 465, 473-74 nn.40-41
(1983), the question "why didn't she leave" is, subtextually, a question of retreat any time it is
posed in relation to the period directly preceding the assault, rather than to the woman's role in
the entire relationship. See Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Jurors' Ken: Battered Wo-
men, 7 VT. L. REv. 1, 5 (1982). Retreat is a hidden question in cases like Stewart and Norman
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tance in women's self-defense claims, this reconceptualization of the
assault on the woman helps clarify the existence of imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm.
Imminence has proved crucial in cases involving the death of
sleeping husbands. Two states have recently held that women who
shot sleeping husbands were not entitled to jury instructions on self-
defense because the woman faced no imminent danger of death or
grave bodily harm. 374 This meaning of imminent harm is not univer-
sal. "Imminent" is often distinguished from "immediate," and courts
and scholars have criticized decisions that confuse the two.375 The
Model Penal Code does not require that the danger actually be imme-
diate: rather, the actor must believe that the defensive action is imme-
diately necessary and that the force against which she defends will be
used on the present occasion, "but he [sic] need not apprehend that it
will be immediately used."1376 Some states have overturned jury in-
structions that required that the attack on the woman pose an "imme-
diate" danger of death or great bodily harm, and have upheld
statutory standards that require only that the harm be "imminent," a
term that broadens the context to include more of the facts and cir-
cumstances of the woman's experience in the relationship. 377 Even
when a statute required "immediate danger," one court has required
an overall consideration of the woman's circumstances and described
as "imminent," rather than immediate, the threat necessary to justify
the use of deadly force.378 Therefore, the recent decisions construing
imminence as virtually equivalent to immediacy place significant limits
on the ability of women to raise claims that they acted in self-defense.
in which the woman's ability to leave the house rather than shoot her abuser is explicitly raised
by the majority opinions. State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 578 (Kan. 1988); State v. Norman, 378
S.E.2d 8, 13 (N.C. 1989). By shifting the lens to emphasize prior assaults on separation, women
who have fled in the past can be shown to have fulfilled a duty to retreat - whether this duty is
explicitly imposed by law or implicitly read into a situation by the way a judge perceived the
facts.
374. Stewart, 763 P.2d at 573; Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 8-9; see also People v. Axis, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
375. See, eg., Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 13 (noting that interpreting "imminent" to mean "im-
mediate" effectively denies a woman the right to self-defense); GILLESPIE, supra note 11, at 64-
77, 185-87; see also State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 570-71 (Kan. 1986). But see Cathryn Jo
Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Wo-
men Who Kill, 36 Am. U. L. REv. 11, 29 n.107 (common law usually equated imminence with
immediacy, though Model Penal Code does not).
376. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. 2(c)(1985), quoted in Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 19 n.1
(Martin, J., dissenting).
377. See GILLESPIE, supra note 11, at 185-87; see also Hodges, 716 P.2d 563; State v. Osbey,
710 P.2d 676 (Kan. 1985), State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985).
378. State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); see also State v. Wanrow, 559
P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977). The jury instruction using an immediacy standard was held to overly
restrict the inquiry into the defendant's circumstances. 559 P.2d at 555-56.
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State v. Stewart 379 is the latest in a line of Kansas cases to grapple
with the meaning of "imminent" and the relevant context for evaluat-
ing the woman's action. Stewart marks a return to a requirement of
immediacy despite a factual background that strongly suggested an
expanded contextual approach was relevant. Peggy Stewart married
Mike Stewart in 1974.380 She had two young daughters, Carla and
Laura, from previous marriages. Mike was abusive from the begin-
ning. Peggy soon developed severe psychological problems and was
treated for schizophrenia.381 Mike tampered with her medication,
forcing her to take too much at times and to do without her medica-
tion at other times.3 82 Mike severely abused Peggy's daughter Carla.
When he ordered Peggy to kill and bury Carla, Peggy filed for di-
vorce,3 3 but the case does not indicate that she followed through with
the divorce action. When Carla was twelve years old, Mike threw her
out of the house with "no coat, no money, and no place to go."'38 4 He
forbade Peggy to have any contact with Carla.3 5 Laura left home as
soon as she could.38 6
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Stewart chronicle an
extraordinarily violent and abusive marriage in which Peggy's life was
repeatedly threatened. Mike shot Peggy's cats and then held the gun
to Peggy's head, threatening to shoot;387 another time, he threatened
her with a loaded shotgun. She told her friends she believed he would
kill her one day.388 Finally, Peggy ran away to Laura's house in an-
other state.3 9 Peggy was suicidal, and Laura had her admitted to a
mental hospital, where she was diagnosed as having reacted to an
overdose of her medication.39 Though Peggy told a nurse that she
felt like she wanted to shoot Mike, the nurse noted that Peggy's main
emotion seemed to be hopelessness. 391 Mike telephoned the hospital
379. 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988).
380. 763 P.2d at 574.
381. 763 P.2d at 574.
382. 763 P.2d at 574 (made her take more than prescribed medication); 763 P.2d at 581
(Herd, J., dissenting) (overdosed her on medication and then cut it off).
383. 763 P.2d at 574.
384. 763 P.2d at 574.
385. 763 P.2d at 574.
386. 763 P.2d at 581 (Herd, ., dissenting).
387. 763 P.2d at 575.
388. 763 P.2d at 575.
389. The court states that this was the first time she left Mike without telling him. 763 P.2d
at 575. However, it could not have been her first attempt to separate, since the facts reveal that a
divorce action was at least undertaken at some earlier time.
390. 763 P.2d at 575.
391. 763 P.2d at 581 (Herd, J., dissenting).
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to say he was coming to get her, and she agreed to leave with him.3 92
At trial, she testified that she decided to go with him because the hos-
pital did not provide the medical help she needed. 393
Mike drove Peggy back to Kansas. He told her that "if she ever
ran away again, he would kill her."' 394 He "forced Peggy into the
house and forced her to have oral sex several times" 395 with such force
that the inside of her mouth was bruised396 - that is, he raped her
repeatedly - while telling her how much he preferred other women.
She discovered bullets and a loaded gun, which frightened her because
he had promised to keep his guns unloaded. 397 She hid the gun.398
Mike made repeated remarks indicating that "she would not be there
long, and could not take her things where she was going," which led
her to think that he meant she would soon be dead. 399 He ceased the
abuse for a brief period while his parents came over to visit, then
forced her to perform oral sex again and demanded that she come to
bed with him. As he slept, she heard voices telling her "kill or be
killed." Peggy got the gun she had found and hidden earlier, and she
shot Mike as he slept.40 0
The Kansas Supreme Court held Peggy was not entitled to a jury
instruction on self-defense, since she was in no imminent danger when
she shot Mike. "Under such circumstances, a battered woman cannot
reasonably fear imminent life-threatening danger from her sleeping
spouse." 4 1 The court distinguished three of its prior cases in which
abused women had killed violent husbands. In State v. Hundley,4°2
State v. Osbey,403 and State v. Hodges,40 4 the Kansas Supreme Court
had held that the statutory requirement of imminence permitted con-
sideration of the history and gradual build-up of violence within a re-
lationship as well as the immediate acts of the batterer. Although
392. 763 P.2d at 581 (Herd, J., dissenting).
393. 763 P.2d at 575.
394. 763 P.2d at 581 (Herd, J., dissenting).
395. 763 P.2d at 575.
396. 763 P.2d at 581 (Herd, J., dissenting).
397. 763 P.2d at 575.
398. 763 P.2d at 575.
399. 763 P.2d at 575.
400. 763 P.2d at 575.
401. 763 P.2d at 578. The court also overruled an earlier holding that measured the reasona-
bleness of perception of harm from the subjective viewpoint of the battered woman. 763 P.2d at
579 (overruling in part State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563 (Kan. 1986)). See infra text accompanying
notes 425-27.
402. 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985).
403. 710 P.2d 676 (Kan. 1985).
404. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563.
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none of these had directly confronted the question of the propriety of
giving a self-defense instruction,4°5 they had rejected the use of the
term "immediate" in explaining the imminence standard.4° 6 The
Stewart court did not directly overrule its prior holdings but distin-
guished the previous imminence cases as "involv[ing] a threat of death
to the wife and a violent confrontation between husband and wife,
contemporaneous with the shooting. ' 407 As the Stewart dissent
pointed out, however, this holding effectively replaced the state's prior
definition of "imminent" with an immediacy standard.4° 8
In holding that there was no "imminent" threat to Peggy, the ma-
jority ignored the imprisoning effect of Mike's bringing her back from
another state after her effort to separate and his threat to kill her if she
left again. In contrast, the dissent emphasized Mike's threat to kill
Peggy if she separated from him again.4°9 The concept of an assault
on separation continued over time may help courts appreciate the cru-
cial distinction between imminence and immediacy in self-defense
cases such as Stewart.
Separation assault can help reveal captivity. In Hundley, the Kan-
sas Supreme Court drew an analogy between battered women and hos-
tages or prisoners of war.410 The Stewart dissent repeated this analogy
and argued the Stewart holding would preclude finding imminence in
"a hostage situation where the armed guard inadvertently drops off to
sleep and the hostage grabs his gun and shoots him."'4 11 This could be
a persuasive analogy: If a hostage were told, "you will be killed in
three days," the danger would still appear imminent even if not imme-
diate.412 The question of imminence therefore appears to be affected
by an assessment of the nature and degree of the hostage's captivity;
the persuasive power of the hostage analogy depends on the recogni-
tion that the woman in an abusive relationship is not free to leave. At
issue is our understanding of the woman's functional autonomy. The
key difference between the analysis of the majority and dissent in Stew-
405. 763 P.2d at 578. Hodges. for example, dealt with the language of the self-defense in-
struction. 716 P.2d at 570-71. The state apparently did not object to the giving of a self-defense
instruction in that case.
406. 763 P.2d at 584-85 (Herd, J., dissenting).
407. 763 P.2d at 578.
408. 763 P.2d at 584-85 (Herd, J., dissenting).
409. 763 P.2d at 581 (Herd, J., dissenting).
410. State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985).
411. 763 P.2d at 584 (Herd, J., dissenting).
412. I am indebted to Mary Coombs for this discussion. Conversation with Mary Coombs,
(Sept. 1990); see also MJ. Willoughby, Comment, Rendering Each Woman Her Du=" Can A
Battered Woman Claim Self-Defense When She Kills Her Sleeping Batterer?, 38 U. KAN. L. REv.
169, 184-85 (1990) (comparing battered women to hostages).
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art is how seriously each takes the constraints Mike imposed on
Peggy's capacity to separate.
Had the Stewart majority been able to perceive Mike's successful
assault on Peggy's separation, they could have found a common
thread of separation assault linking Stewart with Hundley, Osbey, and
Hodges.413 In Hundley, the wife shot her husband as he attacked her
in the motel room to which she had moved after leaving him.4 14 In
Osbey, the wife had insisted on a separation after a history of substan-
tial abuse.415 The husband was in the process of moving out when he
changed his mind, telling a friend he had put too much time into his
wife's house and that "it would be either [him] or her."'416 He had
[previously] threatened her with a gun.41 7 She shot him when she
thought he reached for a weapon as he attempted to return some of his
belongings to the apartment.4 18 In Hodges, the wife had continually
left her husband early in their marriage only to have him pursue her
and brutally fetch her back. On one such occasion
[H]e took her to a wooded location where he beat her, broke her jaw,
and said she was either going to live with him or she wasn't going to live.
He left her there unconscious, but eventually returned, took her to the
hospital, and told her to tell the hospital staff she fell down. She re-
turned home with him because he had her children. 419
She finally succeeded in divorcing him but reunited thirteen years later
because he promised he had changed.420 When the beatings did not
stop, she left again; however, when he again brought her back, she
gave up trying to leave him. He had also threatened her family if they
ever helped her leave him.421 She shot him as he engaged in yet an-
other bout of violence.422
The concept of separation assault thus bridges the difference be-
tween cases like Stewart that involve sleeping husbands and those like
Hundley, Osbey, and Hodges that involve waking husbands. In
413. Unsuccessful separation attempts are also present in many other cases on self-defense
and battered woman's syndrome. For example, in State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1986), the woman told the man in the midst of a long day of violence that she was tired of
being hurt and that she would leave him. He "pulled out his gun and threatened to kill her if she
left." 719 P.2d at 1272. Similarly, in Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1983), Jo Smith tried
to flee before her attacker slammed the door on her, finally, she shot him. 277 S.E.2d at 679.
414. 693 P.2d at 476.
415. 710 P.2d at 677-78.
416. 710 P.2d at 678.
417. 710 P.2d at 678.
418. 710 P.2d at 678.
419. 716 P.2d at 566-67.
420. 716 P.2d at 566-67.
421. 716 P.2d at 567.
422. 716 P.2d at 567.
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Hodges, expert testimony on battered women was allowed in part to
"help dispel the ordinary layperson's perception that a woman in a
battering relationship is free to leave at any time. ' 423 This same "per-
ception" clearly underlies the majority opinion in Stewart, which, in
deciding that Peggy was not in imminent danger, specifically noted
that Peggy had access to the car keys - without reviewing the threat
to her life if she used them to escape.424
Finally, the Stewart opinion emphasized a requirement of objective
reasonableness in the battered woman's self-defense claims. In
Hodges, Kansas had held that "the jury must determine, from the
viewpoint of the defendant's mental state, whether defendant's belief
in the need to defend herself was reasonable." 425 Stewart overruled
Hodges on this point, holding that after determining whether the de-
fendant subjectively sincerely and honestly believed it necessary to kill
in self-defense, "We then use an objective standard to determine
whether defendant's belief was reasonable - specifically, whether a
reasonable person in defendant's circumstances would have perceived
self-defense as necessary. ' 426 The objective standard to be applied is
how a "reasonably prudent battered wife" would have perceived the
aggressor's demeanor.4 27 Separation assault is important here as well.
The cultural redefinition of the dangers of separation goes beyond the
individual woman's "subjective" perception of danger; it does not
merely bolster her argument that under her particular, individual cir-
cumstances, her subjective perceptions (though unreasonable for a
"normal person") persuaded her of danger. Rather, separation assault
helps shift what judges and jurors "objectively" know as truth: To the
extent that objective standards embody in law the shared cultural
norms of society, separation assault helps restructure those norms to
allow "objective" perception itself to track more closely the painfully
accrued understanding of women who have lived with violent
partners.
A recent North Carolina self-defense case involving a sleeping hus-
band exemplifies perhaps even more dramatically than Stewart the ur-
gent need for a better judicial understanding of separation assault. In
State v. Norman,428 a North Carolina court of appeals held that a wo-
man who had shot her sleeping husband was entitled to a jury instruc-
423. 716 P.2d at 567.
424. State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988).
425. State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563 (Kan. 1985).
426. 763 P.2d at 579.
427. 763 P.2d at 579.
428. 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), revd., 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
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tion on perfect self-defense. The North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed, holding that there was no imminent danger to the wife.429
Judy Norman had been subjected to vicious torture and degradation
over a period of twenty years. Her husband, John Thomas (J.T.) Nor-
man, had beaten her, thrown objects at her, put out cigarettes on her
skin, and broken glass on her face. He forced her to prostitute herself
daily to support him and then ridiculed her to family and friends. He
called her a "dog," forced her to bark like a dog, eat pet food out of
pet dishes, and sleep on the floor.430 He deprived her of food for days
at a time and had "often stated both to defendant and others that he
would kill [her] ... [and] threatened to cut her heart out."431 She left
him several times, but each time he found her, took her home, and
beat her.432
The thirty-six hours before Judy Norman shot her husband were
marked by incredible violence, which escalated after her husband was
arrested for drunken driving. He beat her almost continuously, re-
fused to eat food that her hands had touched, refused to let her eat for
a period of days, threatened to cut off her breast and "shove it up her
rear end, '433 and put out a cigarette on her chest.
On the first evening after the drunken driving arrest, Judy called
the police for help. An officer told her they could only help if she filed
a complaint ("[took] out a warrant on her husband"). 434 She replied
that "if she did so [her husband] would kill her." 435 An hour later, she
swallowed a bottle of "nerve" pills, 4 36 and her family called for help.
Her husband told the paramedics to let her die and repeatedly ob-
structed their attempts to save her.437 The police did not arrest him
for attempting to block her rescue: "When he refused to respond to
the officer's warning that if he continued to hinder the attendants, he
would be arrested, the officer was compelled to chase him back into
the house. '438 At the hospital, Judy Norman spoke to a therapist and
discussed filing charges against her husband and having him commit-
ted for treatment.439 She seemed depressed and said she should kill
429. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989).
430. 378 S.E.2d at 9-10.
431. 366 S.E.2d at 587.
432. 366 S.E.2d at 589.
433. 366 S.E.2d at 588.
434. 378 S.E.2d at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting).
435. 378 S.E.2d at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting).
436. 366 S.E.2d at 588.
437. 366 S.E.2d at 588.
438. 378 S.E.2d at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting).
439. 378 S.E.2d at 10 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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him for what he had done to her. She stayed at her grandmother's
that night.440
The next day, she went to the mental health center to discuss
charges and the possibility of her husband's commitment and "con-
fronted [him] with that possibility."'441 Her husband told her that if he
saw them coming to take him away, he would cut her throat before he
could be committed.442 She went to apply for welfare benefits,443 but
her husband followed her there, interrupted her interview, and forced
her to return home with him.44 He continued to beat her and abuse
her physically and would not permit her to eat or feed her children.445
He later lay down to take a nap, but made her lie on the concrete floor
next to the bed, because "dogs" couldn't lie on beds. 446 While he
slept, her infant grandchild began to cry. She took the baby to her
mother's house for fear it would awaken him. Judy's mother had
placed a gun in her purse from fear of Judy's husband. At her
mother's house, Judy asked for an aspirin, found the gun, returned
home, and shot him.447
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that
all of the evidence tended to show that the defendant had ample time
and opportunity to resort to other means of preventing further abuse by
her husband. There was no action underway by the decedent from
which the jury could have found that the defendant had reasonable
grounds to believe either that a felonious assault was imminent or that it
might result in her death or great bodily injury. Additionally, no such
action by the decedent had been underway immediately prior to his fall-
ing asleep.448
It is hard to know where to begin to discuss Norman. In the face
of all the grave danger and murderous violence the opinion over-
looks,449 it seems presumptuous to claim that the concept of separa-
440. 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting).
441. 378 S.E.2d at 11.
442. 378 S.E.2d at 11.
443. 378 S.E.2d at 11. This may have been another separation attempt
444. 378 S.E.2d at 11.
445. 378 S.E.2d at 11.
446. 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting).
447. 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting).
448. 378 S.E.2d at 13.
449. In Norman, so much disappears from both the majority and dissenting opinions. Forced
prostitution - essentially, third-party rape - must by the terms of the discussion have been
considered something other than "great bodily harm." Or, perhaps, since she had experienced
this particular bodily harm for many years, it no longer amounted to "great" harm. The Norman
court indicated that the type of harm required was "life-threatening" injury and denied that her
husband had inflicted any such harm on her, "even during the 'reign of terror.'" 378 S.E.2d at
15. In addition, the facts of the case show that he had prevented her from eating for three days
and had given no indication of when he might permit her to eat again. Surely this also
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tion assault could have remade the Norman holding. Yet the idea that
Judy Norman was not captive is crucial to the majority's finding that
she faced no imminent threat. The dissent is clearly groping for just
such a concept in its attempt to describe what had happened to her.
The dissent first quotes a psychologist, an expert witness, who com-
pared Judy Norman to a brainwashed prisoner of war and described
her as "a woman incarcerated by abuse, by fear, and by her conviction
that her husband was invincible and inescapable.. .,:450
Mrs. Norman didn't leave because she believed, fully believed that es-
cape was totally impossible. There was no place to go .... [S]he had
left before; he had come and gotten her. She had gone to the Depart-
ment of Social Services. He had come and gotten her. The law, she
believed the law could not protect her, no one could protect her, and I
must admit, looking over the records, that there was nothing done that
would contradict that belief.451
The concept of separation assault addresses a major problem with
sleeping husband cases like Norman and Stewart. These cases look to
courts like executions; judges express concern over the specter of
homicidal self-help for battered vives.4 52 Separation assault replaces
this image - as the dissenting judges in Stewart urged - with the
paradigm of hostages resisting their captors. We believe the danger to
a hostage is imminent both because the force used to hold them there
is apparent and because our cultural knowledge includes the memory
of the many hostages who have been harmed in the past. Courts
might see Judy Norman very differently if they understood that she
could as easily be Mrs. Godfrey (shot to death in her mother's trailer),
or Rachel Pessah (the dead wife in Beny), or Grace Morales (the mur-
dered mother in Garcia). By emphasizing the similarities between past
and current uses of force, by emphasizing that force which holds the
woman captive, and by persuasively invoking the shadow of many past
threatened great bodily harm. Also, the day before he died, her husband had essentially at-
tempted her murder: rather than fulfilling his duty to save her life when she attempted suicide,
he had done all he could to cause her to die and prevent others from saving her. He had sworn
persuasively to her and to others that he would kill her in the future. Her whole family was
convinced that he would kill her, and would kill them if they intervened. 378 S.E.2d at 19-20
(Martin, J., dissenting).
450. 378 S.E.2d at 17 (Martin, J., dissenting).
451. 378 S.E.2d at 17 (Martin, J., dissenting). The dissent concludes that a juror could have
found "that defendant believed that her husband's threats to her life were viable, that serious
bodily harm was imminent, and that it was necessary to kill her husband to escape that harm ...
[a] juror could find defendant's belief in the necessity to kill her husband not merely reasonable
but compelling." 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting).
452. See eg., Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 15 ("Homicidal self-help would then become a lawful
solution, and perhaps the easiest and most effective solution, to this problem."); see also State v.
Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988) ("To hold otherwise in this case would in effect allow the
execution of the abuser for past or future acts and conduct.").
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assaults that have resulted in the death of women, separation assault
helps shift the paradigm from the image of vigilantism to the image of
a hostage resisting her own death. Here, at the intersection of legal
standards and cultural perception, separation assault helps to reveal
that by its very nature battering implicates questions of both violence
and power, and to make possible a greater cultural understanding of
the lives and experience of women.
CONCLUSION
Violence is a way of "doing power" in a relationship;453 battering
is power and control marked by violence and coercion. A battered
woman is a woman who experiences the violence against her as deter-
mining or controlling her thoughts, emotions, or actions, including her
efforts to cope with the violence itself. Many, many women experience
such violence in our society. The precise response of any woman is
likely to be determined by her life circumstances and family situation.
We should know this. Nothing in the preceding paragraph should
make women ashamed of being battered. However, the interrelation-
ship among cultural images, legal images, litigation, and substantive
law has made it difficult for women to understand our experience of
violence. The stereotypical image of a battered woman - dysfunc-
tional, helpless, dependent - is alien to the self-image and self-knowl-
edge of most women who encounter violence from our partners.
Attempts to counter these stereotypes have interacted with other con-
temporary social and legal developments: each block of legal reform
(such as the development of expert testimony on battered women) has
interacted with the rest of the legal structure (such as the advent of no-
fault divorce, or the evidentiary rules governing the admission of ex-
pert testimony) to pose continued difficulties in recognizing women's
experience in law.
These reciprocal, mutually reinforcing forces of popular percep-
tion, law, and litigation have made it difficult for women to identify
ourselves and our experience as part of a continuum of power and
domination affecting most women's lives. The challenge is to identify
legal and social strategies that will allow us to change law and culture
simultaneously, by illuminating the context of power and control
within which a woman lives and acts. Naming separation assault can
help reveal the overall struggle for power that is the heart of the bat-
tering process: it describes a particularly dangerous attack hitherto
hidden in the phrase "domestic violence," emphasizes the assault on
453. STETs, supra note 64, at 109.
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the woman's autonomy and volition, and offers insights that can help
resolve several troubled areas of law. This intervention is both legal
and cultural, a way to rewrite legal doctrine by changing the way we
understand the questions and categories involved.
I offer the theory of separation assault as part of a feminist ap-
proach to law reform in this area: working from women's experience,
we must develop legal and cultural strategies that more clearly reveal
the struggles we face. We need many such interventions. The key to
more widespread change lies in the way transformed legal and social
images of women will in turn affect women's experience and under-
standing of our lives, allowing women to recognize our experience as
part of a larger system of subordination so that we can structure our
understanding of our needs in relation to those of other women facing
oppression. Women's recognition of our own oppression has been
slowed by the images that law has helped create. As we come to rec-
ognize our experiences as oppression, rather than personal insuffi-
ciency, weakness, or "unhappiness" in marriage - for example,
recognizing separation assault rather than "failure" to leave a relation-
ship - we will be better able to address the dangers we face and real-
ize our individual and collective capacity for change.
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